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Researchers consistently find that youths who work longer hours during high 
school tend to have higher rates of crime and substance use. On the basis of this and other 
research showing the negative developmental impact of an “intensive” work commitment 
during high school, the National Research Council (1998) recommended that federal 
lawmakers place limits on the maximum number of hours per week that teenagers are 
allowed to work during the school year. However, recent empirical research demonstrates 
the possibility of severe bias due to failure to control for unobserved sources of 
heterogeneity.  
I take advantage of two unique characteristics of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1997 to assess the veracity of the claim that longer work hours are 
causally related to elevated involvement in crime and substance use. First, since the same 
respondents are followed over a period of five years, I use individual fixed effects to 
adjust for the omission of relevant time-stable covariates. Second, I exploit state-to-state 
variation in the restrictiveness of child labor laws governing the number of hours per 
week allowed during the school year, and the fact that these restrictions are relaxed (and 
eventually expire) with increasing age. In this model—based on a fixed-effects 
instrumental variables (FEIV) estimator—identification of the “work intensity effect” on 
problem behavior is predicated on exogenous within-individual variation in school-year 
work hours attributable to the easing of child labor restrictions as youths age out of their 
legal status as minors. The attractiveness of the FEIV estimator is its ability to eliminate 
bias in the estimated “work intensity effect” due to omitted stable and dynamic variables. 
The model thus provides an especially powerful test of the thesis that intensive 
employment during the school year causally aggravates involvement in problem 
behavior.  
The empirical results demonstrate that longer work hours are associated with a 
significant decrease in adolescent crime, contrary to virtually all prior research. The 
results for adolescent substance use are mixed, suggesting the possibility that longer work 
hours either increase or have no effect on substance use, depending on whether a fixed-
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The labor market is a major life domain among youths enrolled in high school. 
The ubiquity of high-school employment is illustrated in Figures 1, 2, and 3 using a 
nationally representative sample of American youths. These data are from the first three 
waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, and are generalizable to the 
population of contemporary youth cohorts. Figure 1 provides the employment rate and 
cumulative employment rate by month during the four years of high school. Averaging 
over the nine months of their freshman year of high school, 13 percent of youths are 
employed at least once during the academic year, but this figure increases to 25 percent 
during the sophomore year, 44 percent during the junior year, and 56 percent during the 
senior year. Over the course of these four academic years, 38 percent of youths work 
during any given school month, on average. There is also a very clear seasonal pattern to 
youth employment, as summer months are consistently associated with a 10-point 
increase in the proportion of youths employed (May-to-July comparison).1 A 
consideration of the cumulative employment probabilities further illustrates the dynamic 
nature of the youth labor market. Fully 87 percent of students have ever worked during 
high school by May of their senior year, while only 58 percent are actually employed 
during this month. Thus, less than two-thirds (60%) of youths who have ever worked by 
the end of their senior year are actually employed during this period.  
*** Figure 1 Here *** 
                                                 
1 Notice also that summer work may be “sticky,” in that not all youths who acquire summer jobs 
leave them once the school year commences. Thus, summer work may constitute one gateway to the 
acquisition of more long-term employment. Rothstein (2001) and Oettinger (2000) offer similar 
descriptions of summer work.  
 1
The fact is that almost all youths gain some employment experience during high 
school. This observation is consistent with past youth employment research that finds 
cumulative employment rates of 80 percent and as high as 90 percent (Marsh, 1991; 
National Research Council, 1998; Steinberg and Cauffman, 1995). In addition to the fact 
that most high-school youths work, prior research suggests that a non-trivial proportion 
of employed students work at “high intensity”—a label applied by prior researchers to 
denote employment of over 20 hours per week. Figure 2 provides mean weekly hours of 
work by month among employed youths in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1997, showing that this 20-hour benchmark is surpassed by the spring (March) of the 
sophomore year of high school. The average work commitment continues to increase to 
almost 30 hours per week by May of the senior year. Notice also that the “summer effect” 
on work intensity tends to become less pronounced over the high-school years. Figure 3 
groups work intensity into five-hour intervals (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, etc.) for further 
comparison. Notice that during their freshman year, three of every four employed youths 
(76%) work 20 or fewer hours per week, or what is commonly referred to as “low-
intensity” work. This percentage declines steadily to well under half of employed youths 
by the senior year (45%). Almost one in four employed seniors (23%) is working full 
time at over 35 hours per week. By all appearances, then, by the time they graduate from 
high school, many youths are fully attached to the labor force. 
*** Figures 2 and 3 Here *** 
Folk wisdom suggests that employment during the school year provides a number 
of positive benefits for adolescents, and prior to the early 1980s, educators, policy 
makers, and laypersons were united in the belief that adolescents benefit from exposure 
 2
to the world of adult work. As the thinking went, working structures a youth’s leisure 
time, increases exposure to adult authority figures, fosters independence and maturity, 
teaches responsibility in the use of money, and promotes balancing of multiple 
responsibilities. In fact, a series of “blue ribbon” commissions at the time strongly 
encouraged greater work experience among students for precisely these reasons 
(Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1979; National Commission on 
the Reform of Secondary Education, 1973; National Commission on Youth, 1980; 
National Panel on High School and Adolescent Education, 1976; Panel on Youth of the 
President’s Science Advisory Committee, 1974).2 The statements of one such panel are 
representative: 
The Panel urges the removal of those regulations…that handicap and limit the 
employment of adolescents…. With half the high school group already in the 
work force the Panel’s suggestions seek to facilitate the growth of employment 
opportunities for still more young people as a necessary adjunct to formal 
education. (National Panel on High School and Adolescent Education, 1976:11) 
 
Of particular interest is the fact that one panel—the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies 
in Higher Education (1979)—encouraged greater work experience on the grounds that 
such experience would reduce crime and delinquency.3
                                                 
2 The overriding concern of virtually all of these panels was finding a more effective way of 
bridging the gap between adolescence and adulthood at a time when society was undergoing rapid social 
changes, evidenced by high levels of youth unemployment, crime and drug use, high-school dropout, and 
suicide. The fear was that some groups of young people were not adequately prepared to compete 
successfully in adult institutions, mired as they were in a school-based “youth culture” cut off from other 
traditional socializing institutions of the family, school, workplace, and community. The emphasis was thus 
on minimizing the amount of time that youths spent in a period of transition: “The bridge of time between 
youth and adulthood has become a bridge too long” (National Commission on Youth, 1980:9). Although I 
focus on the labor market recommendations of these commissions, the truth is that the proposed solutions 
were manifold, requiring collective effort on the part of schools, employers, communities, and public 
officials. 
3 Consider the following: “How do young people who are neither in school nor in the labor 
market, or who are unemployed over long periods of time, support themselves? Clearly, crime plays a role” 
(Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1979:65).  
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Ruhm (1995:293), however, explains that the presumed benefits of employment 
were taken for granted, and that these early panel recommendations were “made in the 
absence of hard empirical evidence that increased job-holding caused or even was 
correlated with favorable outcomes.” It thus came as a surprise when an extensive 
empirical literature consistently found that youths that work during high school also tend 
to engage in higher rates of minor delinquency (e.g., theft, vandalism, phony ID), serious 
delinquency (e.g., Index crime, interpersonal aggression, assault), substance use (e.g., 
cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana, cocaine), and school misconduct (e.g., truancy, cheating, 
plagiarism, detention, suspension), and to have higher rates of police contact (e.g., trouble 
with police, arrest).4 Particularly influential was a book by Greenberger and Steinberg 
(1986) that drew lay attention to the manifold adverse correlates of youth employment, 
not the least of which was elevated involvement in problem behavior. On the basis of this 
and other research, just 20 years after the first round of panel recommendations that 
touted the benefits of adolescent employment, the prestigious National Research Council 
(1998:227) was compelled to propose limits on the extensiveness of the youth work 
commitment: 
The Department of Labor should be authorized by Congress to adopt a standard 
limiting the weekly maximum number of hours of work for 16- and 17-year-olds 
during the school year. This standard should be based on the extensive research 
about the adverse effects of high-intensity work while school is in session. 
 
                                                 
4 In fact, over 30 published studies—at least 20 in peer-reviewed journals—provide empirical 
support for the proposition that employment contributes to adolescent problem behavior. For exceptional 
reviews of the research on problem behavior and other outcomes, I refer the reader to Greenberg and 
Steinberg (1986), Mortimer (2003), the National Research Council (1998), and Steinberg and Cauffman 
(1995).  
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Notice that the suggested policy change was focused squarely on the number of 
hours that youths spend in the workplace.5 The implication of the panel’s proposal was 
that high work intensity while enrolled in high school is a direct or indirect cause of 
elevated levels of adolescent problem behavior. Although the empirical research 
reviewed by the National Research Council (1998) leaves no doubt about the presence of 
this positive correlation between intensive employment and antisocial behavior, there 
remains considerable ambiguity about its causal significance. In the next section, I 
review the empirical literature responsible for this scholarly “about-face.” I then evaluate 
the strength of the evidence for interpreting this adverse “work intensity effect” as causal. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ADOLESCENT 
EMPLOYMENT AND PROBLEM BEHAVIOR 
 
Some of the earliest evidence for a relationship between adolescent employment 
and problem behavior can be found in the classic criminological studies.6 Glueck and 
Glueck (1950), for example, found that official delinquency among Boston-area 10-17 
year olds was related to after-school employment, especially daily employment and work 
in the street trade. Nye (1958) found that the “most delinquent” boys in his school sample 
earned money outside of the family during the school year (there was no relationship for 
                                                 
5 The panel speculated that a 20-hours-per-week cutoff would be appropriate for 16 and 17 year 
olds, although it recognized that some exceptions should be allowed: 
On balance, in the judgment of the committee, the scientific evidence supports increased 
restrictions on the intensity of work by children and adolescents. In keeping with its guiding 
principles and the research evidence, the committee believes that limiting the hours of work for 
most 16- and 17-year-olds during the school year is essential to their healthy development…. 
Following the majority of the evidence to date, and the conventional cutoff used in many studies, 
the committee strongly supports a limit of 20 hours of work per week during the school year for 
adolescents under most circumstances. (National Research Council, 1998:226) 
6 I follow Jessor and Jessor (1977:33) and define problem behavior as “behavior that is socially 
defined as a problem, a source of concern, or as undesirable by the norms of conventional society and the 
institutions of adult authority, and its occurrence usually elicits some kind of social control response.” 
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girls). Hirschi (1969) found that in his school sample of white males, those who were 
currently working for pay engaged in a wider variety of delinquent acts (hours of 
employment were unrelated to delinquency).  
 
Original Data Collection Efforts  
Beginning in the early 1980s, the developmental consequences of adolescent 
employment gained the sustained attention of researchers. This increased attention led to 
the creation of several original longitudinal surveys of high-school students from 
geographically localized samples, from which the most influential research on youth 
employment to date has been conducted. Greenberger et al. (1981), for example, 
conducted the first systematic study of the effects of adolescent employment on problem 
behavior among a sample of 10th and 11th graders in Orange County, California, high 
schools. They found that work status (a binary measure for working vs. not working) was 
generally unrelated to substance use, although weekly earnings and time spent in the 
workplace (the product of hours per week and length of employment) were consistent 
predictors of higher levels of substance use, particularly excessive alcohol use and 
marijuana use, among both males and females. Steinberg et al. (1982) followed up the 
non-workers from this study, and found that youths spending more time in the workplace 
one year later had a higher risk of cigarette and marijuana use than youths who remained 
non-workers. 
Steinberg and Dornbusch (1991) collected data from high-school students in 
northern California and Wisconsin, finding that longer work hours (ordinal measure) 
were associated with higher rates of substance use (cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana, other 
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drugs), minor delinquency (theft, carrying a weapon, vandalism, using phony ID), and 
school misconduct (cheating, copying homework). Following up on this sample, 
Steinberg et al. (1993) reported that, controlling for the level of problem behavior at the 
first wave, non-workers who entered the labor market one year later at high intensity 
(over 20 hours) reported higher levels of substance use, minor delinquency, and school 
misconduct than non-workers who remained out of the labor market. Steinberg and 
Avenevoli (1998) used structural equation models to examine the relationship between 
work intensity (ordinal measure) and problem behavior (drug and alcohol use, minor 
delinquency) over the high-school years. In addition to a positive cross-sectional 
correlation between the two at all four years, they found that work intensity during one 
year predicted higher levels of problem behavior the next year. 
Mortimer et al. (1996) found that youths from St. Paul, Minnesota, participating 
in the Youth Development Study who worked intensively (indicator for 21+ hours) were 
consistently more likely to drink alcohol during each of the last three years of high 
school, controlling for prior behavior. There was no relationship of intensive work, 
however, with school problem behavior (got in trouble for breaking rules, sent to 
principal’s office or detention) or smoking, and in fact, moderate work involvement (1-20 
hours) tended to be associated with less smoking. Along similar lines, McMorris and 
Uggen (2000) found that high work intensity (binary and continuous measures) was 
associated with 9th and 12th grade alcohol use. Even more recently, Mortimer (2003; see 
also Mortimer and Johnson, 1998) concluded that intensive employment (two binary 
measures) was positively associated with 12th grade alcohol use, irrespective of whether 
it was of low duration (“sporadic”) or high duration (“most invested”). Staff and Uggen 
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(2003) again confirmed the adverse effect of work intensity (continuous measure) on 12th 
grade alcohol use, net of other work characteristics (e.g., hourly pay, work-derived peer 
status, learning opportunities, autonomy, work stressors, work-school compatibility). 
They also found that longer work hours predicted elevated involvement in 12th grade 
school misconduct (got into trouble for breaking rules, sent to principal’s office or 
detention). Research from the Youth Development Study thus conclusively found that “it 
is with respect to alcohol use that we find the greatest cause for concern about some 
youth’s high involvement in work” (Mortimer et al., 1996:1257). 
 
Secondary Data Analyses  
In addition to these original data collection efforts to assess the problem behavior 
consequences of adolescent employment, numerous other researchers interrogated pre-
existing data sources. The results from these more representative samples confirmed the 
findings from the earlier non-probability samples. For example, Bachman and colleagues 
(1981, 1986, 2003; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; Safron et al., 2001) pooled 
data for various years from high-school seniors in the annual Monitoring the Future 
survey. They consistently found that an ordinal measure of work intensity (measured in 
5-hour intervals) was predictive of the use of cigarettes, heavy alcohol, marijuana, and 
even cocaine. They found similar adverse work intensity effects for theft, interpersonal 
aggression, and trouble with police. Agnew (1986) used the second wave of the Youth in 
Transition survey, when the young men were in the 11th grade. He found that the number 
of hours worked per week (continuous measure) was consistently related to a scale of 
total delinquency, in addition to its component subscales of interpersonal aggression 
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(fighting, gang fighting, robbery, aggression against parents) and theft/vandalism (petty 
and major larceny, shoplifting, trespassing, arson, vandalism), even while controlling for 
other work characteristics (e.g., hourly pay, skill, satisfaction, length of employment).  
Marsh (1991) used data from the sophomore- and senior-year interviews of the 
High School and Beyond study. He found that an ordinal measure of the number of hours 
worked per week during high school was related to senior-year school troublesomeness 
(others see youth as a troublemaker, disciplinary problems, suspended, cut classes, 
serious trouble with the law), controlling for a wide array of covariates, including 
sophomore-year school troublesomeness. Wright et al. (1997) examined the relationship 
between work intensity and problem behavior among a sample of enrolled 12 to 18 year 
olds in the National Survey of Families and Households. They found that a continuous 
measure of work intensity significantly increased parent-report problem behavior (school 
misbehavior, official delinquency, substance use, aggression), controlling for numerous 
known correlates of delinquency.  
Cullen et al. (1997) utilized the subsample of enrolled youths from the fifth wave 
of the National Youth Survey. They found that the most consistent work characteristic 
related to delinquency was work intensity (continuous measure), adjusting for wages, job 
stability, and job changes, in addition to numerous other controls, including prior 
delinquency. Mihalic and Elliott (1997) also used enrolled youths from the National 
Youth Survey, finding that, relative to youths who did not work at all during the third or 
fourth waves or who worked during only one of the two waves, those that worked during 
both waves had the highest level of alcohol, marijuana, and other drug use. They then 
selected on third-wave non-workers in order to examine the transition to employment by 
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the fourth wave, finding that entering the labor market at high intensity (over 20 hours) 
was associated with the highest level of alcohol and drug use, controlling for prior 
behavior.  
 
Summary of Empirical Evidence  
This lengthy series of findings underscores the idea that work intensity, rather 
than work experience per se, is a crucial distinction in understanding the relationship 
between youth employment and problem behavior.7 The conclusions from major reviews 
of the literature suggest as such (emphases added): 
If there is reason to be concerned about possible deleterious consequences of 
extensive employment during the school year,…it is to be found in studies of 
working and problem behavior. (Steinberg and Cauffman, 1995:158) 
 
The preponderance of evidence…has found higher rates of problem behaviors, 
such as alcohol and other drug use and minor delinquency, among young people 
who work—particularly among those who work at high intensity—in comparison 
with their nonworking peers. (National Research Council, 1998:132) 
 
Thus, irrespective of whether work intensity is measured continuously, ordinally, or 
dichotomously, virtually all prior studies suggest that intensive work during high school 
is robustly correlated with problem behavior, relative to non-work or work of moderate 
intensity.8 That is, high-school youths who work the longest number of hours per week 
                                                 
7 The only other job characteristic as strongly related to problem behavior as work intensity is 
weekly earnings (Bachman et al., 1981; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; Greenberger et al., 1981; 
Heimer, 1995; Ruggiero, 1984; Wright et al., 2002). Since this itself is a function of work intensity, perhaps 
a better measure would be wages, but the evidence is mixed, especially when controlling for other work 
characteristics (for adverse wage effects, see Abe, 1999; Agnew, 1986; Staff and Uggen, 2003; for null 
wage effects, see Cullen et al., 1997; Tanner and Krahn, 1991; Uggen, 2000a). Research that considers the 
impact of “resources” on problem behavior, with no control for other work characteristics, finds that having 
money or desiring large sums of money is a predictor of higher levels of delinquency and drug use (Agnew, 
1990, 1994; Cullen et al., 1985). Moreover, the source of this money—whether from a job or allowance—
appears to be irrelevant (see Wright et al., 2001). 
8 Studies that consider gender, race, and gender-race interactions in the “work intensity effect” on 
problem behavior are comparatively few, but illustrative. There is a fairly clear tendency for work intensity 
to be more strongly related to substance use and school problems among females (Bachman and 
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during the school year also have the highest levels of participation in a wide variety of 
problem behaviors. In fact, the only three studies from this stream of research that found 
no positive association between employment and adolescent problem behavior ignored 
work intensity, and instead relied solely on indicators of work status (Good et al., 1986; 
Gottfredson, 1985; Ploeger, 1997).9  
 
THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 
 
 Robust as the existing findings are across a variety of surveys and a plethora of 
control variables, there remains considerable uncertainty about whether the adverse work 
intensity effect on problem behavior is genuinely causal. In the absence of random 
assignment to employment, any observed correlation between adolescent work and 
problem behavior could be a consequence of differences across youths in “initial 
endowments” or “population heterogeneity.” This is the problem of self-selection, the 
idea that working adolescents (or adolescents that work at high intensity) are 
systematically different with respect to pre-existing (or omitted) characteristics that are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; Bachman et al., 1986; Greenberger et al., 1981; Heimer, 1995; Mortimer and 
Johnson, 1998). There is also a tendency for males to respond more readily to long work hours by acting 
out in a delinquent manner (Abe, 1999; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; Crowley, 1984; Steinberg et al., 
1993; Wright et al., 1997). Mihalic and Elliott (1997) are the only researchers to find the opposite 
tendency; that is, for female work intensity to increase serious delinquency and male work intensity to 
increase substance use. There are even fewer studies that examine race × work interactions. There is a 
tendency for white youths to increase their substance use in response to long work hours (Johnson, 
forthcoming; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997). The evidence for differential work effects on delinquency suggests 
that black and Hispanic youths experience larger increases in their delinquency than white youths (Abe, 
1999). Other research suggests that non-whites increase minor delinquency, whereas whites increase 
serious (Index) delinquency (Mihalic and Elliott, 1997). 
9 There are also other important differences worth highlighting. Gottfredson (1985) relied on an 
urban, primarily minority sample, whereas virtually all other research relies on suburban, primarily white, 
samples of youths. Similarly, Good et al. (1986) used a sample of inner-city youths from low-income 
families who were participating in a crime prevention program, and they in fact found that employment was 
negatively related to police contact. This is the sole study that found that employment might be beneficial 
for involvement in adolescent problem behavior. Ploeger (1997) found that adolescent work status was 
robustly related to substance use (alcohol use, marijuana use, public drunkenness)—even while controlling 
for prior substance use—until he introduced a measure of association with delinquent peers.  
 11
correlated with problem behavior. The research on the basis of which the National 
Research Council (1998) proposed stricter limits on adolescent work involvement has not 
convincingly ruled out the possibility that youths with a high propensity for problem 
behavior are precisely those most likely to work at high intensity while in school. Once 
these pre-existing differences are accounted for, it is entirely plausible that the adverse 
work intensity effect will disappear (or could even reverse signs; see Brame et al., 
forthcoming). The implication of this assertion is that prior researchers have mistaken 
self-selection for the causal impact of working, rendering the correlation between work 
intensity and problem behavior a spurious one.10
                                                 
10 The problem posed by selection bias is exacerbated by the fact that most prior research is 
conducted on samples of school-going youths. Following is a list of all known (to this author) empirical 
studies of youth employment and problem behavior. The first group of studies relies on representative 
school samples: 
• Monitoring the Future (Bachman et al., 1981, 1986, 2003; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992, 
1993; Heimer, 1995; Safron et al., 2001). 
• Youth in Transition (Agnew, 1986). 
• High School and Beyond (Marsh, 1991). 
• National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Johnson, forthcoming; Resnick et al., 1997). 
A second sizable group of studies relies on non-representative school samples: 
• Youth Development Study (McMorris and Uggen, 2000; Mortimer, 2003; Mortimer et al., 
1996; Mortimer and Johnson, 1998; Staff and Uggen, 2003; Uggen, 2000a). 
• The Orange County, California, study (Greenberger et al., 1981; Ruggiero, 1984; Steinberg et 
al., 1982). 
• The California and Wisconsin study (Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 
1991; Steinberg et al., 1993). 
• School Action Effectiveness Study (Gottfredson, 1985). 
• A sample of Canadian students (Tanner and Krahn, 1991). 
• A sample of students in Midwestern towns (Hansen and Jarvis, 2000). 
• Maryland Adolescent Development in Context (Bartko and Eccles, 2003). 
Other non-school samples of adolescents are studied in specific geographic areas: 
• Two birth cohorts (1942, 1949) in Racine, Wisconsin (Shannon, 1982, 1988). 
• A sample of inner-city Philadelphia youths (Good et al., 1986). 
Only a handful of studies use nationally representative samples of adolescents:  
• National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (Crowley, 1984).  
• National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (Abe, 1999, 2001; Apel et al., 2003; Brame et al., 
forthcoming; Huang et al., 2001; Paternoster et al., 2003).  
• National Youth Survey (Cullen et al., 1997; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Ploeger, 1997).  
• National Survey of Families and Households (Wright et al., 1997).  
Of this latter group of surveys, Crowley (1984), Cullen et al. (1997), Mihalic and Elliott (1997), and Wright 
et al. (1997) restricted their analyses to those youths that remained enrolled in school. Consequently, only 
the studies by Abe (1999, 2001), Apel et al. (2003), Brame et al. (forthcoming), Paternoster et al. (2003), 
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There is indeed reason for exercising caution in causal interpretations of the 
adverse work effect. For example, youths may enter the labor market in part as a result of 
weaker emotional attachment to their parents (Gottfredson, 1985; Greenberger et al., 
1981). Research has also found that lower scholastic performance, educational 
expectations, and time spent on homework predict the transition into the world of 
adolescent work (Bachman and Schulenberg, 1993; Entwisle et al., 1999; Mihalic and 
Elliott, 1997; Mortimer, 2003; Mortimer and Finch, 1986; Schoenhals et al., 1998; Singh, 
1998; Singh and Ozturk, 2000; Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg et al., 1993). 
Employed youths are less involved with their family and exercise greater autonomy vis-à-
vis their parents before they begin working (Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Steinberg and 
Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg et al., 1993). Youths who work also engage in more 
delinquency, aggression, substance use, and school misconduct prior to labor market 
entry, and are more heavily involved with delinquent peers than future non-working 
youths (Gottfredson, 1985; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer, 2003; Ploeger, 1997; 
Staff and Uggen, 2003; Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg et al., 1993). Thus, 
there is sufficient evidence to warrant serious concern that school disengagement, 
emotional and behavioral autonomy, and problem behavior precede the transition into 
the adolescent labor market.  
 The problem of self-selection has not gone unnoticed in existing studies. Indeed, 
prior research has controlled for an exhaustive list of known correlates of problem 
behavior, including family background (SES, parental attainment, family income, intact 
family, household size), residential location (Census region, urban residence, local 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Ploeger (1997) are generalizable to the population of all adolescents (as is Huang et al., 2001, but they 
examine only bivariate relationships). Notably, three of these latter studies found no evidence for the 
adverse effect of employment on adolescent problem behavior encountered in previous research. 
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unemployment), youth-parent interaction (attachment, monitoring, rule making, conflict), 
school performance (educational goals, homework, grades, test scores, absenteeism), and 
other selection controls (antisocial peers, low self-control, intelligence, self-concept).11 
Numerous researchers have also employed a lagged dependent variable as a proxy for 
population heterogeneity, or time-invariant differences between individuals responsible 
for a “propensity” toward problem behavior (Cullen et al., 1997; Gottfredson, 1985; 
Johnson, forthcoming; Marsh, 1991; McMorris and Uggen, 2000; Mihalic and Elliott, 
1997; Mortimer et al., 1996; Mortimer and Johnson, 1998; Ploeger, 1997; Staff and 
Uggen, 2003; Steinberg et al., 1982, 1993).  
These efforts to control for observed covariates do indeed substantially reduce the 
magnitude of the relationship between work intensity and problem behavior. For 
example, Bachman and Schulenberg (1993) found that when they control for educational 
commitment (GPA, college plans, curriculum) and other background variables (gender, 
race, region, urbanicity, parent education), they “knock out” over 30 percent of the 
correlation of work intensity with cigarette and heavy alcohol use, and about 25 percent 
of the correlation with interpersonal aggression. Safron et al. (2001) found further that 
controlling for participation in unstructured social activities (dating, riding around for 
fun) and background variables decreases the strength of the relationship of work intensity 
with alcohol use and binge drinking among 8th and 10th graders by well over one-half, 
                                                 
11 The single most extensive analysis to date was conducted by Marsh (1991), who used the High 
School and Beyond study to control for over 25 potential confounding variables that were temporally prior 
to senior-year employment. One of these control variables was a lagged dependent variable measured 
during the sophomore year. Despite the breadth of control variables, work intensity persisted as a 
significant predictor of senior-year school troublesomeness (others see youth as a troublemaker, 
disciplinary problems, suspended, cut classes, serious trouble with the law). 
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and with marijuana use by well over one-third (and in several cases, the impact on 
marijuana use was reduced to non-significance).12  
Despite these controls for observables, work intensity persists, however modestly, 
as a significant predictor of adolescent problem behavior. The robustness of the adverse 
work intensity effect in the face of control for such extensive observed covariates bolsters 
the case for a causal impact of intensive employment on adolescent problem behavior. 
This logic is expressed in Staff and Uggen’s (2003:264, citations omitted) recent 
unequivocal assessment of the research on work intensity and problem behavior: 
[W]orking more than 20 hours per week appears to increase delinquency and 
problem behaviors for adolescents. This relationship is not necessarily a selection 
artifact arising from preexisting propensities of young workers, because some 
longitudinal evidence shows that the number of hours worked affects delinquency 
and substance use even when prior delinquency is statistically controlled. 
 
 The fact is, however, that all prior studies rely on observational data analyzed 
using conventional cross-sectional methods. Even surveys that were collected 
longitudinally (e.g., Youth Development Study, Orange County study, California and 
Wisconsin study, Monitoring the Future, High School and Beyond, National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, National Youth Survey) are analyzed using non-panel methods with 
controls for observed covariates and, in the most rigorous specifications, a control for 
prior problem behavior. A more recent line of research, however, recognizes that it may 
be impossible to control for all persistent heterogeneity through “selection on 
observables” (Heckman and Hotz, 1989), as traditional research is limited to doing. In 
other words, the inclusion of observed covariates alone—including lagged problem 
                                                 
12 Gottfredson (1985) reduced the “work status effect” to non-significance by introducing a 
measure of prior delinquency. Ploeger (1997) did so by introducing a measure of delinquent peer 
association. As previously noted, however, neither of these two studies employed measures of work 
intensity, and relied instead on “work vs. no work” comparisons. 
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behavior—may be insufficient to sweep out bias attributable to persistent, unobserved 
heterogeneity. Two recent studies explicitly acknowledge the inferential risk posed by 
ignoring this source of selection bias, and attempt to formally account for it in their 
models. These two studies form the analytical foundation for the current analysis. The 
methods and findings from each are briefly summarized in turn.13
 
Tyler’s (2003) Instrumental Variables Design  
 Although Tyler (2003) examined the impact of work intensity on academic 
achievement, he used a clever identification strategy that informs the current study of 
problem behavior. He used a cross section of high-school seniors from the National 
Educational Longitudinal Survey (the 1992 second follow-up survey), employing a 
categorical measure of work hours and substituting the interval midpoints to obtain a 
quasi-continuous measure. He accounted for the endogeneity of school-year work hours 
through the use of exclusion restrictions involving state-level child labor laws, a strategy 
capable of producing exogenous variation in work intensity (i.e., variation in work hours 
that is uncorrelated with the model’s error term). Specifically, Tyler (2003:396) used the 
following seven instrumental variables for work intensity: 
                                                 
13 A third study—Brame et al. (forthcoming)—similarly takes selection bias seriously. These 
authors attempt to quantify the uncertainty about the basis for valid estimates of the causal impact of 
adolescent employment on delinquent behavior. Here, they rely on a binary indicator of work status 
(employed vs. not employed) using the first wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. 
After conditioning on a propensity score (incorporating gender, race/ethnicity, and age), they find that the 
estimated “work effect” is indeed positive, as expected from previous studies. Recognizing that 
employment is not exogenous, they then evaluate the sensitivity of the “work effect” to plausible 
assumptions about (1) the effect of an unobserved “crime trait” on the probability of employment, (2) the 
effect of the unobserved crime trait on the probability of delinquent behavior, and (3) the prevalence of the 
unobserved crime trait in the population. Their sensitivity analysis showed that, although most of the 
estimated “work effects” were positive, in several instances they were practically zero or actually negative. 
Thus, their analysis was incapable of even identifying the sign of the work effect on crime, let alone its 
magnitude. Importantly, they concluded that if the unobserved crime trait increased the probability of 
employment and also increased the probability of delinquent behavior (both consistent with prior research), 
the estimated work effect could be shown to be negative. 
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(1) Dollar amount collected in civil monetary penalties from child labor law 
violations. 
(2) Limits placed on student work after 10 p.m. on school nights. 
(3) State department of labor publicizes the names of employers who violate child 
labor laws. 
(4) Imposition of criminal penalties for child labor law violation. 
(5) 40-hour limit on the number of work hours per week while school is in 
session. 
(6) Required work permits for minors employed in agriculture-related jobs. 
(7) Required work permits for minors employed in non-agriculture-related jobs. 
 
A traditional least squares model with controls for observed heterogeneity suggested that 
a 10-hour increase in school-year work hours reduced math and reading test scores by 
about 0.03 standard deviation. However, instrumenting for work intensity suggested a 
corresponding decrease of approximately 0.20 standard deviation. Tyler thus found 
evidence for selection bias in the relationship between work intensity and scholastic 
achievement, such that the consequences of intensive work for school performance were 
actually worse than a traditional cross-sectional model implies. This effect size led Tyler 
to conclude that child labor policies that statutorily reduce the amount of time adolescents 
spend in the workplace during the school year could substantially raise test scores.  
 
Paternoster et al.’s (2003) Fixed-Effects Design  
Paternoster et al. (2003) addressed the selection problem by using three waves of 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and estimating a fixed-effects 
panel model.14 This strategy has the advantage of sweeping out time-stable differences 
between individuals (so-called “unobserved heterogeneity”) that may contaminate the 
                                                 
14 In fact, Paternoster et al. (2003) used a random-effects estimator with decomposition of all time-
varying explanatory variables into between- and within-individual variation (i.e., within-panel means and 
deviations from those means, respectively). For inferential purposes, however, they focused on the 
coefficients corresponding to the deviations from within-panel means, analogous to the fixed-effects 
estimator since both are identified on change. They also replicated all findings with the fixed-effects logit 
model. 
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estimated effect of work intensity on problem behavior. Paternoster and colleagues used 
two binary variables for work intensity: (1) worked over 20 hours per week during the 
school year, and (2) worked over 20 hours per week during the summer only. Their 
estimation strategy proceeded in two steps. First, to replicate prior analyses, they 
estimated a cross-sectional model that included a list of common covariates, including a 
lagged dependent variable. In this model, the estimated coefficient for the effect of 
intensive work on problem behavior (delinquency, substance use, problem behavior) was 
positive and statistically significant. The findings from this traditional model were wholly 
consistent with the results of prior research. Second, they estimated a set of panel models 
using three waves of data, focusing their attention on the within-panel variation (i.e., 
within-individual change) in high-intensity work during the school year. Upon doing so, 
they found that changing from non-work to intensive school-year work had no adverse 
effect on problem behavior, and in fact the coefficient for intensive work was negative in 
all three models (and significant in one). They concluded from their analysis that the 
consistently reported positive association between intensive school-year work and 
adolescent problem behavior is driven by a process of selection rather than causation.15  
 
                                                 
15 This finding also suggests that controls for prior problem behavior are insufficient to sweep out 
all population heterogeneity, and thus all potential sources of selection bias. The justification for a lagged Y 
by Steinberg et al. (1993:174) is representative: “Controls for Time 1 scores rule out the possibility that 
observed differences at Time 2 are due to selection effects and point instead to consequences of differential 
patterns of employment.” This is a questionable assertion, however, since lagged Y is by necessity 
correlated with the current disturbance. If lagged Y is also correlated with current work involvement—and 
we know that it is (see Gottfredson, 1985; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer, 2003; Ploeger, 1997; Staff 
and Uggen, 2003; Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg et al., 1993)—the estimate of the “work 
intensity effect” is biased and inconsistent. Thus, using lagged Y as a proxy for population heterogeneity 
may in fact make matters worse. 
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A REPLICATION AND METHODOLOGICAL EXTENSION 
 
 This study constitutes a re-assessment of the relationship between work intensity 
and problem behavior. The primary innovation introduced in this study is the use of 
instrumental variables within a panel framework to investigate the causal effect of work 
intensity on two problem behavior outcomes: crime and substance use. The use of this 
particular method follows from two important features of the data. First, I use a 
contemporary, nationally representative sample of youths, whereas much prior research 
relied on localized school samples. As such, all 50 states and the District of Columbia are 
represented. Like Tyler (2003), I exploit the fact that there is state-to-state variation at the 
cross-sectional level in the restrictiveness of the child labor laws that are enforced. 
Specifically, states vary in the total number of hours per week that youths are allowed to 
work during the school year, and in how late youths are allowed to work during the 
evening before school days. Second, since the same respondents are followed over a 
period of five years, I use a panel estimator to adjust for the potential omission of 
relevant time-stable covariates. Like Paternoster et al. (2003), I include individual fixed 
effects to sweep out all sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The resulting estimates are 
identified from within-individual change in school-year work hours over time.  
 The proposed model is a fixed-effects instrumental variables (FEIV) estimator. In 
this model, identification of the “work intensity effect” is predicated on exogenous 
within-individual variation in school-year work intensity that is attributed to the easing of 
child labor restrictions as youths age out of their legal status as minors. The strength of 
this procedure lies in the fact that state child labor laws are applicable to specific age 
ranges. For example, the most restrictive laws apply to youths under 16 years of age, less 
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restrictive laws apply to youths 16 and 17 years of age, and child labor laws no longer 
apply to youths 18 years of age and older. Moreover, states vary in the restrictiveness of 
these laws. The attractiveness of the FEIV estimator lies in its ability to eliminate bias in 
the estimated work effect due to omitted stable and dynamic variables. To the extent that 
the assumptions of the model are valid, the results provide the best estimate to date of the 
true average causal effect of work hours on problem behavior during the adolescent 
developmental period. The FEIV model thus provides an especially powerful test of the 
thesis that longer hours of employment during the school year causally aggravates 
involvement in problem behavior. 
The FEIV estimator has received limited attention in economic studies of crime. 
For example, Levitt (1996) used a first-differenced instrumental variables (FDIV) 
strategy to examine the impact of prison population size on crime rates for all 50 states 
from 1972 to 1993. Because of the endogeneity of prison population, he introduced as 
instruments the status of prison overcrowding litigation, in which a state’s entire prison 
system came under court order. As anticipated, there was a negative relationship between 
prison population and violent and property crime. However, the coefficient from the 
FDIV specification was over three times that from a traditional first-differenced model. 
Ayres and Levitt (1998) considered the impact of the introduction of Lojack on the auto 
theft rate in 57 large cities between 1981 and 1994. When they included city fixed 
effects, they found that the number of years of Lojack availability and the percent share 
of registered vehicles with Lojack installed corresponded with significant decreases in 
auto theft. When they instrumented for these endogenous explanatory variables (using the 
number of years elapsed since Lojack began the regulatory approval process as the 
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instrumental variable), they found that the effect of Lojack on auto theft increased by 
factors of four and nine, respectively. 
 
SUMMING UP AND LOOKING AHEAD 
 
 A lengthy literature suggests that employment has detrimental consequences for 
involvement in a wide variety of adolescent problem behaviors, most notably 
delinquency and substance use. The emphasis in this literature has been almost 
exclusively on the amount of time that adolescents spend in the workplace, and the 
accumulated findings suggest that work that is of high intensity (i.e., over 20 hours 
weekly) is most strongly related to adolescent problem behavior. The tendency has been 
to interpret this association as causal, as the effect has proved to be remarkably robust to 
control for an exhaustive list of observed covariates. Because of this, scholars have called 
for time limits on youth work to minimize its adverse developmental impact. 
Nevertheless, recent evidence urges greater restraint in inferring causality from this 
empirical association. Although the intensive work effect is robust to controls for 
observed heterogeneity, recent analyses show that it may not withstand more rigorous 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity.  
 In this dissertation, I evaluate the plausibility of an adverse causal effect of work 
intensity on problem behavior during adolescence using a nationally representative panel 
of youths. The research evidence is sufficiently lengthy and the policy stakes sufficiently 
high to justify the use of a more sophisticated analytic strategy in an attempt to parse out 
the relative contributions of self-selection and causality. Specifically, I use a fixed-effects 
instrumental variables design that exploits exogenous within-individual variation in 
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formal work hours during the school year, using as instrumental variables a vector of 
state child labor laws governing school-year employment for enrolled minors. This 
document will proceed as follows. Chapter Two exhaustively reviews the empirical and 
theoretical literature on youth employment. Chapter Three describes the data and 
provides a detailed overview of the modeling strategy employed in this study. Chapter 
Four presents the results from these statistical models. Finally, Chapter Five ties the 






Prior to 1970, researchers paid little attention to youth employment. By this time, 
however, systematic surveys revealed that youth employment was an exceedingly 
common phenomenon (Entwisle et al., 2000). Consider the historical context of youth 
employment illustrated in Figure 4. This figure provides employment rates by age (14-15, 
16, 17, 18) in the decennial Census from 1940 to 2000 among enrolled youths.1 There is a 
clear secular increase in employment among all youths over this seven-decade period. 
For example, employment increases by 3.1 points per decade, on average, among 16 year 
olds (or 2.7% per decade), 4.8 points among 17 year olds (3.9%), 5.5 points among 18 
year olds (4.2%), and 4.1 points among 19 year olds (3.1%). In the 2000 Census, 24 
percent of enrolled 16 year olds were employed, 37 percent of enrolled 17 year olds, and 
46 percent of enrolled 18 year olds.  
*** Figure 4 Here *** 
Apel et al. (2003) provide similar estimates of youth employment using the 
annual Current Population Survey, designed much like the Census. They find that from 
1980 to 2000, 31 percent of 16 and 17 year olds were employed during school months. 
For a variety of reasons, however, the Census and Current Population Survey 
conservatively estimate youth employment. For one, parents are relied upon to report on 
the employment of their teenage children. More importantly, both surveys inquire about 
formal jobs—what may be termed regular, “paycheck” work—thereby ignoring a much 
more pervasive, informal labor market. We will see the magnitude of this omission in the 
                                                 
1 I attained these estimates from five percent samples available from the Integrated Public Use 
Micro-Data Series (IPUMS). The time series for 14-15 year olds is included for comparative purposes, but 
is not discussed due to incomplete data. Beginning in 1970, the Census inquired about employment only 
among youths 16 or older. 
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next section, in which I describe in some detail the nature of youth employment, both 
formal and informal. 
 
THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY ADOLESCENT EMPLOYMENT 
 
A pernicious descriptive problem is arriving at a consistent definition of youth 
employment. One source of variability across surveys is the scope of the definition of 
employment. Many surveys operationalize youth employment vaguely as “paid work” or 
“work for pay” (Bartko and Eccles, 2003; Johnson, forthcoming; Marsh, 1991; Wright et 
al., 1997), a “regular job” (Gottfredson, 1985), or a “paying job” (Tanner and Krahn, 
1991). Other surveys offer more precise definitions. Following is a sampling of 
employment definitions from the six major youth surveys from which multiple 
publications appear in the literature: 
Orange County, California, study – regular, paid employment, by non-family 
members, of at least three hours per week. 
 
California and Wisconsin study – employed in a regular paying part-time job, 
excluding volunteer and occasional work. 
 
Youth Development Study – employed at least once a week outside of the home 
for pay. 
 
Monitoring the Future – employed in a paid or unpaid job currently or in the last 
three months, excluding chores. 
 
National Youth Survey – employed in the community for pay during the last year, 
excluding allowance. 
 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 – employed in a situation that entails 
an ongoing relationship with a specific employer. 
 
A second source of variability is the temporal dimension of adolescent 
employment. The first four definitions above, because they are student surveys, refer to 
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employment during the current school year, whereas the latter two refer to employment 
during the calendar year. In other studies, youths are variously defined as employed if 
they worked in a specific calendar year (Gottfredson, 1985), during the previous week 
(Wright et al., 1997), or during the current school year (Johnson, 2003; Tanner and 
Krahn, 1991). Only three studies simultaneously consider school-year and summer work 
(Apel et al., 2003; Marsh, 1991; Paternoster et al., 2003). A third source of variability is 
whether the sample is stratified by age or by year in school. After all, a 16-year-old youth 
can be in the 10th or 11th grade, meaning that age-based and grade-based samples are not 
directly comparable.  
 
Employment Status  
Figure 5 illustrates rates of employment in formal and informal jobs by month 
from ages 14 to 18 among youths in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 
(hereafter NLSY). During the month in which they turn 14, 43 percent of all youths are 
employed in some kind of job. However, we see that three percent of 14 year olds are 
employed only in formal jobs, 37 percent are employed only in informal jobs, and 
another three percent are employed in both formal and informal jobs. When we look 
ahead to the month in which youths turn 18, we see that 56 percent of all youths report 
working in a job. At this age, 49 percent are employed only in formal jobs, four percent 
are employed only in informal jobs, and four percent are employed in both formal and 
informal jobs. Thus, youth employment figures are sensitive to the degree of formality of 
the definition of employment. Definitions restricted to formal jobs will underestimate the 
true extent of youth work at younger ages. Conversely, broad definitions of employment 
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will overestimate the extent of youth employment at younger ages. Consider that the 
share of all youth employment accounted for by formal work increases from 14 to 94 
percent from age 14 to age 18. It is thus at later ages—toward the end of high school—
that formal employment figures accurately reflect the true extent of youth work.  
*** Figure 5 Here *** 
 In order to assess comparability across youth surveys, I consider employment 
among 10th through 12th graders in high school. The following figures are summarized 
in Table 1. Lower-range estimates of youth work in existing surveys suggest average 
employment rates of 40 to 50 percent. Greenberger et al. (1981) report that 40 percent of 
10th and 11th graders were employed. Agnew (1986) finds that 46 percent of 11th grade 
boys report working. Steinberg and Dornbusch (1991) find that 45 percent of their high-
school youths are employed (excluding 9th graders). Middle-range estimates suggest 
average employment rates of 50 to 70 percent. Mortimer (2003) finds that 47 percent of 
10th graders were employed, 58 percent of 11th graders, and 64 percent of 12th graders. 
Tanner and Krahn (1991) report that 70 percent of seniors were employed during the 
school year (while 57 percent were currently employed). Upper-range estimates suggest 
average employment rates over 70 percent. Bachman et al. (1986) report an 80 percent 
employment rate among high-school seniors. Bachman and Schulenberg (1993) find 
further that 74 percent of seniors were working for pay, while another 6 percent were 
working but not for pay. Marsh (1991) reports a 64 percent employment rate among 10th 
graders, 70 percent among 11th graders, and 77 percent among 12th graders. Wright et al. 
(2002) find that 86 percent of seniors in their second survey (Tri-Cities Study) were 
employed (75% currently).  
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*** Table 1 Here *** 
The formal employment figures provided by the NLSY place it in the lower range 
of 40 to 50 percent. Recall that Figure 1 provides school-year formal employment rates in 
the NLSY of approximately 25 percent among 10th graders, 44 percent among 11th 
graders, and 56 percent among 12th graders. The weighted average for all three grades is 
38 percent. The primary explanation for the conservative employment rate in the NLSY 
relative to other surveys is the use of the narrower, more explicitly “formal” work 
criterion. Most other surveys include “informal” workers in their employment definitions, 
which we know will inflate estimates of youth work at younger ages (see Figure 5). As an 
illustration, Mortimer (2003) reports that 23 percent of 10th grade workers, nine percent 
of 11th grade workers, and six percent of 12th grade workers are employed in informal 
work. Broadening the definition of employment in the NLSY to include either formal or 
informal work places it in the middle range, as 50 percent of sophomores, 59 percent of 
juniors, and 65 percent of seniors are employed in any job (see Table 1). 
 
Work Intensity  
Figure 6 provides the average work intensity by age, showing that the number of 
hours worked increases in a uniform fashion through the teenage years. During the month 
in which they turn 14, employed youths are working 13 hours per week, on average. By 
their 18th birthday, however, the typical employed youth is working 28 hours per week. 
The impact of summer on work intensity is much more pronounced at younger ages. 
Figure 7 categorizes the intensity of the work commitment into five-hour intervals over 
the 14-18 age span. Over half of employed 14 year olds (58%) work 10 hours or less per 
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week, on average, a figure that drops to 27 percent by age 16, and just 12 percent by age 
18. If we use the conventional 20-hour cut-off to distinguish “moderate” from “intensive” 
work, we see that intensive employment (over 20 hours) accounts for only 20 percent of 
youth work at age 14, but 37 percent at age 16, and 60 percent at age 18. Notice that the 
proportion of “full-time workers” (over 35 hours) is seven percent, 12 percent, and 28 
percent, respectively.  
*** Figures 6 and 7 Here *** 
Consider how the NLSY compares with other youth surveys with respect to work 
intensity. To maximize comparability, I will again restrict my attention to surveys that 
include 10th through 12th graders in high school (see Table 1). I will begin with 
estimates of mean work intensity. At the low end are the high-school youths in Marsh’s 
(1991) study, in which 10th graders work 6 hours per week, on average, 11th graders 
work 12 hours, and 12th graders work 13 hours. Tanner and Krahn (1991) report an 18-
hour work week among currently employed 12th graders. At the higher end of the work 
intensity continuum is Agnew (1986), whose employed 11th graders work 21 hours per 
week. Mortimer (2003) finds that 10th grader youths work 17 hours per week, 11th grade 
youths work 20 hours, and 12th grade youths work 21 hours.  
Several studies rely on categorical measures of work intensity. The moderate-
intensive distinction provides a convenient way to compare across these studies. 
Steinberg and Dornbusch (1991) provide conservative estimates of intensive work, 
categorizing 28 percent of their high-school youths as intensive workers (excluding 9th 
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graders).2 Mortimer (2003) reports that 28 percent of employed 10th graders are 
categorized as intensive workers, as are 40 percent of 11th graders, and 40 percent of 
12th graders. Bachman et al. (1986) find that 39 percent of employed seniors are 
intensively employed. Using later cohorts, Bachman and Schulenberg (1993) find that 42 
percent of employed seniors are intensive workers. 
Among employed youths in the NLSY, Figure 2 shows that during school months, 
10th graders work an average of 19 hours per week, 11th graders 22 hours, and 12th 
graders 26 hours. The weighted average for these three years is 23 hours per week during 
school months. The NLSY also suggests that 34 percent of 10th graders, 42 percent of 
11th graders, and 55 percent of 12th graders, work at high intensity during the school 
year (see Figure 3). By both measures, then, the estimates of work intensity in the NLSY 
tend toward the high end relative to other youth surveys. As with employment rates, this 
is probably due in large part to the fact that the NLSY emphasizes formal work, whereas 
other surveys sweep up both formal and informal employment, the latter of which tends 
to be more irregular.  
 
Age of First Employment  
Figure 8 provides age of first employment in formal and informal jobs. Almost 
two-thirds (63%) of employed youths take their first informal job between 12 and 14 
years of age. The mean age of the first informal job is 13.1 (median = 13). The modal age 
of the first formal job is 16 years (36%), corresponding with the age in which many state 
                                                 
2 In their follow-up study, Steinberg et al. (1993) report that 22 percent of the sample of 10th and 
11th grade youths at the first wave are employed at high intensity. At the second wave, as 11th and 12th 
graders, 28 percent of employed youths are working at high intensity. 
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child labor laws ease work restrictions.3 Notice that by this age, however, 80 percent of 
employed youths have already taken their first formal job. The mean age of the first 
formal job is 15.5 (median = 16). 
*** Figure 8 Here *** 
 
Industry and Occupation  
 Figures 9 and 10 describe the industry of first formal youth jobs. The four top 
industries accounting for 62 percent of all youth work between ages 14 and 18 include 
eating and drinking establishments, other retail trade, entertainment and recreation 
service, and grocery stores (see Figure 9). Employment in eating and drinking 
establishments takes on particular relevance at age 16, when fully 40 percent of first jobs 
acquired at this age are concentrated in this industry. When we consider gender and race 
patterns (see Figure 10), white males are most likely to work in agriculture and, along 
with Hispanic males, construction. Males are over-represented in grocery stores and, 
along with white females, recreation and entertainment facilities (e.g., movie theaters, 
video rental stores). Females, meanwhile, are much more likely than males to work in 
                                                 
3 By way of example, the child labor provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA) govern businesses that (1) have annual gross sales of at least $500,000; (2) are hospitals or 
educational institutions; (3) are public agencies; or (4) are engaged in interstate commerce or in the 
production of goods for interstate commerce (see U.S. Department of Labor, 2000:3-13). The FLSA bans 
employment of youths under 14 years of age, although exceptions for informal work are allowed (e.g., 
babysitting, paper routes). Youths 14 and 15 years of age may work outside of school hours, but are 
prohibited from working in occupations other than retail, food service, and gasoline service. Their 
employment is also restricted to no more than 18 hours per week or 3 hours per day when school is in 
session, and to no more than 40 hours per week or 8 hours per day when school is not in session. They are 
also restricted to working between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. except during the summer, when they may work 
evenings until 9 p.m. Youths 16 and 17 years of age may work in any occupation that is not deemed 
hazardous for this age group (e.g., mining, meatpacking, operating certain types of machinery). These 
youths are allowed to work any time of the day, any day of the year, and for unlimited hours. Youths 18 
years of age and older are no longer subject to the child labor provisions of the FLSA. Note that not all 
youth employment is covered under the FLSA, and numerous exemptions from these provisions are 
allowed (particularly in agricultural work). Moreover, every state has its own child labor law that may be 
more or less restrictive than the provisions of the federal law.  
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eating and drinking establishments, which also tend to over-represent black males. Other 
retail trade (e.g., department store, gasoline service station, shoe store, appliance store, 
gift shop) also tends to be dominated by females, white and Hispanic females in 
particular, as well as health and social services (e.g., doctor’s office, hospital, child care). 
Notice that, relative to their same-gender peers, black youths are over-represented in 
health and social service industries, but under-represented in other retail trade.  
*** Figures 9 and 10 Here *** 
Figures 11 and 12 describe the occupation of first formal youth jobs. At all ages, 
food preparation and service work accounts for the largest share (28%) of youthful 
occupations (see Figure 11). By the middle teenage years, work as a cashier is the second 
most common occupation (17% at age 16). Considering gender and race patterns (see 
Figure 12), males are more likely than females to work in occupations as construction 
helpers, stock handlers or baggers, and other laborers. Females, on the other hand, are 
much more likely to work as cashiers (especially black females) and administrative 
support (e.g., receptionist, file clerk, messenger). Females also tend to be over-
represented in sales occupations (e.g., clothing store, home furnishings store, appliance 
store, sales counter clerk) and, along with black males, in food service occupations (e.g., 
waiter/waitress, cook). Black youths tend to predominate in other service occupations 
(e.g., family child care, dental assistant, janitor, baggage porter).  
*** Figures 11 and 12 Here *** 
 Informal occupations are illustrated in Figures 13 and 14. The two most pervasive 
types of informal jobs (see Figure 13)—which together comprise 80 percent of first 
informal jobs between ages 11 and 14—are babysitting and yard work (e.g., lawn 
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mowing, snow shoveling, leaf raking, tree trimming, wood cutting). Across all ages, 
babysitting accounts for one-half (49%) and yard work one-quarter (27%) of all first 
informal jobs. Manual labor (e.g., maintenance and repair, construction, painting, moving 
or hauling) takes on greater importance at later ages, accounting for 10 percent and more 
of first informal jobs at age 16 and later. Paper routes account for five percent of youth 
jobs at age 10, but decline in importance thereafter. The remaining informal occupations 
entail such tasks as cleaning (house, office, church, school), farm work, office chores 
(e.g., filing, reception, computer work, flyers), and odd jobs (e.g., pet sitting, house 
sitting, car washing, hair cutting, tutoring, errands). When we consider gender and race 
patterns (see Figure 14), we see that females are far more likely to babysit in their first 
informal job than males, although a non-trivial proportion of males also babysit in their 
first informal job. Males, on the other hand, are much more likely than females to do yard 
work and manual labor. Relative to their same-gender peers, black youths tend to work 
somewhat more often in odd jobs.  
*** Figures 13 and 14 Here *** 
The foregoing description of the contemporary youth workplace is consistent with 
reports that youth employment as a whole is overwhelmingly concentrated in the retail 
and service sectors, constituting what Greenberger and Steinberg (1986) refer to as the 
“new adolescent workplace.” It is also consistent with other reports about the gender and 
racial stratification that exists in adolescent jobs. Males are much more likely than 
females to be employed in formal and informal jobs that entail some form of manual 
labor (e.g., yard work, construction, stock handler) or farm work, whereas females are 
more likely to be employed in jobs that entail counter work (e.g., cashier, retail sales), 
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desk work (e.g., administrative support), or caring for people (e.g., babysitting, health and 
social services) (see also Apel et al., 2003; Entwisle et al., 1999; Greenberger and 
Steinberg, 1983; Mortimer, 2003; Mortimer et al., 1990; National Research Council, 
1998; White and Brinkerhoff, 1981). In other words, young males tend to “work with 
their hands,” while young females tend to “work with people” (see Mortimer, 2003). 
Minority youths, on the other hand, are more likely than their white counterparts to work 
in service and unskilled occupations (e.g., cook, janitor, hospital worker) and in 
unspecified “odd” jobs (see also Apel et al., 2003; Entwisle et al., 1999, 2000; National 
Research Council, 1998; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000). 
 
ADOLESCENT WORK INTENSITY, DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH, AND 
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 
 
 A new phase of youth employment research commenced in the early 1980s. This 
research began to raise serious questions about the potential interference of employment 
with more important developmental tasks of adolescence (Entwisle et al., 2000). The 
conclusions from developmental research were in stark contrast to those from economic 
research, from which there was nearly universal agreement that work involvement during 
high school is a form of investment that provides net benefits in the early adult labor 
market (Ruhm, 1995:302). For example, for up to two years following graduation, youths 
who worked during high school tend to have higher rates of labor force participation, 
earn higher wages and income, work for longer duration, achieve a higher-status 
occupation, and experience fewer bouts of unemployment than their peers who remained 
unemployed or out of the labor force during high school (Light, 1994; Marsh, 1991; 
Meyer and Wise, 1982; Michael and Tuma, 1984; Mortimer and Johnson, 1998; 
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Stephenson, 1981a, 1981b; Stern and Nakata, 1989; Stevenson, 1978; but see Hotz et al., 
2002). These results have been corroborated in long-term follow-ups of six years (Ruhm, 
1995, 1997) and ten years (Carr et al., 1996). 
The seminal work among developmental researchers, on the other hand, was a 
volume by Greenberger and Steinberg (1986), the culmination of an extensive and well-
publicized collaboration that challenged widely held beliefs about the benefits of work 
experience during adolescence (e.g., Greenberger and Steinberg, 1981; Greenberger et 
al., 1981, 1982; Steinberg et al., 1981, 1982). They stated their conclusions bluntly: 
“[E]xtensive commitment to a job may interfere with the work of growing up…work that 
requires exploration, experimentation, and introspection” (1986:7, 9). This research 
agenda did not arise in a vacuum, and in fact, they were not the first to express concerns 
about the precocity of early work involvement; they were simply the most vocal about it 
(see Greenberger, 1983; Steinberg, 1982).4  
Results from developmental research generally favored a less sanguine view of 
the benefits of early work experience. To be sure, the overarching theme was that “the 
correlates of school-year employment are generally negative” (Steinberg and Dornbusch, 
1991:309). Developmental research showed that adolescent employment—particularly 
“high-intensity” employment of over 20 hours weekly during the school year—has 
                                                 
4 Greenberger and Steinberg (1986) echoed a theme made forcefully in the early 20th century by 
Hall (1904:xvi-xvii): 
In this environment our young people leap rather than grow into maturity…. [O]ur vast and 
complex business organization…absorbs ever more and earlier the best talent and muscle of 
youth…but we are progressively forgetting that for the complete apprenticeship to life, youth 
needs repose, leisure, art, legends, romance, idealization, and in a word humanism, if it is to enter 
the kingdom of man well equipped for man’s highest work in the world. 
The heightened concern with adolescents who adopted adult-like behaviors and attitudes may have been 
symptomatic of deeper concerns about the social changes taking place at the turn of the century. Kett 
(1978) points out that precocious adolescents were probably viewed as symbols of an increasingly 
“precocious” society. 
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detrimental consequences for several arenas of adolescent development: mental and 
physical health, family relationships, school performance, and peer associations, to name 
a few. The accumulated empirical findings from the last 20 years suggest several 
theoretical avenues to explain the consistently positive relationship between work 
intensity and delinquency and substance use reviewed in Chapter One. I review two types 
of theories: those that specify causal mechanisms and those that specify spurious 
mechanisms.  
 
Causal Mechanisms for the Adverse Work Intensity Effect  
 Figure 15 illustrates several potential causal mechanisms to explain the 
relationship between intensive work during adolescence and elevated involvement in 
problem behavior. In the language of structural equations, this positive correlation 
reflects a “reduced-form” or indirect relationship, in that one or more intermediate 
mechanisms are directly responsible for the observed effect. Thus, intensive work is 
simply the first step in a causal sequence, the end result being increased levels of problem 
behavior. Prominent criminological theories that specify mediating causal mechanisms 
include social control, general strain, learning, and routine activity theories. Each of the 
potential causal mechanisms highlighted by these theories, as well as their empirical 
plausibility, is summarized below.  
*** Figure 15 Here *** 
Social Control Theory. Youth employment has particular salience for adolescent 
functioning in family and school domains. With respect to family relationships, 
developmental research suggests that intensive employment disrupts healthy parent-child 
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relationships. Youths who work intensively during high school tend to spend less time 
with (Greenberger et al., 1980; Marsh, 1991; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer and 
Shanahan, 1994; Pickering and Vazsonyi, 2002; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991),5 are 
less emotionally close to (Greenberger et al., 1980; Pickering and Vazsonyi, 2002; 
Shanahan et al., 1991; see Gottfredson, 1985, for an exception), engage in more 
disagreements with (Bachman et al., 1986; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; 
Manning, 1990; Mortimer and Shanahan, 1994), are less closely monitored by (Manning, 
1990; Pickering and Vazsonyi, 2002; Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg and 
Dornbusch, 1991; Tanner and Krahn, 1991), and exercise greater decision-making 
autonomy vis-à-vis (Mortimer and Shanahan, 1994; Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; 
Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991) their parents than non-workers or moderate workers.6  
In schooling domains, intensive youth work appears to be responsible for 
disinvestment in and disengagement from school. High-intensity work during high school 
tends to be associated with less time spent on homework and studying (Agnew, 1986; 
Bachman et al., 1986; Bartko and Eccles, 2003; D’Amico, 1984a; Lillydahl, 1990; 
Marsh, 1991; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer et al., 1996; Steinberg et al., 1982, 
1993; for an exception see Gottfredson, 1985; Osgood, 1999; Schoenhals et al., 1998), 
                                                 
5 It is possible that this is moderated by residential location and job type. Shanahan et al. (1996) 
found that intensive work is associated with more time spent with the family. Their sample consisted of 
youths residing in central Iowa, many of whom worked with other family members in family-owned 
businesses or on farms. 
6 Youths that work at moderate intensity, however, may actually experience more positive 
relationships with their parents than even non-workers (Pickering and Vazsonyi, 2002). This idea fits well 
with research indicating that parents by and large encourage work involvement that fosters self-reliance and 
self-worth, financial independence, time management skills, and an appreciation for adult responsibility 
(Phillips and Sandstrom, 1990). Moreover, many of the youth-parent disagreements that emerge about 
employment tend to concern such relatively mundane issues as how late youths stay out, helping more 
around the house, and how earnings are spent (Manning, 1990; see also Campbell, 1969; Csikszentmihalyi 
and Larson, 1984). In other words, the issue underlying these conflicts is the newfound independence of 
working adolescents; not so much its existence perhaps as the speed with which it is acquired and the 
circumstances under which it is exercised (Campbell, 1969:830). 
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cutting class and absenteeism (Bachman et al., 1986; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; 
Barling et al., 1995; Greenberger et al., 1981; Lillydahl, 1990; Marsh, 1991; Schoenhals 
et al., 1998; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991; Steinberg et al., 1993; for an exception see 
Gottfredson, 1985; Hotchkiss, 1986), lower educational expectations and aspirations 
(Agnew, 1986; Bachman et al., 2003; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; Marsh, 1991; 
Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer and Finch, 1986; Steinberg et al., 1993; for an 
exception see Green and Jaquess, 1987), a non-college prep or non-academic track 
curriculum (Bachman et al., 1986, 2003; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; Marsh, 1991), 
fewer courses in mathematics and science (Marsh, 1991; Singh and Ozturk, 2000), 
negative school attitudes (Agnew, 1986; Bachman et al., 1986; Steinberg and Avenevoli, 
1998; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991; Steinberg et al., 1982, 1993; but see Gottfredson, 
1985; Mortimer et al., 1996), and dropout and forgoing college attendance and 
completion (Carr et al., 1996; D’Amico, 1984a; Lillydahl, 1990; McNeal, 1997; 
Mortimer and Finch, 1986; Mortimer and Johnson, 1998; Steel, 1991; Warren et al., 
2001; Warren and Lee, 2003). The research with respect to scholastic performance (as 
measured by grades and test scores) is mixed, with numerous studies finding evidence 
that longer work hours correspond with lower educational performance (Agnew, 1986; 
Bachman et al., 1986, 2003; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; Green and Jaquess, 1987, 
using ACT scores; Hansen and Jarvis, 2000; Marsh, 1991; Mortimer and Finch, 1986; 
Mortimer and Johnson, 1998; Schill et al., 1985; Singh, 1998; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 
1991; Tyler, 2003), while others find no relationship (Green and Jaquess, 1987, using 
GPA; Hotchkiss, 1986; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer et al., 1996; Schoenhals et 
al., 1998; Steinberg et al., 1982, 1993; Warren et al., 2000).  
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Social control theory, for one, predicts that an intensive work commitment during 
adolescence disrupts emotional attachment to parents (“relational control”), diminishes 
parental monitoring of adolescent behavior (“instrumental control”), and erodes 
commitment to conventional educational pursuits (Hirschi, 1969). For Hirschi, youths 
who share their thoughts, feelings, and goals with their parents, and who personally 
identify with their parents—who are, in a word, attached—are more strongly bound to 
their expectations and thus to the legal norms of society. Affectional identification, love, 
and respect are crucial elements of the emotional bond to parents. At the same time, 
youths who spend more time in the company of their parents (direct monitoring), but 
more importantly who perceive their parents as aware of their whereabouts, companions, 
and activities when away from home (indirect or “virtual” monitoring), are more likely to 
give thought to parental reaction before engaging in deviant behavior. In the domain of 
school, youths who demonstrate higher academic competence, express greater liking of 
school, have more concern for the opinions of teachers, exert more scholastic effort, 
perceive good grades as important, and devote more time to homework, consequently 
have more time and energy invested in this conventional socializing institution, and thus 
more to lose by engaging in deviant conduct. Taken as a whole, then, social control 
theory proposes that the unattached, uncommitted, and uninvolved youth is subject to 
lower levels of informal social control over her behavior. To the extent that intensive 
work weakens the youth’s bond to conventional society, higher levels of delinquency and 
substance use are a consequence.  
General Strain Theory. Most adolescents work in minimum-wage jobs 
concentrated in the secondary labor market (Greenberger and Steinberg, 1986), and little 
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of what they do on the job provides opportunities for learning, such as the use of reading, 
writing, or arithmetic skills, formal training, or spending time with a supervisor 
(Greenberger et al., 1982). Mortimer (2003) finds that intensive work patterns are 
characterized by a significantly greater number of work stressors, such as uncertainty 
about work tasks, role overload, and noxious work conditions, and this job stress is much 
more likely to be perceived by young males than young females. Greenberger et al. 
(1981) report that work stressors such as task meaninglessness, poor environmental 
conditions, autocratic supervision, low wage structure, and conflict between work and 
school roles increase the likelihood of excessive alcohol use. Ruggiero et al. (1982) also 
find that a stressful work environment (high levels of noise, time pressure, temperature 
extremes, heavy lifting, dangerous equipment) increases the likelihood of theft and non-
theft deviance in the workplace. Part of this effect may operate through the development 
of cynical attitudes toward work (Ruggiero et al., 1982; Steinberg et al. 1982).7  
 In addition to these on-the-job stressors is the concern that extensive involvement 
in employment compromises a youth’s central role as student by conflicting with school 
demands. In other words, premature “embeddedness” in the worker role diminishes the 
time and effort invested in other developmentally appropriate roles, primarily the student 
role (see Wright et al., 2002). Hansen and Jarvis (2000) find that longer work hours 
interfere with school attentiveness (e.g., come to school tired because of work). Warren 
                                                 
7 Employed adolescents are not immune from occupational injuries, illnesses, and even fatalities. 
The U.S. Department of Labor (2000:58-67) estimates that 67 work-related deaths occurred per year during 
the 1992 to 1998 period, with little variability over time. While 43 percent of these fatalities were 
concentrated in the agricultural industry, 19 percent were in retail trade, and another 14 percent in 
construction. Of the fatalities among youths in retail trade, about two thirds were homicides, suggesting 
robbery. From 1992 to 1997, there were almost 18,800 injuries and illnesses per year, on average, among 
youths 17 and younger requiring time away from work. Over this period, injured youths lost a median four 
days of work, with the most frequent type of injury being sprains, strains, or tears. Over two thirds of 
workplace injuries were in the retail trade sector. 
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(2002) finds that longer work hours diminish the centrality of the student role for youths’ 
identities. Mortimer (2003) reports that many young workers struggle in combining the 
roles of employee and student. The most intensively employed youths have difficulty 
completing their homework, coming to class prepared, coming to school on time, and 
coming to school with adequate rest. Staff and Uggen (2003) find that work-school 
incompatibility (work reduces grades) is a consistent predictor of senior-year problem 
behavior, controlling for other work characteristics.  
Several studies also find that intensive employment has consequences for the 
mental and physical health of adolescents. Intensively employed adolescents tend to 
suffer from lower self-esteem (Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991; Steinberg et al., 1993; for 
exceptions see Bachman et al., 1986; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; Mortimer 
et al., 1996), depressed mood (Resnick et al., 1997; Shanahan et al., 1991), and 
diminished time allotted for sleep, exercise, and breakfast (Bachman et al., 1986; 
Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; D’Amico, 1984b; Mortimer, 2003; Safron et al., 
2001), in addition to a higher likelihood of crime victimization (Bachman et al., 1986, 
2003; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; Dugan and Apel, 2003). 
According to general strain theory, heavy work involvement creates job 
dissatisfaction and stress, a form of noxious stimuli that, in the absence of conventional 
coping mechanisms, is eased through delinquency and alcohol and drug use (Agnew, 
1992). Agnew’s theory proposes that negative relationships with others increase the 
likelihood that individuals will experience negative affect (depression, anger, fear, 
cynicism), with a corresponding desire to take corrective action to alleviate strain. One 
potent source of strain relevant to adolescent work is the “presentation of negatively 
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valued stimuli” in the workplace. The highly impersonal and demanding workplace of 
teenage “McJobs” may generate a desire to manage the resulting negative affect inwardly 
through substance use (smoking, drinking, using marijuana) and poor physical health 
(lack of sleep, exercise, eating). Brezina (1996) highlights three additional coping 
responses, or delinquent adaptations, to the strain that may be induced by intensive 
employment. Youth may respond to the strain produced by conflict with school by 
skipping classes or dropping out of school altogether, a form of “escape/avoidance” 
behavior. Low remuneration of youth work in combination with long hours on the job 
may generate a desire to “level the playing field” by stealing money or goods from one’s 
employer, taking extra time for breaks, purposely working in an inefficient manner, or 
other forms of “compensation” for their negative emotional states. Strained youths may 
also adapt through vandalism, physical violence, and other forms of “retaliation” as a 
way to achieve a sense of justice.  
Learning Theory. The adolescent workplace is dominated by young people. 
Greenberg et al. (1982) find that food service jobs—among the most common adolescent 
jobs—involve a high degree of time spent with and interaction with peers in the 
workplace. Thus, an intensive work commitment puts adolescents in contact with a wider 
circle of young people, some of whom may have dropped out of school. McMorris and 
Uggen (2000) find that spending more time with work friends leads to higher levels of 
9th grade alcohol use. Moreover, several researchers find that employment increases 
exposure to delinquent peers (Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Ploeger, 1997; Tanner and 
Krahn, 1991). Wright and colleagues (Wright and Cullen, 2000; Wright et al., 2002) find 
further that a high level of co-worker delinquency increases a youth’s own non-work 
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delinquency. Ruggiero et al. (1982) report that working in a positive social environment 
(closeness with co-workers, opportunity to get to know people in the workplace, more 
socializing with co-workers outside the workplace) actually increases the likelihood of 
engaging in occupational deviance. Wright and Cullen (2000) find that contact with 
delinquent co-workers is a strong predictor of occupational deviance, net of job 
characteristics (positive job skills, negative work environment) and delinquent propensity 
(low self-control, non-work delinquency). In fact, delinquent youths who interact with 
delinquent co-workers increase their occupational deviance over and above the direct 
effects of either engaging in non-work delinquency or associating with delinquent co-
workers. 
 Learning theories such as differential association and social learning propose that 
intensive employment puts youths in regular contact with older, less-than-conventional 
peers in the workplace, who provide a source of antisocial attitude transference, 
behavioral modeling, and reinforcement (Akers et al., 1979; Sutherland, 1947). Intensive 
employment puts youths in close proximity to a wider social circle for a non-trivial 
number of hours each week. Since the workplace is less age segregated than the high 
school, working youths are likely to come into regular contact with older adolescents and 
young adults. Considering that youth job opportunities often originate in low-wage, low-
skill, service occupations, adult co-workers in this environment are expected to be more 
deviant and unconventional. Consequently, intensive employment potentially alters the 
balance of definitions favorable and unfavorable to violation of the legal code, as 
Sutherland’s differential association theory predicts. Moreover, it is quite likely that the 
working youth’s parents are less familiar with their son’s or daughter’s new workplace 
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associates than with his or her school peers. Akers’ social learning theory proposes that 
this differential association forms an immediate context for the acquisition of antisocial 
definitions (verbal) and delinquent imitation (behavioral). Over time, the resulting 
problem behavior is maintained through processes of differential reinforcement. Warr 
(2002) proposes that three potent sources of social reinforcement for antisocial conduct 
are fear of ridicule for non-compliance, loyalty to the group, and the social status that the 
association with older youths brings. There is also the possibility of non-social 
reinforcement attributable to the intrinsically rewarding experience of committing crime, 
including, in the case of employee theft, the feeling of “being on a high” and the sense of 
accomplishment associated with “edgework” (Wood et al., 1997), or the “sneaky thrills” 
associated with conquering one’s emotions to maintain a normal, calm appearance at the 
workplace until the crime has transpired (Katz, 1988).  
Routine Activity Theory. In contrast to a straightforward “zero-sum” model of the 
allocation of time between employment and leisure activities, work intensity does not 
lead to a reduction in time spent with friends (Greenberger et al., 1980; Steinberg et al., 
1982). On the contrary, adolescents who work at high intensity tend to spend more time 
each week going out on dates, (Agnew, 1986; Bachman et al., 1986; Bachman and 
Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Safron et al., 2001), going out for 
evening fun and recreation (Bachman et al., 1986; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; 
Safron et al., 2001), and spending time with friends (Ploeger, 1997). Working adolescents 
also participate in such activities as cruising around, going to parties and movies, 
shopping, and having informal get-togethers with friends (Bachman et al., 1986; Osgood, 
1999; Safron et al., 2001). Thus, employed youths appear to be able to find time for an 
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active social life. Time for these consumption-driven and peer-oriented leisure activities 
may be drawn from other forms of adolescent time use, as extensive work involvement 
also tends to be associated with less time spent watching TV, being alone, playing 
instruments, reading for pleasure, participating in sports, volunteering, joining clubs, and 
observing religious ceremonies (Bachman et al., 1986; Bartko and Eccles, 2003; Green 
and Jaquess, 1987; Osgood, 1999; Safron et al., 2001), as well as completing fewer 
household chores (D’Amico, 1984b).  
An extensive work commitment also presents newfound opportunities for 
workplace deviance unavailable to non-employed youths. Working youths who report 
that it would be easy to steal at work are more likely to engage in theft and non-theft 
workplace deviance (Ruggiero et al., 1982). Wright and Cullen (2000) find that low self-
control and non-work delinquency—proxies for delinquent “propensity”—are 
independent predictors of occupational deviance. Thus, the workplace can be a “gold 
mine” of deviant opportunities for those youths who are so inclined. 
 Routine activity and opportunity theories predict that intensively employed youths 
spend more time engaging in unstructured leisure activities with peers in the absence of 
adult authority figures (Osgood et al., 1996). According to Osgood and colleagues, the 
motivation for problem behavior inheres in the situation rather than in the participants or 
in the activity itself (see also Briar and Piliavin, 1965). In particular, situations most 
conducive to deviance involve (1) time spent in the company of peers, (2) an absence of 
adult authority figures (e.g., “handlers” or “place managers”), and (3) no organization or 
agenda for how time is to be spent. Accordingly, youths who are intensively employed 
are more likely to spend their time being “out and about” (e.g., driving, cruising, 
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shopping) and “making the scene” (e.g., parties, dates, bars), suggesting a pattern that is 
“anything but ‘all work and no play’” (Osgood, 1999:180). They thereby more often 
place themselves in these social situations conducive to deviance. The automobile plays a 
particularly important role in the routine activities of youths. By providing autonomy, 
having a car presents ample opportunities to cruise around with friends farther away from 
home and the watchful eyes of parents and other “handlers” (Felson, 1998). From a 
simple opportunity perspective, moreover, adolescent employment facilitates access to 
the “tools” of deviance. For example, the income earned by working can be used to 
purchase cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana, or stolen property. Additionally, older workplace 
associates who are of legal age are able to purchase alcohol for their underage co-
workers.  
 
Spurious Mechanisms for the Adverse Work Intensity Effect  
 Some theories propose that the positive relationship between intensive work and 
problem behavior is a spurious one. These theories view the manifold negative correlates 
of intensive youth employment reviewed in the foregoing section as more than a mere 
coincidence. Rather, they are viewed as multiple outcomes of a common underlying 
process. Bachman and Schulenberg (1993:232) conclude that “heavy time commitment to 
employment can be seen as an important symptom of a potentially wide range of 
psychosocial difficulties.” The emphasis on intensive work as a symptom clearly suggests 
that it is but one of several adverse outcomes associated with some latent, unifying 
process. Studies of the correlational structure of problem behavior during early and 
middle adolescence lend credence to this perspective. For example, Donovan and Jessor 
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(1985) find that such diverse behaviors as alcohol use, smoking marijuana, sexual 
intercourse, general deviant behavior (shoplifting, vandalism, lying, truancy, fighting, 
parental defiance), and even church attendance and school performance (reverse coded), 
all load on a single first-order construct that they refer to as a “syndrome” of problem 
behavior. This finding of a univariate factor structure of adolescent problem behavior is 
remarkably robust (see also Donovan et al., 1988; Farrell et al., 1992; McGee and 
Newcomb, 1992).8  
 Empirical studies that explicitly address the possibility of spuriousness support 
this notion. The results of Paternoster et al. (2003), clearly fall under a “spurious work 
effect” interpretation. Recall from Chapter One their finding that, once they adjust for 
unobserved heterogeneity using individual fixed effects, there is no relationship between 
intensive work during the school year and delinquency, substance use, or problem 
behavior. Schoenhals et al. (1998) find that the relationship between tenth-grade work 
intensity and academic outcomes (grades, absenteeism, time spent on homework) 
disappears once background variables (e.g., parental education, family income, school 
type) and controls for pre-existing differences between workers and non-workers (e.g., 
8th grade academic performance and school detachment) are introduced.9 Warren et al. 
(2000) use instrumental variables to identify the simultaneous relationship between work 
intensity and academic performance in the 12th grade (grades in academic courses). They 
instrument for work intensity using the lagged (10th grade) zip-code-level employment 
                                                 
8 Notably, this appears to be true only during early and middle adolescence. Studies of late 
adolescents and young adults suggest greater differentiation (specialization?) of problem behavior (Osgood 
et al., 1988).  
9 It is noteworthy that introducing the predictors of employment does not reduce the effect of work 
intensity on absenteeism to non-significance. In fact, there is a roughly linear increase in absenteeism as a 
function of work intensity. The effect, however, is quite modest, suggesting that youths that work the most 
intensively (31+ hours per week) are absent just over one additional day (1.3) per semester, on average, 
relative to non-working youths. 
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rate of 16 to 19 year old high-school students and graduates, and they instrument for 
academic performance using lagged reading and math achievement scores. Subsequently, 
they find no relationship between work intensity and academic performance.10 Findings 
by Hotz et al. (2002) suggest that even favorable work effects on wages in early 
adulthood may be spurious. In their most rigorous specification (their “dynamic selection 
control” model), the returns to work experience during high school were small and non-
significant.  
Theories that specify spurious mechanisms include precocious development and 
propensity theories. Although there is resemblance with respect to the underlying 
mechanism that accounts for the correlations among diverse problem behaviors 
(discussed below), the theories differ in one very important respect: whether the 
underlying structure of problem behavior is unique to the period of adolescence, or 
manifests itself in a stable way across all life stages. These two theories are illustrated in 
Figure 16, and are reviewed below.  
*** Figure 16 Here *** 
 Precocious Development Theory. Precocious development theory draws attention 
to the life stage of adolescence per se, emphasizing the changes in affiliations, identities, 
and responsibilities that correspond with a stage-appropriate “drive toward autonomy.” 
This perspective attributes the positive association between intensive work and problem 
behavior to the overly hasty transition to adult-like roles and behaviors that coincides 
                                                 
10 This is an interesting conclusion in light of the fact that Warren et al. (2000) used the same data 
set as Tyler (2003), but arrived at a different conclusion. Moreover, both used an instrumental variables 
estimation strategy (simultaneous equations in Warren et al.’s study, single equation in Tyler’s study). 
Warren and colleagues concluded that work intensity has no impact on senior-year grades in academic 
courses, whereas Tyler concluded that higher work intensity negatively influences math and reading test 
scores. One possible explanation is that Warren et al.’s conclusion is a methodological artifact, a 
consequence of questionable exclusion restrictions. 
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with emancipation from emotional and financial independence upon parents. According 
to this perspective, intensive employment is one symptom of a broader, latent, stage-
specific propensity to expedite the transition to adulthood: “The underlying motivation is 
to engage in adult behaviors that are rewarding at an age that is generally considered to 
be premature for such behavior” (Newcomb and Bentler, 1988:39). The issue is thus one 
of early timing of transitions, rather than the simple occurrence of transitions.11 This 
notion has been variously referred to as “pseudomaturity” (Greenberger and Steinberg, 
1986), “premature affluence” (Bachman, 1983), “transition proneness” (Jessor and 
Jessor, 1977), and “precocious maturity” (Newcomb and Bentler, 1988). Each refers to 
“the appearance but not the substance of maturity” (Greenberg and Steinberg, 1986:5), or 
the idea that adolescents have not yet acquired the capabilities and maturity necessary to 
assume adult roles and responsibilities.12  
The idea of early and intensive work as one symptom of a precocious maturity is 
consistent with a growing body of literature that links youth employment with such 
activities as dating, sexual intercourse, pregnancy, alcohol use, and smoking (Bachman 
and Schulenberg, 1993; Ku et al., 1993; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Resnick et al., 1997). 
Much of this problem behavior is normatively age graded, such that they are only 
considered “problem behavior” when engaged in by teenagers. Accordingly, early and 
intensive involvement in the youth labor market simply constitutes one of the 
                                                 
11 True to most developmental accounts, then, there is the implicit assumption of a single, 
“normal” or “ideal” course of development that is accelerated or foreshortened in precocious youth.  
12 Hirschi (1969) also touched on the notion of “premature claims to adult status.” According to 
his social control theory: 
[C]laims to adult status may be seen as an orientation toward adult activities which may or may 
not be expressed in actual indulgence in these activities…. To claim the right to act contrary to the 
wishes of adults is to express contempt for “their” expectations, which…is to free oneself for the 
commission of delinquent acts. (1969:166, emphasis in original) 
Hirschi thus theorized that “premature adulthood” affects delinquency indirectly through its impact on 
attitudes toward adult expectations. 
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accoutrements of a desired “pseudo-adult” lifestyle and the precocious youth’s perceived 
ticket to independence. In reality, however, this independence manifests itself more as a 
form of “hyper-independence,” or what Campbell (1969) refers to as “normative excess.” 
Newcomb and Bentler (1988:216) characterize this normative excess well by relating 
precocious development to either “extreme versions of those developmental tasks 
confronted in adolescence or else…ones that should normatively be faced as adults.” 
However, Jessor et al. (1991) propose that the overall course of development during the 
transition to adulthood is toward greater conventionality (e.g., higher value on 
achievement, lower value on independence, lower tolerance of deviance), particularly 
among those who were the least conventional as adolescents. Thus, by late adolescence 
or early adulthood, precocious youths “mature out” of problem behavior as they assume 
conventional work and family roles.  
Newcomb and Bentler (1988) point out that a dominant theme of precocious 
development theories is the inability to delay gratification, in that the more rewarding 
aspects of adulthood as perceived by youths are sought (and encouraged and respected by 
peers) at the expense of the more difficult tasks responsibly gained through experience 
and maturity. This suggests that youth employment provides a way to circumvent the 
“typical” maturational sequences without acquiring the growth that enhances success in 
these adult-like roles, thus increasing the likelihood of failure in these roles (1988:35-36). 
Bachman (1983) also draws attention to the theme of immediate gratification in 
adolescent spending patterns, observing that the typical high-school student is likely to 
use most or all of her earnings for discretionary spending. He finds that high-school 
seniors report spending a substantial portion of their earnings not on saving for college, 
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car payments, household expenses, or other long-term goals, but rather on clothing, 
stereos, music, eating out, recreation, and other personal expenses, or on what he refers to 
as “dressing well and having a good time” (1983:66). Bachman interprets this pattern of 
spending earnings on immediate sources of pleasure and a lifestyle of leisure as an 
indicator of a diminished ability to delay gratification.  
Propensity Theory. Propensity theories propose that intensive youth employment 
and such correlates as problem behavior, school disengagement, poor grades, diminished 
aspirations, emotional distance from parents, and exposure to delinquent peers are all 
diverse manifestations of a single underlying tendency that is established early in life and 
remains relatively stable over time. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:177) refer to this 
proclivity as low self-control, or the tendency to pursue short-term gratification without 
consideration of the long-term consequences of one’s actions. According to their theory, 
youth employment and its adverse outcomes are simply manifestations of the 
“versatility” of individuals with low self-control. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) would 
also be classified as a propensity or “ontogenetic” theory. Abstracting from their 
biosocial theory, intensively employed youths have certain traits, such as low intelligence 
and impulsive personality, which make them less attuned to the long-term consequences 
of their actions. Their sense of immediacy, in combination with the failure of 
conventional socializing institutions (primarily the family) to reinforce internal 
inhibitions (i.e., a “conscience”) against deviance, leads these youths to take advantage of 
the short-term benefits of intensive employment and antisocial behavior (e.g., autonomy, 
earnings, social status) at the expense of the long-term costs (e.g., lower grades, dropout, 
arrest). 
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A growing body of empirical research provides some support for the notion that 
stable differences between individuals—whether low self-control or some other 
construct—account for at least part of the observed correlation between intensive work 
and problem behavior. Of particular relevance is the finding by Agnew (1986) that youths 
with low self-control work longer hours, net of sources of informal social control. Studies 
that include a measure of low self-control as a covariate find that this construct predicts 
problem behavior net of work involvement (Wright et al., 1997, 2002). Studies that 
include a lagged measure of problem behavior—often used as a proxy for population 
heterogeneity or “propensity”—consistently find that prior problem behavior is a strong 
predictor of present problem behavior (Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Mortimer et al., 1996; 
Paternoster et al., 2003; Ploeger, 1997; Wright et al., 2002). Paternoster et al. (2003) are 
able to “knock out” the intensive work effect on problem behavior by introducing 
individual fixed effects, suggesting that between-individual differences that are stable 
over time explain the correlation between the two. 
Propensity theory differs from precocious development theory in one important 
respect—the underlying “propensity” is generally presumed to be stable rather than 
transitory. This distinction is especially important given that both theories draw upon a 
concept of the inability to delay gratification as the basis for the relationship between 
intensive youth work and problem behavior. According to precocious development 
theory, the positive association is motivated by the maturity gap and the “storm and 
stress” of adolescence. According to propensity theory, the positive association is rooted 
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in biological predispositions and poor socialization that are set early in life (by age 8) and 
remain relatively stable thereafter.13
 
RACE, THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, AND THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF 
INTENSIVE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT 
 
 The literature reviewed to this point implies that there is theoretical agreement 
that a heavy work commitment is detrimental for involvement in adolescent problem 
behavior.14 The truth is, however, that criminological theory is not uniformly arrayed 
against intensive youth work. Indeed, Paternoster et al. (2003) show that the same 
theories often predict both beneficial and adverse effects of intensive work on problem 
behavior. For example, if working facilitates strong attachment to conventional 
employers and other workplace adults and socialization into the conventional order, 
social control theory predicts a negative association with problem behavior. To the extent 
that employment provides a source of money and thus alleviates the negative emotional 
state accompanying the inability to acquire desired goods (e.g., nice clothes, CDs, 
movies, etc.), general strain theory likewise proposes that intensive work reduces 
problem behavior. Employers and other well-meaning adults in the workplace who 
provide a source of conventional socialization and mentoring might also contribute to 
reduced problem behavior, as predicted by learning theory. To the extent that a heavy 
                                                 
13 Newcomb and Bentler (1988:38) speculate that the source of the inability to delay gratification 
that is the source of precocious maturity “may stretch back into childhood,” in which case their theory is 
entirely consistent with the propensity theory of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). However, they also 
entertain the possibility that it derives from social sensitivity to pressure to appear grown-up. In the final 
analysis, their theory remains agnostic about the actual source of precocious maturity. Therefore, because 
of its similarity with other developmental perspectives, I opt to interpret it as a “maturity gap” theory rather 
than as a “low self-control” theory.  
14 This is not because delinquency theorists have explicitly incorporated youth employment into 
their theories. In fact, only two theories have done so: precocious development (Bachman and Schulenberg, 
1993; Greenberger and Steinberg, 1986) and social control (Hirschi 1969, 1983).  
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work commitment after school and on the weekends precludes “hanging out” in peer-
dominated social settings, routine activity theory suggests that intensive work reduces 
problem behavior. In many ways, then, it is only through post hoc theorizing that 
criminologists can explain the positive correlation between intensive youth work and 
problem behavior.  
Empirical accounts provide some basis for the assertion that such social-structural 
factors as race and socioeconomic risk level moderate the relationship between youth 
employment and related outcomes. By virtually all accounts, adolescent employment is a 
suburban white, middle-class phenomenon (Carr et al., 1996; Greenberger and Steinberg, 
1986; Marsh, 1991; Mortimer, 2003; National Research Council, 1998; Rothstein, 2001; 
Schoenhals et al., 1998; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000). There is no shortage of 
evidence that the availability of so-called “naturally occurring” jobs is structured to a 
large extent by family background (two parents, higher income, suburban residence, 
parental employment and high-status occupation) and local employment opportunities 
(retail jobs, employment growth, unemployment, residential segregation, racial 
discrimination), which provide a “resource advantage” to suburban white over urban 
minority youths (see Deseran and Keithly, 1994; Larson and Mohanty, 1999; Lewin-
Epstein, 1986; Michael and Tuma, 1984; O’Regan and Quigley, 1996; Stoll, 1998).15 
Moreover, since white youths begin working at a comparatively younger age, whites have 
acquired a larger stock of work-related skills as well as an enlarged employment network 
                                                 
15 Gardecki (2001) finds that, in a multivariate model, “family variables” (e.g., family structure, 
parental employment, sibling employment) jointly predict the probability that a white youth will be 
employed in a formal job, whereas “neighborhood variables” (e.g., urbanicity, unemployment rate) and 
“access variables” (e.g., travel time to work) do not contribute net of family factors. For black youths, on 
the other hand, family variables do not predict formal employment net of neighborhood and access 
variables. 
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at any given age than minorities. These experiences give whites a “leg up” in the youth 
labor market by teaching them the “soft skills” which make them more desirable as 
employees and by providing them better access to employment networks and 
opportunities. Apel et al. (2003) entertain the possibility that, because of the fewer 
employment opportunities available to minority youths (due to disadvantaged family 
background, racial discrimination, residential segregation, less conventional self-
presentation style), employers are better able to “skim” the best prospects from minority 
applicants. That is, the average minority worker may be generally low risk because of this 
differential selection process on the part of employers. On the other hand, the average 
white worker, because employers reach further back into the pool of applicants, may be at 
a comparatively higher risk for antisocial behavior.  
Limited evidence also suggests that the negative “premature affluence” created by 
adolescent employment does not generalize to all socioeconomic contexts. Entwisle et al. 
(2000), for example, find that a larger proportion of disadvantaged and minority youths 
contribute their earnings to the family economy, suggesting that middle-class youths 
work for very different reasons than lower-class youths (see also Johnson and Lino, 
2000). Newman (1999) adds that poor inner-city youths must often cover the marginal 
cost of their presence in the household (see also Sullivan, 1989).16 Thus, the meaning of 
adolescent employment as it relates to the generation of discretionary income, 
consumption, and a “lifestyle of active leisure” may be true only for relatively 
advantaged youths. Because of their resource advantages, these youths occupy more 
                                                 
16 On this point, Marsh (1991) found that using employment earnings to help support the family 
was inversely related to school troublesomeness. 
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favorable positions in youth “labor queues” (Deseran and Keithly, 1994), but are also the 
most likely to take for granted the potential benefits of early work experience.  
Leventhal et al. (2001) suggest that for poor urban adolescents exposed to low-
quality schools and residing in neighborhoods offering expansive illegal opportunities, 
not having a job may be associated with higher levels of problem behavior (see also 
Anderson, 1999). The findings by Good et al. (1986) support this notion. They rely on a 
sample of low-income 13 to 18 year olds enrolled in a crime prevention program in inner-
city Philadelphia. Using monthly data on employment and arrest for 47 months, they find 
that being employed significantly reduces the probability of arrest. This is the only study 
of a contemporary sample to find that youth employment reduces the likelihood of 
problem behavior, and it is notable that it is the highest-risk sample encountered in this 
literature (followed by Gottfredson, 1985, who found no relationship).  
Farrington et al. (1986) find that rates of officially-recorded offending were 
higher during periods of unemployment for 16- to 18-year-old working-class London 
men in the Cambridge Study.17 Conversely, they find that convicted youths experience 
higher rates of unemployment (or non-employment), on average, than non-convicted 
youths. When they condition on a prediction scale of delinquency at age 10 (e.g., low 
income, poor parental child rearing, low intelligence, parental conviction), they find that 
unemployment is significantly related to crime only among those with the most risk 
factors. This latter finding suggests that unemployment is criminogenic only among those 
with high propensity for crime, and therefore may not cause crime among generally low-
                                                 
17 Although labor economists define unemployment as being out of work but seeking employment 
(i.e., not employed but in the labor force), Farrington et al. (1986) do not appear to make this distinction. 
Thus, unemployment in their study is more accurately characterized as non-employment, although the 
authors are unclear on this point. 
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risk youths. Viewed another way, employment may be associated with the largest crime-
preventive benefits among high-risk youths, but may have little or no impact on crime 
among low-risk youths.  
In accord with the foregoing quantitative findings, qualitative accounts further 
illustrate the strong link between level of risk and the valence of the “work effect.” Hagan 
and McCarthy (1997) suggest that employment is a key turning point in the youth 
homelessness “career.” Not only does the income from steady work provide the 
economic means to successfully exit the street, but embeddedness in employment 
institutions creates a “dissonance” that is in direct opposition to the maintenance of an 
active street life. The jobs that homeless youths acquire are, on the whole, low-skill, 
service types of work, such as fast food, janitorial, and retail jobs. Despite the uniformly 
low quality of these work opportunities, a larger share of time spent in the workplace 
corresponds with less time spent hanging out, panhandling, using drugs, stealing, and 
engaging in other criminal activities. 
Sullivan’s (1989) comparative ethnography of groups of young males from three 
Brooklyn neighborhoods highlights the intersection of ecology, economic opportunity, 
and family capital in shaping employment and crime decisions during the teenage years. 
Although youths from all three neighborhoods engaged in similar amounts of expressive 
violence and exploratory theft during their early teens, only the youths from the two poor, 
minority neighborhoods (La Barriada, Projectville) sustained their involvement in 
burglary, larceny, and robbery as a primary source of income through their middle and 
late teens. The more pervasive legitimate economic opportunities and neighborhood-
based employment networks in the most advantaged neighborhood (Hamilton Park) 
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contributed to these youths’ earlier desistance from economic crime as they acquired 
better paying, skilled manual jobs. Sullivan also draws attention to a secondary benefit of 
these more expansive youth work opportunities: 
Labor market segmentation affects the career patterns described in this study not 
only by providing competitive labor market advantages to one group but also by 
weakening social controls in the other two. The unionized workers of Hamilton 
Park enjoy relatively greater job security and pay, which allow them to maintain 
more two-parent households and a more stable neighborhood environment. Youth 
joblessness in the minority communities makes economic crime more attractive, 
while adult un- and underemployment contribute to a weakened social control 
environment. (1989:226) 
 
Newman (1999) suggests that intensive employment provides an important sense 
of order and structure in otherwise disorganized inner-city environments, even 
employment in low-wage and unskilled jobs such as fast food work. For high-risk youths, 
the structure and discipline of the workplace tend to permeate other institutional settings, 
particularly the school. The Harlem “Burger Barn” owners in Newman’s study further 
facilitated the connection between employment and schooling by monitoring report cards, 
paying for books, sponsoring tutoring programs, offering monetary rewards for good 
grades, and threatening to cut back on the work hours of young people who performed 
poorly in school.  
In summary, there is some evidence that the relationship between work intensity 
and antisocial behavior may actually be negative for some groups of youths, particularly 
racial minorities and lower-class youths residing in inner cities. These youths face 
different employment opportunity structures and bring different family resources to the 
table than the suburban, middle-class, white youths that have been the focus of much of 
the youth employment research conducted during the last 20 years.  
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INTEGRATION OF EXISTING RESEARCH FROM A LIFE-COURSE 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 The conceptual tools of life-course analysis provide a convenient way to integrate 
much of what we know from existing research about adolescent employment and its 
potential consequences for problem behavior. Elder (1998) highlights four principles of a 
life-course perspective: context, timing, interdependency, and agency. Each is defined 
and discussed with respect to adolescent employment in greater detail below. 
 
The Principle of Context  
Context refers to Elder’s principle of “historical time and place,” or the idea that 
“the life course of individuals is embedded in and shaped by the historical times and 
places they experience over their lifetime” (1998:3). Historical, spatial, and 
socioeconomic contexts are important facets of youth employment. From the standpoint 
of historical context, virtually all of the existing adolescent employment research was 
conducted on samples of youths born in the 1960s and enrolled in high school during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when youth unemployment reached “crisis” proportions (see 
Freeman and Holzer, 1986; Freeman and Wise, 1982).18 However, the booming economy 
after the early 1990s offered more expansive work opportunities to a larger cross-section 
of youths. A historical perspective might thus suggest that the positive association 
between employment and adolescent problem behavior in these studies is due to the 
                                                 
18 For example, the Monitoring the Future cohorts have included high-school seniors from 1979 
(Bachman et al., 1981) and 1980-84 (Bachman et al., 1986). The Orange County study was conducted 
using youths in the 10th and 11th grades in 1979 (Greenberger et al., 1981). Youths in the High School and 
Beyond survey were enrolled in the 12th grade in 1982 (Marsh, 1991). Youths in the National Youth 
Survey were enrolled in high school between 1976 and 1983 (Mihalic and Elliott, 1997). Even relatively 
more recent research relies on samples graduating from high school during the late 1980s to early 1990s, 
still prior to the time that the U.S. economy experienced its largest growth (e.g., Bachman and Schulenberg, 
1993; Mortimer et al., 1996; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991). 
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employment difficulties encountered by youths as they attempted unsuccessfully to make 
a smooth transition into the labor market. The implication is that these early studies 
confound the adverse work effect with a larger secular trend of high youth 
unemployment. It also suggests that in more recent cohorts of adolescents employed in 
the middle to late 1990s, there would be no relationship or a negative relationship 
between employment and problem behavior. 
An even longer historical view might suggest that the adverse work effect for 
adolescents is a relatively recent phenomenon (i.e., a period effect); a consequence of the 
changing nature of adolescent work (see Greenberger and Steinberg, 1986). Adolescents 
have become employed in larger numbers in the food service and retail service sectors, 
contributing to the formation of a “new adolescent workplace.” Over the same period of 
time, the proportion of adolescents employed in craft, factory, and farm work (the “old 
adolescent workplace”) has precipitously declined. Greenberger and Steinberg (1986) 
point to three dimensions of this historical shift. First, the educational value of youth 
employment has eroded to the point that it is no longer likely to provide preparation for 
adult work roles, thereby creating a discontinuity between adolescent and adult 
employment experiences. Simply put, contemporary adolescent work, concentrated as it 
is in the secondary labor market, is much less likely to provide an opportunity to “learn a 
trade.” Second, contemporary youth employment is less an economic necessity for the 
family than it is a convenient way for young people to acquire the symbols and 
accoutrements of popular youth culture out of their own pockets. For many employed 
youths, their earnings provide money that does not have to be accounted for (Hirschi, 
1983). Third, today’s employed youths are much less likely to work alongside adults who 
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provide supervision, instruction, and socialization. In other words, there is an 
intergenerational disconnection in today’s youth workplace. According to Greenberger 
and Steinberg, then, in recent decades there has been a transformation in the adolescent 
workplace in ways that are likely to interfere with, rather than enhance, healthy 
adolescent development. Intensive employment in this new adolescent workplace may 
thus produce the most problematic deviant outcomes. 
From the standpoint of spatial and socioeconomic context, the retail and service 
industries—dual strongholds of youth work—are concentrated in suburban areas. In 
addition, employment while in high school is a luxury most often available to the white 
middle class. This is not to say that minority youths are less interested in working, as 
Greenberger and Steinberg (1986:20, emphasis in original) report that the “racial gap in 
having a job is far greater than the gap in seeking employment” (see also Entwisle et al., 
2000; Newman, 1999). Ironically, it is precisely those youths that have the least need for 
independent sources of income—by virtue of their more advantaged family background 
(e.g., two parents, well educated, high-status occupation, dual-earner household)—that 
are the most likely to hold down a regular job during high school. For these youths, 
employment may be the means to fund a middle-class “party subculture” that values 
partying, concert going, drinking, dating, cruising, and otherwise living for the moment 
(see Hagan, 1991). As Ruggiero (1984:480, parenthetical material omitted) notes: “The 
same jobs which promote deviance among financially secure youths might actually 
decrease deviance among economically disadvantaged youths who truly need the income 
and may not find the work particularly stressful.” Accordingly, race, space, and class are 
key determinants of what groups of youths are employed, and in what jobs they tend to 
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work. Much of this no doubt stems from the opportunistic nature of the adolescent labor 
market, and to the simple availability (or lack thereof) of “naturally occurring” jobs.  
 
The Principle of Timing  
Timing refers to Elder’s principle of “timing in lives,” or the notion that “the 
developmental impact of a succession of life transitions or events is contingent on when 
they occur in a person’s life” (1998:3). Timing is a key element of much of the 
developmental research on youth employment conducted over the last 20 years, and the 
basis of concerns about the precocity of intensive work during high school. Early and 
intensive employment—before youths are fully prepared developmentally—is believed to 
correspond with the most detrimental outcomes, contemporaneously and prospectively.19  
The concern about “off-time” entry into employment stems from a view of the 
family and school as the primary socializing institutions in adolescents’ lives, with the 
workplace taking on secondary importance until the late teenage years. This sentiment 
finds empirical support in Wright et al. (2002:10): 
For younger adolescents,…embeddedness in work predicted higher levels of 
delinquent involvement. In contrast, just the reverse is found in the older group. 
For those at the end of their compulsory school experience and for those who 
have just completed high school,…work embeddedness…reduced 
contemporaneously delinquent involvement. 
 
Recall that intensive employment is correlated with strained family relationships (less 
family time, less closeness, more conflict, less supervision) and school disengagement 
                                                 
19 The issue of timing has added significance in light of the fact that full-time (“intensive”) 
employment during adulthood is inversely associated with deviance and crime. This poses an interesting 
dilemma—that the “sign” of the work intensity effect changes during the transition to adulthood (Blumstein 
et al., 1986:52; Uggen, 2000b:530). This suggests that the relationship between employment and problem 
behavior is conditional on life stage, and thus that age is an essential component in understanding the 
dynamics of employment and crime. The jury is still out, however, about whether the relationship between 
adolescent work intensity and problem behavior is causal or spurious; that is, whether there truly is a 
change in the sign of the work intensity effect. 
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(less studying, lower class attendance, lower aspirations, lower grades, dropout), among 
other outcomes. Accordingly, “embeddedness” in developmentally unproductive work 
roles at an early age competes with family and school roles as the dominant influence in 
the lives of early adolescents. What some critics of early work experience recommend 
instead is an Ericksonian “psychosocial moratorium” that provides ample opportunity for 
learning, exploration, and experimentation; opportunity that is simply not available in the 
highly routinized and unstimulating “new” adolescent workplace (see Greenberger and 
Steinberg, 1986).  
 Related to the detrimental influence of the early timing of the work transition is 
the issue of the timing of the acquisition of adult-like privileges and responsibilities on 
the job. Staff and Uggen (2003) suggest that a “good job” in adolescence is very different 
from a “good job” in adulthood. They find that jobs with higher wages, higher work-
derived peer status (having a job provides higher status among friends), and a higher 
degree of autonomy (control over time spent at work, freedom to make decisions about 
what to do and how to do it) are positively related to school deviance, alcohol use, and 
arrest, controlling for work intensity and prior problem behavior.20 They conclude that 
work characteristics that are valued in adulthood may lead to greater problem behavior 
among adolescents: 
Adolescents in jobs with great autonomy, social status, and relatively high 
wages—conditions that are positively valued in adult work—are more deviant in 
their senior year of high school than adolescents in jobs that are more closely 
supervised, provide less status with friends, and pay relatively low wages. 
(2003:282) 
 
                                                 
20 Note also that work intensity retains a positive and significant effect on school deviance and 
alcohol use (but not arrest) in these multivariate models. 
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Instead, Staff and Uggen suggest that the “ideal” adolescent job is one that enhances 
rather than detracts from school performance, and that offers skills, challenges, and 
learning opportunities that complement academic roles and have a more direct link to 
future adult economic roles.21  
A developmental over-emphasis on timing (“on time” vs. “off time”) may mask 
other important features of the transition into youth employment. Bushway et al. (2003) 
present evidence suggesting that how youths make the transition into work is of perhaps 
greater importance than when they do so. They construct work histories over the entire 
14-17 age span with the first three waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1997. Using a semi-parametric, group-based model of monthly work status, they 
encounter five distinct “transition groups” that differ in the timing and patterning of the 
transition to work: non-workers that remain out of the labor market until at least age 18 
(21% of the sample); stable workers that transition by age 14 (6%); early-transition 
workers that make an orderly transition by age 16 (20%); late-transition workers that 
make an orderly transition by age 18 (28%); and unstable workers who fail as a group to 
become fully attached to the labor market by age 18 (24%). By the fourth wave, when the 
sample is in their late teens and early 20s, the stable workers are the least likely to engage 
                                                 
21 Ruggiero (1984:35-36, emphasis removed) reflected on the “ideal” adolescent job implied by 
the dominant delinquency theories of the time:  
[T]he factors which can be expected to mitigate against deviance…are likely to become apparent 
only through work experiences which exhibit a number of particular features. Specifically, with 
respect to work activities, it is essential that they allow for significant skill acquisition, utilization, 
and refinement; advancement both within and across jobs; complementarity rather than 
competition with the education of in-school adolescents; cooperation, collaboration, and the 
development of prosocial ties among workers; responsible, autonomous action and decision-
making; adequate monetary compensation, and participation in “meaningful,” non-trivial tasks—
while keeping psychological and physiological distress to a minimum. With respect to work 
associates, it is essential that they be non-deviant, conventional role models; that they be adult and 
supervisory for substantial percentages of the time; that they reinforce non-deviant, conventional 
worker attitudes and behaviors; and that they be available for congenial non-work- as well as 
work-related interaction.  
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in criminal behavior (24%), followed by the non-workers (27%), and all other workers 
(29%). At the same time, the stable workers are the least likely to have dropped out of 
high school (3%), followed by the early- and later-transition workers (11%), the unstable 
workers (15%), and the non-workers (17%). Bushway and colleagues conclude that 
successful and orderly (i.e., stable) work transitions are the least problematic with respect 
to subsequent outcomes. On the other hand, failure to transition to work successfully (or 
to make the transition at all) may be associated with the most problematic prospective 
outcomes. 
A life-course emphasis on timing should be attentive to the fact that the 
adolescent labor market is much more dynamic than its adult counterpart, as these youths 
have yet to become fully attached to the labor force. For example, Lorence and Mortimer 
(1985) show that the youngest workers (16-29) exhibit the least stable work orientations 
(job involvement, income, occupational status, work autonomy) during the four-year 
period they consider. They conclude that the initial phase of the work career manifests 
considerable volatility, which they attribute to a “career stage” phenomenon in which 
young workers have yet to find their occupational niche. Topel and Ward (1992) 
similarly find that work attachment following entry is extremely fragile, but that job 
mobility declines with experience.  
Thus, employment during adolescence can be characterized as inherently 
unstable, while increasing age brings with it greater job stability. Numerous studies link 
employment instability with higher levels of deviance among adolescents. Agnew (1986) 
finds that the duration of the current job predicts lower levels of delinquency. Cullen et 
al. (1997) report that a higher rate of job switching produces higher levels of delinquency. 
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Mortimer and Johnson (1998; see also Mortimer, 2003) find that high-intensity work 
produces the most detrimental outcomes when that work is of relatively short duration 
(i.e., “sporadic” work). Paternoster et al. (2003) and Apel et al. (2003) similarly find that 
employment restricted to the summer months only—a rough indicator of short-duration 
or unstable work—tends to be associated with elevated levels of problem behavior.22  
 
The Principle of Interdependency  
Interdependency refers to Elder’s principle of “linked lives,” or the idea that 
“lives are lived interdependently, and social and historical influences are expressed 
through this network of shared relationships” (1998:4). One aspect of interdependency 
that may have particular salience for youth employment is the density of job referral 
networks through parents, siblings, other family members, friends, and acquaintances. 
These may be especially important in inner cities beset by a dearth of employment 
opportunities. The youths in Newman’s (1999) study lament that “what you know” is 
often of secondary importance to “who you know” when looking for a job. For example, 
she finds that jobs are in such short supply, and the pool of eligible workers so large, that 
business owners often exploit the social networks of existing employees to cut down on 
                                                 
22 Other studies find similar effects for adults, suggesting a general process in which job instability 
aggravates involvement in a variety of deviant and antisocial behaviors for both adolescents and adults. In 
other words, the positive relationship between adolescent employment and problem behavior may be due 
less to the timing of work entry than to the fact that adolescent work involvement is inherently less stable. 
Sampson and Laub (1993), for example, found that job stability during the 17-25 and 25-32 age spans 
(composite of employment status, stability of most recent employment, work habits) was strongly 
correlated with excessive alcohol use, general deviance (gambling, illicit sexual behavior), and arrest 
among official delinquents and non-delinquents in the sample of Glueck men. Nagin and colleagues (Nagin 
et al., 1995; Nagin and Land, 1993) found that the “high-rate chronic offenders” in the Cambridge Study 
had the least stable work records and the highest rate of unemployment during the late teens. Witte and 
Tauchen (1994) found that the proportion of each year employed during the 19-25 age span reduced the 
probability of arrest among the men in the 1945 Philadelphia birth cohort. Fagan and Freeman (1999) found 
that the number of weeks worked in 1979 had a stable, negative relationship with the probability of 
incarceration at four time periods (1980, 83, 86, 89) among men in the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979.  
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the cost and trouble of looking for new workers. One deviance-related possibility is that 
youth jobs acquired through personal connections may be associated with reduced 
antisocial behavior than jobs acquired through a “walk-in” application process. This is 
because there is greater interest in “keeping one’s nose clean” associated with the former 
type of jobs, because one’s personal reputation, as well as the reputation of the individual 
who makes the referral, is jeopardized by misconduct inside and outside of the 
workplace. 
Granovetter (1973) draws attention to the strength of neighborhood-based social 
ties, suggesting for our purposes that weak ties may improve access to job networks 
relative to strong ties. He finds weak ties to be associated with broader diffusion of 
information, because they “bridge” people who move in different social circles. In other 
words, weak social ties promote the diffusion of more information than strong social ties 
which link similar individuals to one another. The implication is that youths with a 
broader web of “friends of friends” may develop the kind of job contacts that lead to 
more desirable work opportunities. Elliott and Sims (2001) find that, in addition to 
neighborhood effects on access to job referral networks, there are equally important 
cultural differences in the quality of these personal contacts and in how they are exploited 
to actually obtain jobs: 
[W]hen barrio residents look for and acquire jobs, they tend to use contacts that 
are close to themselves socially (strong ties), spatially (neighbors), and 
organizationally (insider referrers); whereas, when ghetto residents look for and 
acquire jobs, they tend to rely on contacts that are further from themselves 
socially (acquaintances) and spatially (non-neighbors). (2001:355, emphasis 
removed) 
 
A second component of interdependency concerns the adolescent workplace 
itself. Greenberger and Steinberg (1986) note that youth jobs have become ever more age 
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segregated. The lack of intergenerational contact in today’s adolescent workplace is no 
doubt attributable in part to the fact that many of these jobs are simply unappealing to 
adults, being as they are unskilled, minimum-wage, part-time jobs with irregular work 
schedules. These prototypically “teenage” jobs (e.g., fast food worker, grocery bagger, 
cashier), because they bring together a large number of young people both during and 
(perhaps more importantly) after work, might be expected to correspond with higher 
levels of antisocial behavior. Other jobs characteristic of the “old adolescent workplace,” 
on the other hand, may reduce problem behavior because they facilitate meaningful 
relationships with adult co-workers and supervisors.  
A third aspect of interdependency touched on by Newman (1999) is the 
possibility that, in disadvantaged communities, working long hours may narrow youths’ 
friendship circles to contain a larger share of fellow workers as youths increasingly 
withdraw from non-working (and presumably, less desirable and less conventional) 
friends and associates. In effect, young inner-city workers may begin to substitute the 
disorganization and unpredictability of the street with the stability and routinization of the 
workplace. A similar theme is expressed by Laub and Sampson (2003), who propose that 
the experience of and investment in full-time employment contributes to meaningful 
changes in routine activities and peer relations. Over time, these changes restrict criminal 
opportunities, and eventually foster desistance from crime and deviance. Importantly, 
these changes need not be the result of conscious effort by working youths. Rather, it is 
quite possible that they accumulate as byproducts of “a commitment to go straight 
without even realizing it” (2003:278-279).  
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The Principle of Agency  
Agency refers to Elder’s principle of “human agency,” or the idea that 
“individuals construct their own life course through the choices and actions they take 
within the opportunities and constraints of history and social circumstances” (1998:4). 
For many youths—especially those from the suburban middle class—employment serves 
the more immediate function of acquiring spending money. For lower-class youths 
attending schools of poor quality, however, employment may serve as a means of 
acquiring and strengthening work-related skills. Working is preparation among those 
youths for whom a high-school diploma is of dubious value (Newman, 1999; Sullivan, 
1989). In this sense, then, intensive employment may be a planful adaptation to 
disillusionment with and subsequent detachment from school. This notion of agency 
suggests reverse causality with respect to developmental accounts which propose that 
intensive employment is a precursor to school disengagement and dropout.  
Recent empirical work by Entwisle et al. (2000) confirms this proposition. They 
collect information on family background, work history, and school performance for a 
sample of Baltimore youths from age six (kindergarten) to age 20. They find that, among 
males, low math and reading scores at age 8 predict semiskilled job holding at age 13 
(sales, clerical, craft). Moreover, these early semiskilled jobs increase the likelihood of 
holding a more desirable job at age 17, but also of dropping out of high school by age 20. 
The authors conclude that youths (particularly males) performing poorly in school 
“channel their energies toward work as an alternative arena for success” (2000:292). 
Although this strategy is successful in the short term, Entwisle and colleagues suggest 
that in the long term, these early choices may backfire. Indeed, Hotz et al. (2002) find 
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that the returns to high-school completion for young males are substantially larger than 
the returns to high-school work experience (which are not significant) in their “dynamic 
selection control” model.  
 
Summary  
In short, upon further inspection, there is some ambiguity about the true nature of 
the association between intensive employment during high school and involvement in 
problem behavior. Some accounts suggest a positive association relationship due to 
causal mechanisms, others suggest a negative relationship due to causal mechanisms, and 
still others suggest an entirely spurious mechanism. Resolution of this problem has been 
limited by the use of relatively homogenous populations of school-going youths. A life-
course perspective suggests that if we look past simple “intensive vs. moderate vs. no 
work” distinctions, we find that other characteristics of youth work besides work 
intensity may have more salience for participation in antisocial behavior, including 




DATA AND METHODS 
 
 The data used in this study are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1997 (hereafter NLSY), sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labor. The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of 8,984 youths born during the 
years 1980 through 1984 and living in the United States during the initial survey year in 
1997. The NLSY consists of a cross-sectional sample of respondents representative of all 
youths (N = 6,748) and an oversample of black and Hispanic youths (N = 2,236). The 
initial interview took place in 1997, and follow-up interviews were conducted in 1998 (N 
= 8,386), 1999 (N = 8,209), 2000 (N = 8,081), and 2001 (N = 7,883). Of the 8,984 youths 
interviewed in 1997, 80.2 percent (N = 7,203) were interviewed in all four follow-ups.  
The NLSY has four distinct advantages to recommend its use for the current 
study. First, it is a nationally representative sample of youths, providing generalizability 
to the population of all youths in the United States who were 12 to 16 years of age in 
1996.1 Relatedly, all 50 states and the District of Columbia are represented, providing an 
opportunity to exploit cross-state variation in child labor laws. Second, the NLSY gathers 
information relevant to the school-to-work transition, collecting an impressive amount of 
detail on adolescent work histories. Third, the NLSY has a special self-report crime and 
substance use module administered on an annual basis, unlike its predecessor, the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Fourth, the respondents have been assessed 
                                                 
1 Due to the oversampling of black and Hispanic youths, all youths ages 12 to 16 in the United 
States did not have an equal probability of being selected to participate in the NLSY. In order to take into 
account this differential selection probability, and to generalize to the population of all youths, each 
respondent is assigned a normed sampling weight that is applied in all statistical analyses. Since 
observations are pooled across five interviews, I use the sampling weight from the first interview for each 
youth. Constructed in this way, the sampling weights are constant within panels (individuals). 
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annually for five years, providing a unique opportunity to examine changes in 




 Descriptive statistics for all measures are provided in Table 2. A full list of 
variable definitions is also available in Appendix A. 
*** Table 2 Here *** 
 
Problem Behavior  
 There are two problem behavior outcomes of interest in this study: crime and 
substance use. Each is a summary scale of multiple items, listed along with definitions in 
Table 3. 
*** Table 3 Here *** 
Annual crime is a composite of 22 self-report offenses. This measure spans 
relatively minor property crimes such as vandalism and shoplifting, major property 
crimes such as auto theft and burglary, violent crimes such as robbery and aggravated 
assault, drug crimes such as selling marijuana and hard drugs, economic crimes such as 
receiving illegal income from stolen property, and arrest for a delinquent or criminal 
offense. For each behavior, an indicator of participation is constructed such that youths 
who report engaging in the problem behavior on at least one occasion since the last 
interview (or ever prior to the initial interview) are coded “1,” and all other non-
participating youths are coded “0.” The measure of annual crime is a variety scale 
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constructed as the sum of all 22 binary indicators of participation.2 The range of possible 
values for this measure is from zero to 22.  
Recent substance use is a composite of four self-report substance use items 
referenced during the 30 days prior to the interview: smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, 
using marijuana, and drinking five or more drinks in a single setting (binge drinking). As 
with annual crime, an indicator of participation for each behavior is constructed such that 
youths who participated on at least one occasion are coded “1,” and all other non-
participating youths are coded “0.” The measure of recent substance use is a variety scale 
constructed as the sum of these four binary indicators of participation.3 The range of 
possible values for this measure is from zero to four.  
Table 4 provides detailed descriptive statistics for the problem behavior measures. 
Pooled across all five interviews, over one third of person-year observations (33.4%) 
report engaging in at least one delinquent or criminal behavior since the previous 
interview (or ever prior to the 1997 interview). There is a roughly linear decrease in 
offending over the five waves, such that from the first to the fifth wave, crime prevalence 
decreases from one-half (52.6%) to one-quarter (23.1%). Recent substance use occurs in 
half (50.4%) of person-year observations. In contrast to crime, there is a roughly linear 
increase in substance use over the five waves, with prevalence rates increasing from 
approximately one-third (29.7%) to two-thirds (66.1%) from the first to the fifth waves, 
respectively.  
*** Table 4 Here *** 
                                                 
2 Cronbach’s alpha by interview year: α1997 = .85, α1998 = .86, α1999 = .84, α2000 = .85, α2001 = .83.  
3 Cronbach’s alpha by interview year: α1997 = .77, α1998 = .75, α1999 = .75, α2000 = .75, α2001 = .72.  
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A more useful statistic is provided in the “within person” column of Table 4. This 
suggests that over two-thirds (68.6%) of youths in the NLSY reported committing a 
crime during at least one of the five interviews, committing 2.76 crimes, on average, 
when they are active. Over three-quarters (78.9%) of youths have recently engaged in 
substance use during at least one of the five interviews, using 2.03 different substances, 
on average, when active.  
Figure 17 graphs the “marginal” distributions of annual crime and recent 
substance use by age, plotting actual and fitted values (using a third-order polynomial in 
age). These figures are adjusted for exposure time. The expected “age-crime curve” is 
observed in this sample, with self-report criminal behavior reaching a peak at 16.5 years 
of age (or 17.25 if crime is modeled as a quadratic in age). Substance use, on the other 
hand, increases in a practically linear fashion from age 12 to age 22, but evidences a 
leveling off beginning at age 21.  
*** Figure 17 Here *** 
 
Formal Work Hours during the School Year  
 The key independent variable in this analysis is the number of hours worked per 
week in a formal job during the school year. The NLSY distinguishes between two types 
of employment: informal work and formal work. Formal (“employee”) jobs are defined 
as “a situation in which the respondent has an ongoing relationship with a specific 
employer,” while informal (“freelance”) jobs are defined as “jobs for which the 
respondent performed one or a few tasks for several people without a specific boss, or in 
which the respondent worked for himself or herself” (Center for Human Resource 
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Research, 2002:96). Formal jobs are thus traditional “paycheck” jobs, while informal jobs 
are traditional teenage “odd jobs” such as babysitting, yard work, and newspaper 
delivery. Because child labor laws regulate formal employment but not informal 
employment, this analysis focuses on the former type of work.  
Beginning with a youth’s 14th birthday, the NLSY creates a week-by-week work 
history of all formal jobs, denoting the youth’s work status (employed, unemployed, out 
of the labor force, in the military) and work hours during each calendar week, accounting 
for within-job gaps in employment due to layoff, pregnancy, leave of absence, etc.4 
Annual school-year work hours are operationalized as the mean number of hours worked 
per week in a formal job during the school year (from the week containing September 1 
to the week containing May 31) since the previous interview (or since age 14 at the initial 
interview). Because recent substance use has a reference period during the 30 days prior 
to the interview, I create a corresponding measure of recent school-year work hours. The 
reference period for this measure is the four weeks prior to the interview week. 
Constructed in this way, the reference period for school-year work hours matches the 
reference period for the corresponding response variables used in the analyses.5
Table 4 provides detailed descriptive statistics for the work intensity measures. 
When considered within persons (final column), over four in five NLSY youths are 
                                                 
4 No information is gathered by the NLSY on formal employment of 12- and 13-year-old youths. 
Thus they are categorized as formal non-workers by definition. Fortunately, this is not as large a source of 
measurement error as one might first suspect. Statutorily, employers subject to the child labor provisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (and many state child labor laws) are forbidden from hiring youths under 14 
years of age, with but a few exceptions (e.g., youths employed in family businesses and certain types of 
farm work, youths employed as actors or performers) (refer to U.S. Department of Labor, 2000:3-13, for a 
detailed overview). Empirically, note that in Figure 5, only 6.8 percent of youths are employed in a formal 
job at the age of 14 (either a formal job, or in both formal and informal jobs). Fitting a linear trend from age 
14 to the month before turning 16 and extrapolating to earlier ages suggests that the formal employment 
rate is –0.8 percent at age 13 and 3.2 percent at age 13.5.  
5 As a way to minimize the impact of outliers, I censored work hours at the 99th percentile. 
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employed during the school year, with 90.0 percent having ever worked since age 14 and 
80.6 percent having worked recently (in the four weeks prior to the interview week). The 
typical employed youths tends to work at high intensity during school as well, with a 
mean 24.63 hours per week on an annual basis, and 24.96 hours during the previous 
month. 
Figure 18 plots the “marginal” distribution school-year work hours by age. Work 
intensity increases steadily from 14 to 19 years of age, at which point it begins to level 
off.  
*** Figure 18 Here *** 
 
Individual Control Variables  
I incorporate several individual-level control variables. Age is the respondent’s 
age in years (continuous) as of the interview date. Household size is the number of 
individuals that currently live in the household. Educational attainment is operationalized 
as a set of mutually exclusive dummy variables: (1) currently enrolled in high school (the 
reference category); (2) high-school dropout or GED; or (3) high-school graduate with or 
without college experience. Family structure is operationalized as: (1) two parents (the 
reference category); (2) single mother; (3) no mother figure; or (4) live independently. 
Residential location is operationalized as: (1) suburban area (the reference category); (2) 
central city; or (3) rural area.  
Because the 1997 annual problem behavior indicators measure lifetime 
prevalence (i.e., having ever engaged in the behavior prior to the initial interview) rather 
than annual prevalence (i.e., having engaged in the behavior since the last interview), and 
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the amount of time between interviews varies from as little as two months to as long as 
two years, I control for differential “exposure.” Exposure time is thus the number of years 
(continuous) since the last interview (or the youth’s age at the first interview). 
 
County Control Variables  
I incorporate several county-level control variables in order to adjust for local 
labor market conditions that might differentially affect youth employment. Local 
unemployment rate is the unemployment rate for the labor market in which the youth 
resides, available in the geocoded NLSY data.6 The remaining covariates were compiled 
from county-level data available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce (online at http://www.bea.doc.gov). Per capita income is 
personal income per capita in constant (1997) thousands of dollars. Total number of jobs 
refers to the total number of full-time and part-time jobs (thousands of jobs). I also 
incorporate the industrial mix of available jobs, such that manufacturing jobs, retail jobs, 
service jobs, and government jobs refers to the total number of these types of jobs 
(thousands of jobs). Unemployment insurance refers to the total value of the payments 
issued under state-administered unemployment insurance programs in constant (1997) 
thousands of dollars. Medicaid, AFDC, & food stamps refers to the total value of transfer 
payments issued for public assistance, AFDC, and food stamps in constant (1997) 
thousands of dollars.  
 
                                                 
6 Local unemployment refers to the unemployment rate for the metropolitan area in which the 
youth resides, or the balance of the unemployment rate for the state in which the youth resides (for those 
cases in which a youth does not live in a metropolitan area). NLS researchers compile this information 
from annual editions of Employment and Earnings for the month of March, published by the Bureau of 




The goal of this study is to evaluate the plausibility of a causal relationship 
between work hours during the school year and adolescent problem behavior. The 
analytical problem encountered in this literature is that of estimating a “treatment effect” 
(of work hours on problem behavior) using observational data where the treatment is not 
allocated randomly. Since employment and problem behavior are joint products of 
individual decision making, the characteristics of those in the treatment group (employed 
or intensively employed youths) are potentially different from the characteristics of those 
in the control group (non-employed youths). These differences exist in characteristics 
which, from the point of view of the analyst, are both observable (e.g., age, gender, race, 
income, family structure) and unobservable (e.g., ability, motivation, delinquent 
propensity). This is the well known selection problem encountered in observational (i.e., 
non-experimental) studies. 
The debate revolves around the issue of identification (see Manski, 1995:21-50). 
The cross-sectional “work effect” on problem behavior observed in extant research may 
arise because (1) exposure to the world of adult work at high intensity induces 
participation in problem behavior through a variety of direct, indirect, or interactive 
mechanisms (the “treatment effect” or causal mechanism), (2) youths with a higher-than-
average propensity to work intensively have correspondingly higher-than-average 
propensity to engage in problem behavior (the “unobserved heterogeneity” or spurious 
mechanism), or (3) some combination of both causal and spurious processes.  
The nature of the identification problem can be illustrated using the following 
two-variable model: 
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i iy x iα β ε= + +  
where yi represents the problem behavior outcome of interest and xi represents a measure 
of work hours assumed to vary independently of εi, the disturbance. The least squares 
(LS) estimator of β yields 
Cov( , ) Cov( , )
Var( ) Var( )





εβ= = +  
As the second equality shows, in order for b to yield an unbiased estimate of β,  the 
numerator of the second term must be equal to zero; that is, Cov(xi,εi) = 0. In other 
words, there can be no relevant variables omitted from the model that are correlated with 
both xi and yi. Failure to meet this assumption introduces bias in the estimated work 
effect, implying E(bLS) ≠ β. Moreover, in the presence of this endogeneity the least 
squares estimator is also inconsistent, implying plimbLS ≠ β.7  
Paternoster et al. (2003) frame the selection problem as an issue of omitted 
variable bias, or specification error (see also Heckman, 1979). In previous studies, a 
typical solution to the selection problem is to estimate a multivariate model that includes 
a cluster of covariates thought to capture known pre-employment differences among 
youths at varying work intensities. If these observed covariates adequately account for 
differences across youths in the propensity to work at differing levels of intensity, the 
estimated work effect is unbiased. Unfortunately, controlling for selection on observables 
may not entirely resolve the identification problem. If selection on unobservables is also 
part of the data-generating process, the estimated work effect will remain biased (see 
Heckman and Hotz, 1989).  
                                                 
7 It can also be shown that, if ε i  is correlated positively with x i , the estimated work effect β  is 
positively biased, such that E(bLS) > β and plimbLS > β.  
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The issue of identification is both a theoretical and empirical problem. To date, 
criminological theory is not sufficiently refined to resolve the identification problem, as 
the same theory can often be applied to explain the presence as well as absence of a work 
effect, not to mention different signs of the work effect. This implies that selection on 
observables is not a satisfactory solution to the identification problem, since it may not be 
possible to control for all potential sources of heterogeneity through the use of selection 
on observables. Fortunately, empirical strategies can be used as one solution to the 
identification problem. Two empirical strategies are of particular relevance for the current 
study: the instrumental variables and fixed-effects estimators.  
 
Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimator  
One possible empirical solution to the identification problem is to invoke the 
methodology of “natural experimentation” using instrumental variables (IV) estimation. 
IV estimation exploits exogenous cross-sectional variation in the treatment variable (in 
this context, school-year work hours) that is induced by the instrument in order to 
identify the desired estimate of the treatment effect. The goal is to “exploit situations in 
which the forces of nature or government policy have conspired to produce an 
environment somewhat akin to a randomized experiment” (Angrist and Krueger, 2001:7). 
The crucial identifying assumption is that the proposed instrument(s) not be directly 
related to the outcome (problem behavior), except through the endogenous regressor 
(work hours). In other words, the instrumental variable must be uncorrelated with the 
residual in the structural equation (work hours → problem behavior). This idea is 
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illustrated in Figure 19. When this assumption is met, the IV estimator provides a 
consistent estimate of the treatment effect.8  
*** Figure 19 Here *** 
 We can therefore define a random variable zi as an instrument for xi, with which 
we can derive the IV estimator of β.  A useful way of understanding IV estimation is in 
terms of an exclusion restriction, in which the instrument affects the outcome only 
indirectly through the treatment variable (Winship and Morgan, 1999). The IV estimator 
yields 
Cov( , ) Cov( , )
Cov( , ) Cov( , )
i i i i
IV
i i i i
z y zb
z x z x
εβ= = +  
For convenience, an alternative procedure when the number of instruments exceeds the 
number of endogenous regressors is to invoke the logic and method of two-stage least 
squares (2SLS). This intuitive procedure involves estimating the first-stage regression,  
i ix z iγ δ ν= + +  
from which a fitted xi is obtained by 
ˆˆˆi ix zγ δ= +  
These fitted values are then substituted into the second-stage regression, 
ˆi iy x iα β ε= + +  
                                                 
8 To be exact, the IV estimator provides an estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE), 
or an estimate of the treatment effect only for those respondents whose behavior can be manipulated by the 
instruments (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). This is because instrumental variables solve the identification 
problem by using only part of the variation in the endogenous regressor—the part that is uncorrelated with 
the omitted variables—to identify the relationship between “treatment” and the outcome (Angrist and 
Krueger, 2001). As long as the behavior of the “compliers” is representative of those in the entire treated 
group, the distinction between LATE and other treatment effects is irrelevant. However, in the presence of 
heterogeneous treatment effects, the parameter identified by the instrumental variables may differ from the 
average treatment effect (ATE) of interest (see Angrist et al., 1996, and the subsequent exchange; 
Heckman, 1997).  
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to obtain an estimate of β.9 The 2SLS estimator thus yields 
ˆ ˆCov( , ) Cov( , )
ˆ ˆVar( ) Var( )





εβ= = +  
Assuming that the instruments are not correlated with the structural disturbance, the 
IV/2SLS estimator is consistent; that is, plimbIV = plimb2SLS = β.  
 
Fixed-Effects (FE) Estimator  
 A second empirical solution to the identification problem is available when the 
same cross-sectional units are observed over time. We can write a two-variable, linear 
panel model in the following way: 
it it i ity xα β µ ε= + + +  
where yit, xit, and εit are defined as before, but where µ i now represents a time-stable, 
unobserved component of the disturbance that is individual specific.10 This individual 
effect captures such between-individual differences as the inability to defer gratification, 
propensity for sensation seeking, disadvantaged family background, and other such time-
constant risk factors of interest to criminologists. We anticipate that this persistent, 
unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with xit and yit, and thus entails one important 
source of omitted variable bias.  
                                                 
i
9 Although the 2SLS estimation procedure is not typically done in two stages as described here, it 
is possible to do so. Researchers must be careful to obtain the correct second-stage residual. For example, if 
the analyst substitutes the fitted xi into a second-stage equation, statistical software will compute the 
residual as 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆi iy xε α β= − −  
Instead, the correct residual should be obtained by reinserting the observed xi as follows: 
ˆˆ ˆi i iy xε α β= − −  
10 At the cross-sectional level and in the absence of a measurable proxy, the individual effect, µi , 
is indistinguishable from the disturbance, ε i . With fixed-effects panel data, the individual effect is treated 
as a nuisance parameter and is simply swept out of the model. Substantively, then, it is inherently 
uninformative and is treated as a “black box.”  
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A distinct advantage of the fixed-effects (FE) estimator is that it relaxes the 
assumption of orthogonality between the explanatory variables and the individual effect, 
and thereby allows µ i to be arbitrarily correlated with xit (Wooldridge, 2002). This is 
accomplished by taking deviations from within-panel means, thereby “sweeping out” this 
source of omitted variables. The FE transformation proceeds first by averaging over T to 
obtain 
i i iy x iβ µ ε= + +  
where 1 1
T
i t ity T y
−




i t itx T x
−




i tT itε ε
−
== ∑ . These within-panel means 
are then subtracted from the original equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) (it i it i i i it i
it it it
y y x x
y x
)α β µ µ ε
α β ε




This time-demeaning procedure thereby removes the individual effect, µ i. The FE 
estimator of β is thus 
Cov( , ) Cov( , )
Var( ) Var( )





εβ= = +  
Assuming that the within-transformed regressor is not correlated with the within-
transformed disturbance (a time-varying, person-specific “shock”), the FE estimator is 
consistent; that is, plimbFE = β.  
 
THE FIXED-EFFECTS INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (FEIV) ESTIMATOR 
 
The IV and FE estimators are not without their potential shortcomings. An 
important weakness of cross-sectional IV techniques is that the estimated “treatment 
effect” is derived from variation across individuals. A related problem is that the standard 
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errors of IV estimates tend to be large when the sample size is small.11 The FE estimator 
also suffers from an important weakness. Although it allows xit and µ i to be correlated, 
the standard assumption of orthogonality between the explanatory variables and the 
idiosyncratic error, ε it, maintains. Non-zero correlation can be induced by the omission of 
relevant time-varying (i.e., dynamic) explanatory variables, including delinquent peer 
association, school performance, and parental supervision, for example. The resulting 
estimate of β remains biased and inconsistent in the presence of this dynamic 
endogeneity.  
The fixed-effects instrumental variables (FEIV) estimator represents one potential 
avenue for overcoming these weaknesses of the IV and FE estimators. First, by taking 
deviations from within-panel means, the estimated treatment effect is derived from 
within-individual changes. Moreover, by pooling a cross section of observations across 
multiple time periods, the working sample size becomes NT, alleviating efficiency 
concerns. Second, the instruments are used to induce exogenous within-panel variation in 
school-year work intensity, eliminating concerns about its correlation with the 
idiosyncratic disturbance.  
In order to motivate the use of the FEIV estimator, consider the following 
structural model: 
                                                 
11 The variance of the IV estimator in a bivariate regression is 
2











Thus, in order to obtain precise estimates, either the sample size must be unusually large or x i  and z i  must 
be strongly correlated (Winship and Morgan, 1999). A particularly pernicious problem with IV is weak 
correlation between the instrument set and the endogenous regressor, which Bound et al. (1995) link to two 
potential consequences. First, inconsistency of IV can result from even a small correlation between the 
instruments and the disturbance in the structural model. Second, in finite samples, IV estimates are biased 
in the same direction as LS estimates. Several researchers have proposed techniques for judging instrument 
relevance (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Bound et al., 1995; Hall et al., 1997; Shea, 1997). 
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it it i ity xα β µ ε= + + +  
where the causal parameter of interest is β, the impact of school-year work hours on 
problem behavior. The approach adopted here is to use the FE transformation to 
eliminate the individual effect, µ i, from the model and then to choose instruments, zit, for 
the endogenous explanatory variable, xit. The transformed model is estimated using 
2SLS. The first stage is 
( ) ( ) ( ) (it i it i i i it i
it it it
x x z z
x z
)γ δ µ µ ν
γ δ ν




The fitted values are then substituted into the second-stage equation 
( ) ( ) ( ) (
ˆ
it i it i i i it i
it it it
y y x x
y x
)α β µ µ ε
α β ε




In the context of the current problem, I generalize the model to accommodate the 
inclusion of a variety of control variables. The structural model of interest is a two-way 
error components model of the form 
0 1 2 3ijt ijt ijt ijt i j ijtY H X Cβ β β β µ φ= + + + + + +ε
                                                
 
where i indexes individuals, j indexes states (or jurisdictions with the inclusion of D.C.), 
and t indexes interview years. In this model, Yijt is a problem behavior outcome, Hijt is the 
number of hours worked during the school year in a formal job, Xijt is a matrix of 
individual control variables, Cijt is a matrix of county control variables, µ i is an individual 
fixed effect, φ j is a state fixed effect, and ε ijt is a stochastic residual.12 For estimation 
purposes, I first implement a FE transformation by taking deviations from individual-
 
12 State fixed effects adjust for systematic differences across states that may be correlated with 
child labor laws and school-year work intensity. For example, states differed in the timing of the adoption 
of child labor laws (see Moehling, 1999). 
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specific means in order to remove µ i from the model, and I then include dummy variables 
representing states. The final model is of the form: 
0 1 2 3
ˆ
ijt ijt ijt ijt j ijtY H X Cβ β β β φ= + + + + +ε  
where the fitted within-transformed work hours (from the first stage) are substituted for 
their observed analog.13 In this model, within-individual change in problem behavior is 
identified on within-individual change in school-year work hours as youths are subjected 
to less restrictive state child labor laws with increasing age.  
 
Instruments for Formal Work Hours during the School Year  
A plausible instrument set for adolescent work hours is a series of dummy 
indicators for state-level child labor laws.14 The laws and the states where each are 
applicable are summarized in detail in Appendix B. The seven binary indicators for 
restrictions to formal school-year work hours can be conveniently grouped into the 
following categories for weekly hours restrictions during the school year:15
                                                 
13 Since I construct the “within” transformation of all variables prior to model estimation, it is 
important to note that the standard errors are estimated using the wrong degrees of freedom: df = NT – K – 
1 (where K is the number of explanatory variables). This is because they do not take into account that the 
within transformation requires the computation of N individual-specific means, which are themselves 
sample estimates. An equivalent strategy would be to include N – 1 dummy variable contrasts in a model 
containing a constant (this is the least squares dummy variable model). Therefore, the correct residual 
degrees of freedom are: df = NT – (N – 1) – K – 1. The standard errors must thus be adjusted from the 
obtained results by hand in the following way: 
1
( 1) 1k k
NT Ks s
NT N Kβ β
− −′ = ×
− − − −
 
14 The motivation for the set of instrumental variables used in the current analysis derives from the 
1992 child labor law indicators compiled by Tyler (2003:396). My choice of instruments is specifically 
based on his indicator for a 40-hour limit on the number of work hours per week while school is in session. 
Since I have a wider age range (Tyler’s sample was composed of high-school seniors), I can take advantage 
of the fact that child labor laws tend to become less restrictive at age 16, and then to expire at age 18. I 
incorporate these age-specific restrictions (under 16, 16-17, 18 or older) into the construction of the 
instrument set. 
15 In order to compile this information, I first consulted the National Research Council (1998:194-
211), which provides state child labor laws as of January 1, 1996. I then consulted the U.S. Department of 
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(1)  Under 20 hours maximum for youths 14-15 
(2)  20-39 hours maximum for youths 14-15 
(3)  40+ hours maximum for youths 14-15 
(4)  No restriction for youths 14-15 
(5)  20-39 hours maximum for youths 16-17 
(6)  40+ hours maximum for youths 16-17 
(7)  No restriction for youths 16-17 
 
For each instrument at each interview, a youth that resides in the state where a specific 
law is in effect and is also in the age range encompassed by that law is coded “1,” 
whereas youths residing outside of the state or youths residing in the state but that are not 
within the eligible age range are coded “0.”16 Table 5 enumerates the seven child labor 
law indicators and the states where each is applicable (as of January 1, 1997). Among 14 
and 15 year olds, the modal child labor law is one that limits work involvement during 
the school year to 18 hours per week (18 states), consistent with the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA). This is followed by laws that limit work involvement to 40 hours 
                                                                                                                                                 
Labor (online at http://youthrules.dol.gov/states.htm), which provides state child labor laws as of January 1, 
2003. If there were discrepancies between these two sources (indicative of legislative changes between 
1996 and 2003), I consulted the U.S. Department of Labor’s Monthly Labor Review, which summarizes 
state labor legislation enacted on an annual basis for the years 1996 to 2002 (Nelson, 1997-2003). This was 
necessary for five states (CT, KY, NM, VT, WV). The child labor law changes for these states are 
summarized in Table A4 in the Appendix. Note that the trend in all four states was to impose tougher 
restrictions on school-year employment, with the exception that, while 14 and 15 year olds in Vermont 
were allowed to work fewer hours, restrictions were removed for 16 and 17 year olds. 
16 For example, suppose a respondent who is 14 years old at the initial interview resides in the 
state of California, in which minors under the age of 16 are subject to an 18-hour maximum work week 
during the school year, and minors between 16 and 17 years of age are subject to a 28-hour maximum work 
week during the school year. The following table demonstrates how the applicable child labor law 
indicators are coded: 
 
 Interview Year (Respondent’s Age) 











(1) Under 20 hours maximum (14-15) 1 1 0 0 0 
(2) 20-39 hours maximum (16-17) 0 0 1 1 0 
 
At the first two waves, this hypothetical youth will be assigned a value of “1” on the first child labor law 
indicator. By the third wave and later when she is at least 16 years old, however, she will be assigned a 
value of “0,” since this law is no longer applicable to her at these ages. Notice that at the third wave, when 
she passes out of eligibility for the first child labor law, she passes into eligibility for the second child labor 
law indicator. She will thus be assigned a “1” on this indicator during the third and fourth waves, but a “0” 
beginning at the fifth wave.  
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per week (10 states) and 23 hours per week (8 states). In only one state (New Mexico) is 
there no weekly hours restriction, but this changed in 1998. By age 16, all but four 
jurisdictions relax their weekly hours restrictions (CO, DC, MA, MI). Among 16 and 17 
year olds, the modal child labor law is one that allows unlimited weekly hours during the 
school year (30 states). Among the remaining jurisdictions, common restrictions are 48 
hours per week (5 states), 28 hours per week (4 states), and 40 hours per week (4 states). 
Table 6 provides a year-by-year summary of the proportion of the sample that is subject 
to each child labor law (adjusting for amendments introduced after 1997). Of particular 
interest is the “within person” column. The child labor law that affects work involvement 
for the largest proportion of youths during the five waves is one which imposes a less-
than-20-hours work week (39.1%). 
*** Tables 5 and 6 Here *** 
 
Missing Data and Variance Adjustment  
 Appendix C summarizes the restrictions imposed to acquire the estimation 
sample. The first set of restrictions involves the number of respondents retained from the 
initial pool of 8,984 NLSY youths. Youths who are 18 years of age at the initial interview 
(n = 21) are excluded,17 followed by youths who dropped out from the NLSY after the 
initial interview (n = 215). These “i-wise” (or case-wise) deletions result in a cross-
sectional sample of 8,765 youths retained from the initial interview. The second set of 
restrictions involves the handling of missing data at specific interviews. Person-year 
                                                 
17 For a small number of respondents (n = 400), the first interview was conducted in 1998. This 
resulted in the interview of 21 youths who had already celebrated their 18th birthday at the first wave. 
Since these youths are no longer subject to child labor restrictions (and thus cannot experience a change in 
school-year work intensity due to a change in child labor laws), they are dropped from the sample. 
 87
observations are excluded that have missing data on any of the problem behavior 
measures (nt = 655), either of the measures of formal school-year work hours (nt = 102), 
and state of residence (nt = 227).18 These “it-wise” (or cell-wise) deletions result in a 
pooled cross section and time series sample of 40,323 person-year observations. A final 
case-wise adjustment was made by excluding those respondents who have only a single 
valid interview after deletion of missing data at specific interviews (n = 40). These 
adjustments result in the final estimation sample of 8,724 respondents retained from the 
first interview, with 40,283 person-year observations. This constitutes a 97.1 percent rate 
of retention from the full sample of 8,984 respondents.  
Among the 8,724 youths in the estimation sample, 75.1 percent (n = 6,554) have 
five complete interviews, and another 15.1 percent (n = 1,310) have four complete 
interviews. The remaining 9.8 percent (n = 860) have only two or three complete 
interviews. Appendix D describes the interview sequence of youths in the estimation 
sample. By construction, all respondents contribute at least two complete interviews. The 
mean number of interviews among these youths is 4.62 (unweighted).  
There are two additional issues that must be taken into account during model 
estimation. First, each outcome is a discrete random variable assuming non-negative 
integer values, but is modeled under the assumption of a linear functional form. In reality, 
the appropriate functional form is non-linear, introducing the possibility of bias due to 
model misspecification by imposing a linearity condition. For example, annual crime 
                                                 
18 I excluded observations containing missing data on the key measures used in the analyses 
(problem behaviors, work intensity, state child labor laws). Since the proportion of missing data for the 
remaining individual-level control variables was well under one percent, I retained these observations and 
substituted the median value from the pooled cross section and time series. For several county-level control 
variables, the rate of missing data exceeded one percent. For these missing values, I substituted the value 
from the previous year. I then constructed dummy variables for those cases in which this imputation was 
made, and included these dummy variables in all analyses to adjust for any biases that may result from this 
scheme. 
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would be best modeled as a binomial random variable with 22 fixed “trials,” and recent 
substance use would be best modeled as a binomial random variable with four fixed 
“trials.” However, this functional form limitation is mitigated by the fact that the 
dependent variable is a deviation from an individual-specific mean.19 In other words, 
although “annual crime” in its original metric is a 22-item variety scale that is decidedly 
non-normal, this is not the case with the within-transformed variable. 
A second analytical complexity is that respondents are clustered in primary 
sampling units (PSUs). This represents a problem of spatial autocorrelation.20 The within-
PSU clustering is a consequence of the sampling design of the NLSY. Briefly, the NLSY 
sample was selected in two phases (for details, refer to the Center for Human Resource 
Research, 2002:19-21). In the first phase, 147 non-overlapping PSUs were selected. From 
these, a subset of 96,512 households was chosen. In the second phase, screening 
interviews identified all NLSY-eligible youths in these households.21 Since youths 
residing in the same cluster tend to be more similar to one another than youths residing in 
different clusters, standard procedures that assume independence across units are likely to 
                                                 
19 In order to ensure that inference is not negatively affected by specification error, I model the 
reduced-form equation for each of the problem behavior outcomes using the fixed-effects Poisson 
estimator. In these models, the instrumental variables are included in place of the endogenous explanatory 
variable. The sign and significance of the IVs are informative about the direction of the “work intensity 
effect” at the second stage. 
20 The temporal or within-individual autocorrelation is addressed by sweeping out the individual 
effect using the fixed-effects transformation. This procedure adjusts for arbitrary within-panel error 
dependence.  
21 Respondents are further clustered in households, since all age-eligible youths in each household 
are included in the NLSY sampling frame. As a way to ensure that the model errors are not severely biased 
by within-household dependence, I randomly select a single respondent from all multiple-youth 
households. I then re-estimate all models using this subsample. Of the 8,724 respondents in the estimation 
sample, 75.6 percent share the household with at least one other respondent at the first wave (not 
necessarily a sibling). The supplementary models are thus estimated using 6,599 youths from non-
overlapping households (NT = 30,469).  
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result in underestimated model errors. I adjust for within-PSU error dependence by 
estimating survey-adjusted standard errors.22 
                                                 
22 There is also clustering with states as a result of the use of instrumental variables measured at this level 
of aggregation. As of yet, however, it is not a simple matter to adjust for multiple levels of clustering. The 
practical consequence is to bias standard errors downward, resulting in larger t-statistics. However, as 
shown in the next chapter, the t-statistics on the child labor law instruments are quite large; thus the within-
state clustering is of minimal substantive importance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
RESULTS 
 
 It is useful to begin this chapter with a simple illustration of the joint distribution 
of school-year work intensity and problem behavior. Figures 20 and 21 plot fitted values 
derived from a regression of annual crime and recent substance use on a categorical 
measure of work intensity (five-hour intervals: 0 hours, 1-5 hours, 6-10 hours, etc.), 
controlling for age (third-order polynomial) and exposure time. Each work intensity 
category is entered into the model as a dummy variable. In each figure, moreover, four 
regression models are estimated for various subsamples to evaluate the sensitivity of the 
“work intensity effect” for different groups of youths: the total pooled sample (NT = 
40,238); 12 to 18 year olds (NT = 31,262); 14 to 18 year olds enrolled in high school (NT 
= 22,969); and 16 to 17 years olds enrolled in high school (NT = 12,270).  
*** Figures 20 and 21 Here *** 
There is a very clear positive relationship between work hours and both problem 
behaviors. Consider annual crime, for example (Figure 20). Youths who are 12-18 years 
old who do not work in a formal job during the school year engage in 1.00 different types 
of crime (out of 22), on average. Youths who work the longest number of hours per week 
during the school year (41+ hours), on the other hand, engage in the largest variety of 
criminal acts, 1.77 on average. The work intensity effect is similar for recent substance 
use (Figure 21). Non-working 12-18 year olds engage in a mean 0.88 different types of 
substance use (out of four) during the last month, while the mean for the highest-intensity 
workers is 1.34.  
Figure 22 uses a three-category measure of school-year work hours with the 12-18 
year old subsample: no work (0 hours), low work intensity (1-20 hours), and high work 
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intensity (21+ hours). Again, there is the expected positive relationship between work 
intensity and problem behavior, with high-intensity workers most likely to report 
engaging in each of the problem behavior outcomes. Moreover, low-intensity workers are 
only slightly more likely to be involved in crime and substance use than their non-
working counterparts. This illustration confirms the worry of scholars and policymakers 
that intensive employment of over 20 hours weekly—not necessarily employment per 
se—has the most serious consequences for adolescent development in the area of 
problem behavior.  
*** Figure 22 Here *** 
In the section that follows, I examine the validity of the child labor laws used as 
instrumental variables in the empirical analyses. Then, I present the empirical results 
from a series of multivariate models intended to provide estimates of the effect of school-
year work intensity on crime and substance use. Following this, I conduct a series of 
sensitivity analyses.  
 
EVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF STATE CHILD LABOR LAWS AS 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES FOR SCHOOL-YEAR WORK HOURS 
 
 The strength of the FEIV model lies in the validity of the child labor laws used as 
instrumental variables for school-year work hours. One important criterion for a “good” 
instrument is that it be correlated with the endogenous regressor. In the current context, 
state child labor laws should influence the number of hours per week that youths are 
employed during the school year. In this section, I provide a simple graphical illustration 
of the usefulness of these laws as instrumental variables for school-year work intensity. 
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Following this, I incorporate the instruments into multivariate “first-stage” models of 
school-year work intensity. 
 Recall from the previous chapter that I use the maximum number of hours per 
week allowed during school weeks as instrumental variables. Figure 23 provides mean 
work intensity at two time periods, classifying youths by the child labor law in their state 
at each time period. In the first time period, these youths are 15 years old, while in the 
next time period, they are 16 years old. At each period, the (weighted) mean number of 
hours worked during the school year is computed since the last interview (or in the 
previous year if the first time period is the first interview). At age 15, there is consistency 
in work intensity, with most youths averaging fewer than four hours per week. It is 
noteworthy that 15 year olds subject to an under-20-hours restriction work slightly fewer 
hours, on average, than 15 year olds subject to a 20-to-39-hours restriction (2.92 vs. 
3.67). At age 16, there is more variability in work hours that appears to be a function of 
the child labor law in the state in which youths reside. The key labor law change is that 
which imposes no restrictions at age 16, evidenced by the apparently larger increase in 
work intensity among those who, at age 15, must work fewer than 20 hours or between 
20 and 39 hours per week, but by age 16 are allowed to work as many hours as they see 
fit.  
*** Figure 23 Here *** 
 Figure 24 provides a more intuitive way of thinking about how change in child 
labor laws influence change in work intensity by graphing the change in work intensity 
between ages 15 and 16, classifying youths by the change in work hours allowed under 
state child labor laws (using those categories with a sufficient number of observations to 
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provide stable estimates). As expected, there is a roughly linear increase in the number of 
school-year work hours corresponding to larger increases the number of allowable hours 
from age 15 to age 16. Thus, we have graphical evidence that state child labor laws do 
indeed influence adolescent work intensity.1
*** Figure 24 Here *** 
 
First-Stage Models  
Tables 7 and 8 provide fixed-effects estimates of the relationship between the 
child labor law instruments and school-year work intensity. In Table 7, annual school-
year work intensity is the response variable (for use in the annual crime models), while in 
Table 8, recent school-year work intensity is the response variable (for use in the recent 
substance use models). I will focus only on the estimates for annual work intensity, but 
the substantive results are similar using the estimates for recent work intensity.  
*** Tables 7 and 8 Here *** 
 Model 1 in Table 7 controls for exposure time, age dummies, and state dummies. 
The coefficients suggest that all five state child labor laws are significantly related to 
school-year work intensity. The coefficients for the child labor laws governing 14 and 15 
year olds are quite large, while those governing 16 and 17 year olds are of a much smaller 
magnitude. The reader should bear in mind that these are within-individual change (from 
                                                 
1 In order to gain some sense of the magnitude of the “work intensity effect” on crime and 
substance use implied by the use of state child labor laws as instrumental variables, I compute the ratio of 
the change in problem behavior to the change in work intensity for each category of change in work hours 
allowed at age 16. These figures are equivalent to Wald estimates of the “work intensity effect” on problem 
behavior (i.e., the ratio of the reduced-form estimate to the first-stage estimate). The mean (weighted by the 
number of observations) impact of annual school-year work intensity on annual crime using this method is 
–0.022, and the mean impact of recent school-year work intensity on recent substance use is 0.051, 
suggesting that longer work hours reduce crime but increase substance use. We can thus anticipate the 
“work intensity effect” from the FEIV models later in this chapter, as this is indeed what we find (the 
estimates are comparable to those in Model 1). 
 94
individual-specific means) coefficients. It would be inaccurate to claim that being subject 
to a child labor law mandating fewer than 20 hours of work per week is associated with 
an 18.63-hour reduction from youths’ individual-specific means, on average, than they 
would otherwise work when not subject to this law. Specifically, no youth experiences a 
full unit increase (or decrease) in their within-individual change score for this 
instrumental variable at any wave. This point warrants further explanation.  
In the aggregate, the most influential child labor law for 14 and 15 year olds is the 
restriction under 20 hours per week. For our hypothetical youth, her average change score 
on this instrument at the second wave (when she is 15) is 0.38, and she experiences a 
change in work intensity on the order of 7.08 (.38 × (–18.6331) = –7.08) fewer hours than 
she averages over all five waves than if her work involvement were not constrained by 
this law. At the third wave (when she is 16), her average change score is –0.15, which 
means that she experiences a corresponding change in work intensity on the order of 2.79 
(–.15 × (–18.6331) = 2.79) more hours than she averages over all five waves. Thus, the 
effect of this particular child labor law is such that when it “turns off” at age 16, our 
hypothetical youth works almost ten hours longer per week during the school year than 
she did when she was 15 (2.79 – (–7.08) = 9.87). The 14- and 15-year-old restrictions to 
20-39 hours and 40+ hours are associated with between two and three fewer hours than 
average, respectively, at age 15. Among 16 and 17 year olds, the practical impact of child 
labor laws is very small, but is nevertheless negative, as expected.  
 Model 2 in Tables 7 and 8 introduces the individual-level control variables. Doing 
so reduces the magnitude of the child labor law coefficients for 14 and 15 year olds by 
about two hours, yet they remain substantively and statistically significant. Importantly, 
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the change in work intensity corresponding to change in child labor law eligibility is not 
attributable to normal aging, which is controlled in this model. Several other control 
variables significantly influence change in work intensity. Youths who are older 
experience larger within-individual increases in work intensity, although this begins to 
level off, as indicated by the significantly negative quadratic term. Youths who change to 
high-school dropout or high-school graduate status significantly increase their work 
involvement, as would be expected upon leaving school. Moreover, youths whose 
experience a change in family structure to living without a mother figure or living 
independently correspondingly increase their work intensity. The former result is 
particularly interesting, as it suggests that youths who lose a father figure from the 
household (through death, divorce, or separation) increase their work involvement, 
perhaps in order to contribute to the family economy. Oddly, residential location is 
unrelated to work intensity. 
 Model 3 adds county-level control variables intended to provide some sense of the 
conditions of the local labor market. Importantly, the coefficients for the instruments are 
minimally affected by their inclusion. Youths residing in counties that experience an 
increase in unemployment increase their work intensity, perhaps indicative of greater 
work effort or strengthened attachment in response to a slackened labor market. An 
increase in per capita income is also related to an increase in school-year work intensity, 
suggesting that an increase in the socioeconomic profile of a community leads to more 
expansive work opportunities for young people. On the other hand, youths residing in 
counties that experience an increase in the number of manufacturing jobs tend to decrease 
their work intensity. Since manufacturing jobs are largely off limits to adolescents, job 
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growth in this industry may crowd out other youth employment opportunities. For recent 
work intensity (Table 8), change in the number of service jobs and government jobs are 
additionally associated with change in the number of hours of employment, with an 
increase in service jobs resulting in marginally longer hours and an increase in 
government jobs resulting in a significant reduction in hours.  
 To summarize, the results in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that state child labor laws 
restricting the work involvement of 14 and 15 year olds during the school year are 
particularly effective at doing so, while laws restricting the work involvement of 16 and 
17 year olds are less strongly related to school-year work hours. This suggests that the 
16-year-old transition is the key one for adolescent work involvement, and that the 
loosening of work restrictions at this age is a primary agent responsible for the increase in 
the number of hours of employment. One point worth highlighting is that the impact of 
child labor restrictions on the work involvement of 14-15 year olds is almost identical 
irrespective of the number of allowable hours. That is, residing in states that impose an 
under-20-hours restriction is associated with the same reduction in school-year work 
intensity as residing in state that impose a 20-to-39-hours or a 40-or-more-hours 
restriction. This is not the case with 16-17 year olds, however, as the more restrictive 
state child labor laws (20 to 39 hours) are associated with somewhat fewer hours. This 
strongly suggests that the operative child labor law at ages 14 and 15 is at the federal 
level rather than the state level. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 imposes a 
maximum 18-hour work week while school is in session for 14-15 year olds, and no 
restriction for 16-17 year olds.  
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 Although the instrumental variables estimator is consistent, in finite samples it is 
known to be biased in the same direction as the least squares estimator. In Tables 7 and 8 
are two test statistics that provide a useful metric for the explanatory power of the 
instrumental variables in each model, and thus the degree of finite sample bias. First is an 
F-test for the joint significance of the instrumental variables (see Bound et al., 1995). A 
“good” instrument set will have a comparatively large F-statistic given the number of 
instrumental variables, whereas structural models with a small statistic should be 
interpreted with caution.2 Second, a partial R-square for the instruments is provided as an 
alternative metric, with larger values preferred to smaller ones (see Shea, 1997). By these 
criteria, all three models produce extremely large F-tests and respectable partial R-
squares, minimizing any concern about finite sample bias.3
 
ANNUAL CRIME MODELS 
 In the first set of empirical models, I evaluate the “work intensity effect” on 
annual crime. There are three sections that follow, each of which implements a different 
estimation procedure: random effects, fixed effects, and fixed effects with instrumental 
variables. Specification tests are used to determine the most appropriate model. The 
                                                 
2 Since the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instrumental variables at the first stage is 
wrong, I make the following adjustments: 
( 1) 1 1
1 IV
NT N KF F
NT K deft
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎡ ⎤′ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
where the term in the first bracket is a degrees-of-freedom correction for the within transformation, and the 
term in the second bracket is a survey adjustment, with IVdeft  representing the mean design effect for the 
five instrumental variables.  
3 A useful comparison is with Tyler’s (2003) instrumental variables model of the impact of work 
intensity on academic achievement. For Tyler’s seven excluded instruments, the first-stage F-statistic was 
5.69 in the math score model (N = 9,252) and 5.90 in the reading score model (N = 9,242). Using Bound et 
al.’s (1995:450, Table A.1) approximation, the relative bias of the IV estimator to the LS estimator lies 
between .09 and .17 (for τ 2/K = 4.0, and K = 3, 10). 
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Hausman statistic is a convenient way to compare two estimators which under the null 
hypothesis are consistent, with one more efficient than the other. By way of illustration, 
take the random-effects (RE) and fixed-effects (FE) estimators. Under the null 
hypothesis, RE and FE are both consistent, and the estimators differ only by sampling 
error. Since RE requires fewer degrees of freedom and is thus more efficient, failure to 
reject the null hypothesis implies that RE is the preferred estimator. Under the alternative 
hypothesis, only FE is consistent, and thus a rejection of the null hypothesis implies that 
the efficiency loss of FE is outweighed by its consistency gain relative to RE. Hausman’s 












This statistic generalizes to test the consistency of a parameter vector, but in the present 
context, the concern is with a single regressor (school-year work hours). A simple 
transformation produces a z-statistic (or its small-sample counterpart, the t-statistic, when 










I also use the Hausman statistic as a test of the consistency of FE relative to FEIV. In this 
context, both FE and FEIV are consistent under the null hypothesis, with FE the efficient 
estimator. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that FEIV is preferable to FE. 
First, I rely on a random-effects (RE) estimator. This model is of the form 
0 1 2 3ijt ijt ijt ijt i j ijtY H X Cβ β β β µ φ= + + + + + +ε  
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where µ i represents an individual effect assumed to be randomly drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean zero, rendering it necessary only to estimate the standard 
deviation of the distribution.4 This distributional assumption makes the RE model 
comparatively efficient. However, µ i is also assumed to be independent of the regressors, 
meaning in the present case that unobserved, between-individual differences are assumed 
unrelated to the number of hours that youths work during the school year. If this 
exogeneity assumption is violated, RE is biased and inconsistent. 
 Second, I rely on a fixed-effects (FE) estimator of the form 
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (ijt i ijt i ijt i ijt i j ijt i
ijt ijt ijt ijt j ijt
Y Y H H X X C C
Y H X C
)β β β β φ ε
β β β β φ ε
− = + − + − + − + + −
= + + + + +
ε
                                                
 
where the within transformation eliminates µ i from the model. An important advantage of 
the FE model is that it relaxes the assumption of independence between the individual 
effect, µ i, and the regressors. Because it makes no parametric assumptions about the 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and involves the loss of N – 1 additional degrees 
of freedom (in order to compute panel means), it is less efficient than the RE model. 
Nevertheless, if the unobserved heterogeneity is indeed correlated with school-year work 
hours, we can expect that the FE model will be an improvement over the RE model. The 
FE transformation is not a panacea, however, as it also requires the assumption that 
within-individual change in school-year work hours is exogenous. If change in school-
year work hours is correlated with change in other dynamic omitted variables, FE is 
biased and inconsistent. 
 
4 Since individuals in the sample contribute up to five interviews, ignoring the panel structure of 
the data will result in underestimated standard errors and thus type I inferential errors. A random-effects 
model estimates an autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, which accomodates equicorrelated within-panel 
residuals. This parameter is a quantification of the degree of unobserved heterogeneity remaining in the 
model after adjusting for observables. 
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 Third, I rely on a fixed-effects instrumental variables (FEIV) estimator of the 
form 
0 1 2 3
ˆ
ijt ijt ijt ijt j ijtY H X Cβ β β β φ= + + + + +ε  
where the fitted within-individual change in work hours is substituted into the structural 
model. Like the FE model, FEIV relaxes the assumption of independence between the 
individual effect, µ i, and the regressors, and makes no distributional assumptions about 
the unobserved heterogeneity. Because it is also an instrumental variables estimator, 
though, it is even less efficient than FE. The advantage of this model, however, is that 
change in child labor law eligibility produces exogenous change in school-year work 
hours, satisfying the assumption of no correlation between work hours and the structural 
disturbance.  
 
Random Effects  
 Table 9 provides the results for annual crime from a series of models estimated 
using a random-effects estimator. This is an error components model that accomodates 
the panel nature of the data by allowing equicorrelated within-panel residuals. Although 
this model quantifies the unobservables, an important assumption is that these 
unobservables are not correlated with the regressors. This is thus a type of “selection on 
observables” model (to use the terminology of Heckman and Hotz, 1989) intended to 
serve as a baseline for comparison with alternative specifications.  
*** Table 9 Here *** 
 Model 1 includes work intensity along with controls for exposure time, age 
dummies, and state dummies (these coefficients are not shown). This model suggests that 
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ten additional hours of formal employment during the school year increase the number of 
different crimes committed by 0.020 (b = .0020, p < .05). This “work intensity effect” is 
quite modest, but is not unlike that found in other studies. Specifically, the increase in 
crime with ten additional hours constitutes only 0.009-standard deviation (.020 / 2.228). 
To provide some sense of magnitude, when annual crime is evaluated at the sample mean 
(1.034), youths who work ten hours longer commit 1.054 different crimes, on average, 
representing a 1.9 percent higher rate of criminal behavior ([1.054 – 1.034] / 1.034 = 
.019). 
Model 2 adds the individual-level control variables. The work intensity 
coefficient increases by 25.0 percent compared to Model 1, and it remains statistically 
significant (b = .0025, p < .05). Among the control variables, we observe the expected 
age-crime curve with a positive linear coefficient and a negative quadratic coefficient. 
The coefficients imply that criminal offending reaches a peak at 16.8 years of age. 
Youths who drop out of or graduate from high school (relative to enrolled youths) engage 
in significantly more criminal behavior. Youths who live with a single mother or in a 
household with no mother figure (relative to living with two parents) also engage in 
significantly more criminal conduct. Residential location is not an important predictor of 
criminal behavior. 
Model 3 adds the county-level control variables. Work intensity retains a positive 
and significant coefficient in this model (b = .0024, p < .05). In an unexpected finding, 
youths residing in counties with higher unemployment have lower rates of crime. On the 
other hand, youths residing in counties with a larger number of manufacturing jobs or a 
smaller number of service jobs engage in significantly more criminal behavior. It is 
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unclear, however, exactly how manufacturing and service job availability translate into 
higher crime propensity. 
 The main summary point worth highlighting from Table 9 is that the adverse 
“work intensity effect” on criminal behavior is replicated among youths in the NLSY. In 
these models, however, the effect is extremely modest, constituting at most a 2.4 percent 
increase in criminality from the sample mean with ten additional hours (Model 2).  
 
Fixed Effects 
 Table 10 provides the results for annual crime from a series of models estimated 
using the fixed-effects transformation. This is one type of “selection on unobservables” 
model, where individual fixed effects are included to sweep out unobserved 
heterogeneity, or time-invariant, between-individual differences in criminal behavior. In 
this model, identification is based on change in criminal activity corresponding with 
contemporaneous change in work intensity.  
*** Table 10 Here *** 
Model 1 suggests that a change in work intensity on the order of ten additional 
hours during the school year corresponds with a significant 0.048 fewer different crimes 
(b = –.0048, p < .001). Thus, by including individual fixed effects to sweep out 
unobserved heterogeneity from the model, the “work intensity effect” changes signs 
relative to the “selection on observables” model in Table 9. Working ten additional hours 
reduces annual crime by a quite modest 4.6 percent from the sample mean (.022-standard 
deviation). 
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The work intensity coefficient is similar and statistically significant in Models 2 
and 3 (Model 2: b = –.0036, p < .01; Model 3: b = –.0033, p < .01). Notice that, contrary 
to the random-effects model, changing to dropout status corresponds with a significant 
decrease in criminal involvement (relative to high-school enrollment). Changing to high-
school graduate status, on the other hand, is associated with a significant increase in 
crime. Additionally, a change in family structure to living with no mother figure is 
associated with an increase in crime, while a change to living independently is associated 
with a reduction in crime (relative to living with two parents). County control variables 
that reduce crime are increases in local unemployment, the number of retail jobs, and 
unemployment insurance payments, while an increase in the total number of jobs is 
associated with an increase in crime.5
 The important lesson from Table 10 is that conclusions about the nature of the 
association between school-year work intensity and criminal behavior are sensitive to 
model specification. Specifically, a “selection on observables” model, as in the random-
effects (RE) model in Table 9, suggests that high-school work intensity is related to 
elevated annual crime. On the other hand, a “selection on unobservables” model, as in the 
fixed-effects (FE) model in Table 10, suggests that youths who increase their work 
involvement tend to reduce their criminal involvement. Hausman tests indicate that the 
RE estimates from Table 9 are inconsistent relative to their FE counterparts in Table 10 
(e.g., Model 3: H = 10.73, p < .001). Therefore, the RE estimates appear to be biased 
                                                 
5 It is worth comparing the fixed-effects results in Table 10 with those of Paternoster et al. (2003) 
and Apel et al. (2003). In these studies (also using the NLSY, but with the first three waves), the intensive 
work effect on delinquency was consistently negative but did not attain statistical significance. However, 
each used a binary indicator for working over 20 hours per week, whereas here I use the actual number of 
hours. Moreover, their measures of crime were operationalized differently, with Paternoster et al. using a 
five-item binary indicator for participation and Apel et al. using a seven-item variety scale. Here I use a 22-
item variety score. 
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compromise estimates of between- and within-individual differences in work intensity. 
With respect to crime, at least, work hours are indeed of considerable predictive 
importance, but not in the criminogenic way that one would anticipate from a reading of 
existing research. 
 
Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables 
 Table 11 provides the results for annual crime from a series of models estimated 
using a fixed-effects instrumental variables estimator. This is the second of the “selection 
on unobservables” models, wherein individual fixed effects are included to sweep out 
unobserved heterogeneity, and state child labor laws are introduced as instruments for 
formal school-year work hours. In this model, identification is based on exogenous 
within-individual change in work hours attributable to the easing of child labor 
restrictions as youths age. 
*** Table 11 Here *** 
 In Model 1, the impact of school-year work intensity on crime is negative and 
statistically significant (b = –.0175, p < .001). By instrumenting for within-individual 
change in work hours, the “work intensity effect” takes on both statistical and substantive 
significance. Indeed, it is over three times the magnitude of the estimate from its fixed-
effects analog (Model 1 in Table 10). An increase of ten hours produces a 0.175 decrease 
in crime, which represents a 16.9 percent decrease from the sample average (.079-
standard deviation).  
 In Models 2 and 3, the work intensity effect on crime becomes even larger (Model 
2: b = –.0309, p < .001; Model 3: b = –.0282, p < .001). In all other respects, this model 
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closely resembles its fixed-effects counterpart, with the exception that changing to 
dropout status is unrelated to crime in this model, as are local unemployment and 
unemployment insurance.  
 Thus, instrumenting for school-year work hours using state child labor laws as 
instrumental variables produces a work intensity effect that is several orders of 
magnitude larger than that produced by a fixed-effects model. Depending on which 
specification is chosen, the estimate for work intensity is over three-and-a-half times as 
large (Model 1) or over eight-and-a-half times as large (Models 2 and 3). The difference 
is due entirely to the fact that the fixed-effects instrumental variables (FEIV) estimator 
isolates change in work intensity that is exogenous. Both models sweep out time-
invariant individual differences (by within-transforming all covariates), with the 
difference that FE requires the assumption that change in work intensity is exogenous 
conditional on observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, FE assumes that 
there are no omitted variables that change contemporaneously with work intensity that 
are also related to change in crime. Violation of this assumption results in inconsistency 
of FE. The FEIV model relaxes this assumption by assuming a priori that change in work 
intensity is endogenous, and using instrumental variables to isolate the portion of the 
change in work intensity that is not correlated with the structural disturbance. In all three 
models, Hausman tests reject the FE model in favor of a FE model with instrumental 
variables (e.g., Model 3: H = 4.10, p < .001). Thus, the FE model is indeed inconsistent 
because of omission of time-varying factors that are correlated with change in work 
intensity and crime.6  
                                                 
6 There are a number of possibilities for dynamic omitted variables in the fixed-effects model. For 
example, change in parental attachment and supervision, school performance and commitment, peer 
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Of added importance is the J-statistic for overidentification, which serves as a test 
of the validity of the exclusion of the instrumental variables from the structural model.7 If 
the instruments have been appropriately excluded from the structural model, this chi-
square statistic should not exceed 9.49 using a 0.05 criterion, or 7.78 using a 0.10 
criterion. In all cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments satisfy the 
orthogonality condition for their exclusion.8  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
associations, and time use are plausible candidates. As a simple illustration, consider change in parental 
supervision. With the omission of this variable, the direction of the bias in βFE is predictable—βFE is biased 
upward. We know from Chapter Two that an increase in work intensity is correlated with a decrease in 
parental supervision as employed youths gain a greater degree of autonomy. Thus, change in work intensity 
is negatively correlated with change in supervision and control, which in turn is negatively correlated with 












If this illustration is accurate, then by not controlling for change in parental supervision, it is easy to see 
how the estimated impact of work intensity on crime will be biased upward. Although the true relationship 
between work intensity and crime may be negative, the estimated coefficient will tend to also pick up the 
indirect positive correlation between work intensity and crime through parental supervision (the product of 
two negative “paths”), resulting in a much smaller “work intensity effect” on crime. Indeed, in the fixed-
effects model, b = –.0033, whereas in the fixed-effects instrumental variables model, b = –.0282 (these 
estimates are from Model 3).  
7 When the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressors, the model is 
said to be “overidentified.” With an overidentified model, it is possible to test whether some of the 
instruments are correlated with the structural disturbance, and thus whether the instruments have been 
appropriately excluded from the structural model. In the present case, there is a single endogenous 
regressor with five instrumental variables, meaning that there are four overidentifying restrictions.  
8 The J-statistic is a standard routine in the ivreg2 procedure in Stata 8.0 (for details and access to 
the module, see Baum et al., 2003). Although this test is asymptotically valid, it is common in practice to 
make a small-sample correction. This is done in the following way: 
( 1) 1NT N KJ J
NT
− − − −⎡ ⎤′ = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
A regression-based procedure to test overidentifying restrictions is recommended by Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993). They suggest regressing the IV residuals on the full set of instruments (that is, both the 
included and excluded instruments, or xi and zi, respectively). The test statistic is N⋅R 2 (or in the current 
panel context, NT⋅R 2) from this auxiliary regression, which is distributed chi-square with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions.  
 107
Summary  
 The annual crime models estimated in this section suggest that inferences about 
the relationship between school-year work intensity and criminal behavior are sensitive 
to the assumptions that one is willing to make regarding “unobservables.” First, if one is 
willing to assume that work hours are exogenous conditional on observed covariates (the 
random-effects model), there is a positive relationship between work intensity and crime. 
Second, if one is willing to assume that change in work hours is exogenous conditional 
on individual fixed effects (the fixed-effects model), there is actually a modest negative 
relationship between crime and the number of hours worked per week. Third, if one is 
willing to assume that controlling for individual fixed effects is not sufficient to render 
change in work intensity exogenous, and that state child labor laws can be used as 
instrumental variables to do so, there is actually a substantial, negative relationship 
between crime and work hours.  
All objective criteria favor the “work intensity effect” from the fixed-effects 
instrumental variables model. In the context of annual crime, the random- and fixed-
effects estimators are biased and inconsistent due to specification error. In other words, 
omitted stable and dynamic variables that are correlated with work intensity and crime 
produce erroneous inferences in these two models about the causal impact of working. 
The weight of the evidence thus supports the conclusion that longer work hours during 
the school year have a substantial preventive effect on criminal behavior. Moreover, this 
estimate has a causal interpretation, since change in school-year work hours is rendered 
exogenous in the fixed-effects instrumental variables model. That is, a within-individual 
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increase in work involvement while school is in session causally produces a within-
individual decrease in criminal behavior. 
As with other research (e.g., Abe, 1999; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992; 
Crowley, 1984; Cullen et al., 1997; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Steinberg et al., 1993; 
Wright et al., 1997), I find in a random-effects model that youths who work longer hours 
during the school year do indeed engage in significantly more crime than youths who 
work fewer hours (or none at all). However, the findings herein suggest that this positive 
relationship is attributable entirely to selection bias, not to the fact that longer work hours 
are a cause of more extensive criminal involvement. On the contrary, longer work hours 
are a cause of diminished criminal involvement in the fixed-effects and fixed-effects 
instrumental variables models. In other words, youths who work longer hours are indeed 
more criminal, on average, but an increase in work hours produces a non-trivial decrease 
in crime. 
 
RECENT SUBSTANCE USE MODELS 
 In the next set of empirical models, I evaluate the “work intensity effect” on 
recent substance use. The progression of this analysis follows that from the previous 
section. I first use a random-effects estimator, followed by a fixed-effects and then a 
fixed-effects instrumental variables estimator. As before, I will rely on Hausman 
specification tests to choose the most appropriate estimator.  
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Random Effects  
 Table 12 summarizes the results from a random-effects model of recent substance 
use. When only limited control variables are included in Model 1, work intensity is 
positively and significantly related to substance use (b = .0054, p < .001). Specifically, 
working ten hours longer per week increases the number of different types of substances 
used by 0.054, representing a 4.9 percent higher rate of substance use over the sample 
average (1.103), or 0.040-standard deviation (.054 / 1.334). 
*** Table 12 Here *** 
 With individual control variables included in Model 2, the work intensity effect 
remains positive and significant (b = .0039, p < .001). These control variables imply an 
inverted U-shaped pattern of substance use in age, although the peak is 22.7 years of age, 
which is outside the range of the sample. This means that substance use is increasing in 
age, but doing so more slowly at older ages. Youths in larger households use fewer 
substances, while youths enrolled in high school use fewer substances compared to those 
that drop out or graduate. Relative to youths living with two parents, those living with a 
single mother or without a mother figure tend to engage in more substance use, while 
those living independently use fewer substances. Residential location does not seem to 
predict substance use (nor crime). 
 In Model 3, the work intensity effect changes little with the inclusion of county 
control variables (b = .0038, p < .001). The individual control variables also exhibit the 
same patterns as in Model 2. Youths residing in counties with higher unemployment 
engage in less substance use, consistent with the results for crime. Youths residing in 
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counties with more manufacturing jobs also engage in more substance use, consistent 
with the crime models.  
 Thus, as with annual crime, the adverse “work intensity effect” on substance use 
is also replicated among youths in the NLSY. At its strongest (Model 1), this effect 
constitutes a 4.9 percent higher rate of substance use with ten additional hours.  
 
Fixed Effects  
Table 13 provides results from a fixed-effects model of recent substance use. 
Model 1 demonstrates the positive and significant relationship between within-individual 
change in work hours and change in substance use (b = .0055, p < .001). Specifically, an 
increase of ten hours above the mean increases substance use by 5.0 percent above the 
sample average (.041-standard deviation). 
*** Table 13 Here *** 
In Models 2 and 3, the work intensity effect remains positive and significant, and 
is almost identical in the two models (Model 2: b = .0041, p < .001: Model 3: b = .0040, p 
< .001). Unlike its random-effects counterpart, change in household size is unrelated to 
change in substance use, as is change to a single mother household or to living 
independently. On the other hand, change in residential location is significant in these 
models, implying that youths who change to a central city residence increase their 
substance use. In Model 3, change in several of the county control variables are related to 
change in substance use, including local unemployment, the number of manufacturing 
and government jobs, and unemployment insurance payments.  
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 Thus, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by including individual fixed 
effects results in relatively little change in the magnitude of the “work intensity effect” on 
recent substance use. Indeed, Hausman tests reject the random-effects estimates in favor 
of the fixed-effects estimates in only one model (Model 2), although the magnitude of the 
difference is barely perceptible. Therefore, longer work hours during the school year 
significantly increase recent substance use. This conclusion should be tempered, 
however, by the fact that the magnitude of this work intensity effect is extremely small, 
constituting, at most, a 5.0 percent increase in substance use with an increase of ten hours 
per week (Model 1).9  
 
Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables  
 Table 14 reproduces the results from a fixed-effects instrumental variables model. 
Model 1 implies a work effect that is quite large relative to the random-effects and fixed-
effects models (b = .0437, p < .001). Youths who work ten hours above average increase 
their substance use by 39.6 percent above the sample mean (.328-standard deviation). 
This estimate is approximately eight times that from the random-effects (Table 12) and 
fixed-effects (Table 13) models. 
*** Table 14 Here *** 
                                                 
9 The conclusion from the fixed-effects model that an increase in work intensity results in an 
increase in substance use is contrary to the findings of Paternoster et al. (2003) and Apel et al. (2003) that 
intensive school-year work has no impact. As mentioned earlier, I use a continuous measure of work 
intensity in these analyses, rather than a binary indicator for intensive work. Additionally, the substance use 
response variables used in these analyses are referenced during the 30 days prior to the interview, whereas 
in the earlier studies it is referenced since the last interview (or ever prior to the initial interview). 
Moreover, I use a four-item substance use variety scale as the response variable, whereas these earlier 
studies used a three-item variety scale (cigarettes, alcohol, marijuana). When I re-estimated Models 1-3 
using the same three-item variety scale, the “work intensity effect” on substance use was consistently 
positive using binary and continuous measures of work intensity. However, when I re-estimated the models 
using only the first three waves, I fully replicated Paternoster et al.’s and Apel et al.’s findings of null 
effects. It seems that the additional information available in the fourth and fifth waves (when respondents 
are older) alters conclusions about the impact of school-year work intensity on substance use.  
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 The work intensity effect remains significant and of a similar magnitude in Model 
2 (b = .0445, p < .001) and Model 3 (b = .0429, p < .001). The individual control 
variables demonstrate that change in educational attainment is also related to change in 
substance use, but in a different way than in previous models. Change to high school 
dropout status produces a significant decrease in substance use. Although a change to 
living independently significantly decreases substance use, other changes in family 
structure are unrelated. Change in central city residence is also related to an increase in 
substance use, consistent with the fixed-effects results.  
 The fixed-effects instrumental variables results for recent substance use imply a 
substantial adverse “work intensity effect.” In addition, in all three models, Hausman 
tests reject the null hypothesis that the fixed-effects estimator is consistent. Consequently, 
we may on first inspection conclude that the impact of longer work hours on substance 
use is not only positive, but of a much larger magnitude than implied by a fixed-effects 
model (and even random effects). This series of results is far from conclusive, however. 
The overidentification tests for all three models reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are asymptotically uncorrelated with the structural disturbance, and 
therefore the exclusion restrictions involving state child labor laws are not valid. 
Rejection of the orthogonality condition implies that the fixed-effects instrumental 
variables estimator is inconsistent in this context, and that it leads to erroneous inferences 
about the relationship between work intensity and substance use.10
 
                                                 
10 Also available in the NLSY are measures of annual substance use for smoking cigarettes, 
drinking alcohol, and using marijuana, with reference periods since the last interview (or ever prior to the 
first interview). I created a three-item variety scale and re-estimated the models in Tables 12-14 using this 
as the response variable. All substantive results were replicated using this measure. Moreover, the 
overidentifying restrictions were also rejected using this measure. 
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Summary  
 The recent substance use models estimated in this section suggest that longer 
work hours during the school year are associated with higher rates of substance use. 
That is, the “sign” of the work intensity effect is consistently positive, irrespective of the 
assumptions one makes regarding “unobservables.” The magnitude varies, however, as a 
function of what estimator is used. The random- and fixed-effects models suggest a rather 
modest effect, and the fixed-effects instrumental variables model suggests a quite 
substantial effect. However, in this latter model, the instruments do not satisfy the 
orthogonality condition that permits their exclusion from the structural model. In words, 
the instruments are not “good” when used in the context of substance use. Because the 
fixed-effects instrumental variables results are invalid, the random-effects estimates are 
favored in Models 1 and 3, while the fixed-effects estimate is favored in Model 2 (on the 
basis of Hausman specification tests).  
 It should be noted, moreover, that because of the poor performance of the fixed-
effects instrumental variables estimator, the identification problem cannot as yet be 
resolved. Although individual fixed effects sweep out time-stable omitted variables 
(“unobserved heterogeneity”), the potential presence of omitted dynamic variables 
continues to pose an inferential risk, since change in school-year work intensity remains 
endogenous even in the fixed-effects instrumental variables model. In other words, the 
work intensity effect on substance use is not identified in these models, and thus cannot 
(and should not) be interpreted in a causal manner.  
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 In this section, I evaluate the sensitivity of the empirical estimates from previous 
sections by estimating a series of auxiliary models. These models take one of two forms: 
(1) problem behavior-specific outcomes and (2) alternative model specifications.  
 
Behavior-Specific Models  
 Table 15 summarizes conclusions from a series of models in which each 
individual problem behavior is treated as a response variable. Recall, for example, that 
annual crime is a 22-item variety scale, and that recent substance use is a four-item 
variety scale. There are thus 26 distinct problem behavior indicators which are treated as 
dependent variables in auxiliary fixed-effects instrumental variables regressions. In 
addition to binary indicators, frequencies are available in the NLSY for seven measures 
of crime and all four measures of substance use.11 To simplify presentation, I report 
simply whether or not the work intensity coefficient is statistically significant in each 
auxiliary model (using α = .10, two-tailed), and if so, its direction. I also denote those 
models in which the overidentification test rejects the null hypothesis (α = .10), 
suggesting that the instruments may not be “good” in that particular model. Model 1 is 
the same as before, including a control for exposure time, age dummies, and state 
dummies, Model 2 adds individual control variables, and Model 3 adds county control 
variables. 
                                                 
11 The frequencies for five crime measures (vandalism, major theft, “other” property crime, 
aggravated assault, selling drugs) are referenced since the last interview, or the year prior to the initial 
interview. For the frequency of carrying a handgun, the reference period is the 30 days prior to the 
interview. For the frequency of arrest, the reference period is since the last interview, or the ever prior to 
the initial interview. The frequencies for all four substance use measures are referenced during the 30 days 
prior to the interview. 
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*** Table 15 Here *** 
 In the top panel of Table 15 under the “prevalence” column are the binary 
indicators of annual crime. The most important finding is that work intensity is not 
positively related to the prevalence of any type of crime. Note that change in school-year 
work intensity is negatively and significantly related to change in 12 of the 22 indicators 
in at least one model. These vary in seriousness to include comparatively minor property 
crime (petty and major theft, vandalism, petty and major shoplifting), serious property 
crime (vehicle theft, petty burglary), dealing in stolen property (“other” property crime, 
illegal income from stolen property and “other” property crime), and violent crime 
(aggravated assault). Work intensity appears to have no relationship with the prevalence 
of larceny, robbery, arrest, and offenses related to selling drugs. Particularly interesting is 
that for all three indicators for selling drugs, I reject the null hypothesis that the 
instrumental variables are appropriately excluded from the structural model; I return to 
this below.  
Under the “frequency” column in the top panel are the annual crime frequencies. 
Only two of these response variables are consistently related to school-year work 
intensity: vandalism and major theft. There is some discrepancy for “other” property 
crime, aggravated assault, and carrying a gun, in that work intensity is significantly 
related to the prevalence but not the frequency of these criminal behaviors. Unexpectedly, 
longer work hours are associated with a significant increase in the frequency of selling 
drugs, but only in Model 1, as the addition of control variables eliminates this 
relationship. The pattern of results for annual crime thus suggests that school-year work 
hours are most consistently and strongly related to a reduction in relatively minor 
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property crimes such as vandalism and theft. Importantly, however, there is no evidence 
that an increase in school-year work intensity increases any type of delinquent or 
criminal behavior, with the possible exception of drug selling. On the contrary, work 
intensity consistently has either no relationship or a negative relationship with individual 
criminal behaviors.  
 In the bottom panel of Table 15 are the recent substance use measures. First, note 
that the work intensity effect is positive and statistically significant in all substance use 
models, irrespective of whether prevalence or frequency is treated as the response 
variable. Second, note that the test of overidentifying restrictions rejects the null 
hypothesis in all of the marijuana use and binge drinking models. Considering that the 
instrumental variables in the drug selling models in the top panel posed similar 
endogeneity problems, it would seem that the comparatively more serious substance use 
(and selling) behaviors are ill suited to excluding state child labor laws for identification 
purposes. Thus, the poor performance of the fixed-effects instrumental variables model 
for the recent substance use variety scale (Table 14) is attributable largely to the inclusion 
of marijuana use and binge drinking. On the other hand, the model appears to perform 
quite well for smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol.12
 In Table 16, I summarize the empirical results for all relevant models (RE, FE, 
FEIV), specification tests, and fit statistics using smoking and drinking frequency as 
dependent variables. In the top panel are the smoking frequency models. School-year 
work hours are positively and significantly related to smoking in all three random-effects 
                                                 
12 To ensure that the overidentification test is not sensitive to the composition of the substance use 
scale, I re-estimated the recent substance use models from Table 14 using a two-item variety scale that is 
the sum of the indicators for smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol in the last 30 days. The test of 
overidentifying restrictions was still rejected in all four models. Thus it is only when these two behaviors 
are treated separately that the instruments can be considered “good.” 
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(RE) models. This is also true in all three fixed-effects (FE) specifications, and the 
coefficients are very similar with the relationship slightly stronger. However, Hausman 
tests fail to reject RE only in Model 1, implying that RE is no less consistent than FE. 
When instrumental variables are introduced, the adverse “work intensity effect” becomes 
quite large. Model 3 results suggest that an increase of ten hours per week above the 
(individual-specific) mean results in an increase of 2.98 additional days (above the 
sample mean) of cigarette smoking in the previous month, on average, representing a 
50.0 percent increase from the sample mean (.266-standard deviation).  
*** Table 16 Here *** 
 In the bottom panel of Table 16 are the drinking frequency models. The 
coefficient for school-year work hours is positive and significant in all three RE models. 
Similarly, in all three FE models the coefficient for work intensity is significantly 
positive, and slightly larger in magnitude than the corresponding RE estimates (as in the 
smoking models). Indeed, Hausman tests fail to reject RE in all models except Model 1. 
In the models estimated using FE with instrumental variables, the work intensity 
coefficient is positive and statistically, as well as substantively, significant. Model 3 
implies that ten additional hours results in 1.40 additional days of alcohol use per month, 
representing a 62.6 percent increase from the sample mean (.302-standard deviation).  
 In sum, when smoking and drinking frequency are considered separately from the 
recent substance use variety scale, the results favor a deleterious “work intensity effect.” 
Moreover, we may place more confidence in the substance use frequency models, as the 
empirical results using the variety scale are negatively affected by the inclusion of 
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marijuana use and binge drinking. In subsequent models, then, I will consider smoking 
and drinking frequency as response variables over and above the variety scale. 
 
Alternative Model Specification  
Table 17 summarizes conclusions from a series of models in which various 
functional form alternatives for work intensity are introduced. I will describe each of 
these efforts and elaborate on those with important implications. As before, Model 1 
includes limited control variables, Model 2 includes individual control variables, and 
Model 3 adds county control variables. First, since maximum work intensity is 67 
(annual) and 70 (recent) hours per week, I censored work hours at three different 
thresholds: 60 hours, 50 hours, and 40 hours. All results were identical to the original 
models, suggesting that the model parameters are not adversely affected by outliers.  
*** Table 17 Here *** 
Second, I assessed non-linearity using dummy variables and a second-order 
polynomial.13 Using a single dummy variable for work status, the “work effect” on crime 
                                                 
13 Identification is more complicated with a quadratic endogenous regressor. Kelejian (1971; 
Kelejian and Oates, 1989:303-329) shows that obtaining the fitted value for the endogenous regressor from 
the first stage and then substituting the fitted value and its square into the second stage results in 
inconsistency. This is because the square of a linear projection is not equivalent to a linear projection on a 
square (Wooldridge, 2002). Kelejian suggests augmenting the first-stage model with squares and cross-
products of the instruments (see also Wooldridge, 2002:230-237). An alert reader will notice that the 
instruments which I employ are binary and mutually exclusive, which means that squares and cross-
products do not exist (in fact, the squares do exist but are perfectly collinear with the original instruments, 
and the cross-products produce all zeroes). However, I augment the first stage with dummy variables for 
the sequence of child labor laws that regulate employment during the 14-15 and 16-17 age periods. For 
example, a youth residing in New Jersey may not work more than 18 hours per week during the 14-15 age 
period, and not more than 40 hours per week during the 16-17 age period. Imagine that we have a 
hypothetical 14-year-old youth residing in New Jersey at the first wave. During waves one and two, this 
youth will be coded “1” on the “under-20 hours restriction” dummy, and during waves three and four, she 
will be coded “1” on the “40 or more hours restriction” dummy. In addition, during all four waves, she will 
be coded “1” on a single dummy variable for an under-20 hours restriction at age 14-15 and a 40 or more 
hours restriction at age 16-17. This is the best approximation to a cross-product available with the 
instruments used here. 
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remains negative and significant, but positive and significant for substance use. Using 
two dummy variables for work intensity (low intensity and high intensity), change to 
low-intensity work is not significantly different from non-work, whereas change to high-
intensity work is associated with a significant reduction in criminal behavior (Model 3: b 
= –1.2319, p < .01). For substance use variety and smoking frequency, both work 
intensity indicators are positive and significant. To illustrate, consider Model 3 for 
smoking frequency. The coefficient for the moderate work indicator is 12.512 (p < .01), 
and for the intensive work indicator is 4.849 (p < .10), and the difference between these 
two coefficients is statistically significant. Thus, although employment per se increases 
smoking, it is change to low-intensity work that is particularly strongly related to an 
increase in smoking. The pattern is reversed for drinking, as high-intensity work 
significantly increases drinking frequency (b = 4.2442, p < .01), while low-intensity work 
is unrelated.  
In the quadratic specification for annual crime, neither the linear term nor the 
quadratic term is significant in all three models. In the substance use models, the linear 
term is consistently positive and significant while the quadratic term is negative and 
significant in the substance use variety models, but largely non-significant in the 
substance use frequency models. There is thus some evidence for a non-linear 
relationship between work intensity and substance use, suggesting that relatively modest 
increases in work intensity produce substantively large increases in substance use, but 
this effect diminishes as change in work intensity becomes large.  
 Third, I explore other model specifications by controlling for the individual’s 
level of work hours at time t, and by taking a natural log (+1) transformation of school-
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year work hours. Since identification in a fixed-effects model is based only on within-
individual change, the model ignores the mean from which this change occurs. Thus, in a 
fixed-effects model, the impact of an increase of five hours is treated the same despite 
whether that change is from an individual-specific mean of ten hours or an individual-
specific mean of 25 hours. By including the level of work hours it is possible to control, 
to a limited extent, these differences across youths. The semi-log model accomplishes a 
similar goal by accounting for the percent change from the individual-specific mean. 
Thus, an increase of five hours from an individual-specific mean of ten hours represents a 
50 percent (5 / 10) increase, whereas an increase of five hours from an individual-specific 
mean of 25 hours represents a 20 percent (5 / 25) increase. In both sets of models, the 
empirical results replicate the original findings. The results for the semi-log models are 
worth summarizing in some detail. Model 3 for annual crime implies that a ten percent 
increase from the (individual-specific) mean results in 2.44 fewer crimes (b = –.2440). 
The corresponding estimates for the remaining response variables are 3.24 for substance 
use variety, 19.98 for smoking frequency, and 9.17 for drinking frequency.  
 The next model introduces prior problem behavior as a regressor, allowing for a 
genuine “state dependent” effect (Nagin and Paternoster, 1991, 2000), or a causal effect 
of prior problem behavior on current problem behavior. This provides an important 
robustness test of the “work intensity effect” since it is acknowledged that past problem 
behavior is correlated with current work intensity (see Gottfredson, 1985; Mihalic and 
Elliott, 1997; Mortimer, 2003; Staff and Uggen, 2003; Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; 
Steinberg et al., 1993). However, the models suggest that with the inclusion of a lagged 
Y, the “work intensity effect” remains largely intact. 
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 The next set of results evaluates the sensitivity of the coefficients to functional 
form assumptions by estimating a fixed-effects Poisson model. This is a reduced-form 
model in which the instrumental variables are directly substituted for school-year work 
intensity in the problem behavior models. The coefficients in a reduced-form model are 
the product of the coefficient(s) on the instrumental variable(s) from the first stage with 
the second-stage structural estimate. Since we know from the first-stage models that the 
instrumental variables are negatively related to school-year work intensity, we can infer 
the direction and significance of the second-stage “work intensity effect” from the 
reduced-form estimates. For example, in the annual crime models, the instrumental 
variables are all positively and significantly related to crime. This means that the “work 
intensity effect” at the second stage must be negative and significant (since the product of 
two negative values produces a positive value). In the recent substance use models, the 
instrumental variables are negative but are not jointly (nor individually) significant. 
However, they are negative and jointly significant in the smoking and drinking frequency 
models, implying that the second-stage “work intensity effect” is positive and significant. 
Thus, for criminal behavior, smoking, and drinking, the results are insensitive to whether 
the model is specified in a linear or non-linear form.  
 Estimation in First Differences. As a final test of robustness, I estimate a model in 
first differences rather than fixed effects. The first-differences (FD) estimator is similar to 
the fixed-effects (FE) estimator, in that the individual effect is swept out of the model in 
both; this is just accomplished in a different way.14 The FE estimator does this by 
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14 A first-differences (FD) model is parameterized in the following way: 
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transforming all variables into deviations from within-panel means, while the FD 
estimator does it by computing the change from the previous time period. A comparison 
of results using these two estimators is often good practice, although it can be difficult to 
choose between the two if they give substantively different results (Wooldridge, 2002).  
 Under the FDIV specification, the results for annual crime are identical to the 
original (FEIV) specification, and the coefficients are well within sampling error. 
However, the FDIV results for the substance use response variables differ in important 
ways, so I will describe these in some detail. In Table 18, I provide the estimates from 
models of first differences and first differences with instrumental variables, as well as the 
random-effects coefficients for comparative purposes (from Table 16). In the top panel of 
Table 18 are the first-stage fit statistics for the FDIV model, showing that the models 
provide a satisfactory fit. An important finding from this table is that the estimates from a 
traditional first differences model are substantially smaller than those from their fixed-
effects counterparts, and they are not within sampling error for smoking.15 A similar 
finding applies to FDIV and FEIV, but here the estimates are decidedly not within 
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where differences are taken from the previous time period rather than from panel means. Although first 
differences eliminate the unobserved individual effect, µi , doing so results in the loss of the first 
observation for all individuals. The working sample size is thus N(T – 1) rather than NT as in the fixed-
effects model. The first-differences instrumental variables estimator (FDIV) is a straightforward extension: 
α β ε∆ = + ∆ + ∆  
where the fitted “difference” is substituted into the second stage. 
15 When the errors are serially independent, FE is efficient, whereas if the errors follow a random 
walk, FD is efficient (Wooldridge, 2002). Unfortunately, there is no formal statistical test for choosing 
between FD and FE (or between FDIV and FEIV). A Hausman specification test is inappropriate because 
both estimators are consistent under the alternative hypothesis. The metric I use to determine what is 
“substantively” different is whether or not 95 percent confidence intervals around the work intensity point 
estimates overlap. When comparing the FD estimates to the FE estimates for smoking, none of the 
confidence intervals overlap (and 99% confidence intervals barely overlap). When comparing the point 
estimates for drinking, a 95 confidence interval does not overlap in Model 1, but does overlap slightly in 
Models 2 and 3. Note that I use this only as a shorthand metric, and that it is inappropriate in a formal 
sense. Since the models are estimated using the same sample, the estimators have non-zero covariance. If 
this covariance is positive, the confidence intervals are wider than reported here and are thus more likely to 
overlap. 
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sampling error.16 For smoking frequency, the Hausman tests favor the FDIV models. 
Interestingly enough, all coefficients are negative, and the coefficients from Models 2 and 
3 attain statistical significance. For drinking frequency, Hausman tests favor the FD 
models. Although the coefficient from Model 1 is marginally significant, the coefficients 
from Models 2 and 3 are non-significant. What is noteworthy is that, with but a single 
exception (Model 1 for drinking in FD), the favored models imply that there is not a 
positive relationship between school-year work intensity and substance use, and in two 
cases, longer work hours are actually associated with a significant decrease in substance 
use (Models 2 and 3 for smoking in FDIV).  
*** Table 18 Here *** 
 Thus, empirical results from models estimated in first differences lead to different 
inferences about the relationship between school-year work intensity and substance use 
than from models estimated using individual fixed effects. There are at least four 
econometric explanations that can account for the more conservative (and largely null) 
estimates provided by FD/FDIV relative to FE/FEIV. I will consider each possibility in 
turn. One potential reason for the difference between FD/FDIV and FE/FEIV is that the 
FD/FDIV model loses important information by excluding the first observation for all 
individuals (in order to compute the difference between the first and second time 
periods). To address this, I re-estimated the FE/FEIV models excluding the first 
observation for each individual.17 In all cases, the coefficient for school-year work 
                                                 
16 When comparing the FDIV estimates to the FEIV estimates, none of the confidence intervals 
overlap. For example, using the estimates for smoking frequency in Model 3, the 95 percent confidence 
interval from the FDIV model is (–.1560, –.0209) and from the FEIV model is (.2478, .3483). Additionally, 
there is not even overlap between 99 percent confidence intervals for any of the models.  
17 I did this in two different ways. I first re-estimated the existing FE and FEIV models by 
excluding the first observation for each individual. I then re-estimated the FE and FEIV models by re-
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intensity was positive and statistically significant. Thus, the difference between FD/FDIV 
and FE/FEIV cannot be explained by the mechanics of the differencing procedure and the 
loss of information from the first observation. 
 A second possibility is that change in school-year work intensity is simply not 
exogenous in the substance use models, even with the exclusion of state child labor laws. 
Wooldridge (2002) warns that if FD/FDIV and FE/FEIV differ in ways that cannot be 
attributed to sampling error, the exogeneity assumption could be violated. In the event 
that this is true, FD/FDIV and FE/FEIV are both inconsistent and converge to different 
probability limits. Simply put, in this case the results provided by both estimators are 
wrong. This explanation would require that the state child labor laws be correlated with 
the structural disturbance. However, we have seen that the tests of overidentifying 
restrictions in FDIV and FEIV are not rejected in the smoking and drinking models. 
Thus, violation of the exogeneity assumption is unlikely. 
 A third possible explanation for the inferential divergence between FD/FDIV and 
FE/FEIV is the problem of serially correlated errors. The FE/FEIV estimator assumes 
that the model errors are serially uncorrelated, whereas the FD/FDIV estimator assumes 
that the errors follow a random walk. If in fact the model residuals are positively serially 
correlated, the FE/FEIV standard errors are biased downward as a function of the degree 
of dependence among the residuals (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). The practical 
effect is to invalidate hypothesis testing by making the usual t-statistics too large, and 
thus increasing the likelihood of type I inferential errors. In the present context, this 
means that positive serial correlation can make it appear that there is a significant 
                                                                                                                                                 
computing individual change scores after omitting the first observation for each individual. Both sets of 
results were identical. 
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relationship between school-year work intensity and substance use, when in fact no 
causal relationship exists. The FD/FDIV model, on the other hand, assumes a priori the 
presence of first-order serial correlation, and the differencing procedure is intended to 
remove it. Testing for serial correlation is not routinely done in FE/FEIV, although 
Bhargava et al. (1982) propose a straightforward diagnostic. They suggest a Durbin-
Watson statistic which they generalize to panel data as a way to test for serially correlated 
as well as random walk errors.18 Using this procedure, in all models I reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation, but fail to reject the null hypothesis that the errors 
follow a random walk. Thus, there is indeed positive serial correlation in FE/FEIV 
biasing the standard errors downward, but not as much as implied by a random walk. 
When I implemented the GLS procedure outlined by Bhargava and colleagues, there was 
only minimal change in the substantive results for FE/FEIV, although the t-statistics did 
decrease slightly as expected in the presence of positive serial correlation.19 Thus, the 
difference between FD/FDIV and FE/FEIV cannot be attributed to serial correlation.  
                                                 

















where d is sufficient to test for both serially correlated and random walk residuals. Bhargava et al. (1982) 
note that for large data sets (in N), it is not necessary to calculate upper and lower bounds for d when 
testing for serial correlation (traditional bounds do not apply in a panel context, since they rely on N, T, and 
K). Instead, since these bounds are tight in moderately large samples, all that is required is to determine 
whether d is less than two (in the case of positive serial correlation) or greater than two (in the case of 
negative serial correlation). The null hypothesis is that ρ = 0, implying no serial correlation. In the three FE 
smoking models, d is approximately 1.57, while in the three FE drinking models, d is approximately 1.73. 
Similar results were obtained when I estimated the FEIV models. Thus, in all models I reject the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. If this hypothesis test is rejected, Bhargava and colleagues then suggest 
testing whether the residuals form a random walk, with the null hypothesis now that ρ = 1. Since the upper 
and lower bounds that they provide for this hypothesis test are less than one, I also reject the null 
hypothesis that the errors form a random walk. An initial estimate of ρ can be recovered by using 
ˆ 1
2
dρ = −  
Using this formula, the estimate of first-order serial correlation is 0.215 in the smoking frequency models 
and 0.135 in the drinking frequency models. 
19 Bhargava et al. (1982) suggest transforming all variables in the following manner: 
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 A fourth possibility is the problem of measurement error. In the presence of 
classic measurement error (i.e., error that is random), conventional estimators suffer from 
an attenuation bias that drives estimates toward zero (Greene, 2003). Measurement error 
tends to be exacerbated in FD/FDIV, as it relies on period-to-period variation in the 
explanatory variables. Although FE/FEIV is also adversely affected by measurement 
error, transformation of the regressors into deviations from panel means makes the 
estimates less sensitive to the “noise” present in year-to-year change, and thus less 
inconsistent than FD/FDIV (McKinnish, 2000). As an informal diagnostic test, I re-
estimated the FD/FDIV models taking two-year differences, then three-year differences, 
and so on (see McKinnish, 2000).20 In the smoking frequency models, the magnitude of 
the coefficients systematically increases with the length of the difference, suggesting that 
measurement error is leading to some attenuation bias in FD/FDIV. Indeed, the FD 
estimates converge toward the FE estimates. However, the FDIV estimates are still 
substantially smaller than their FEIV counterparts. It should be noted as well that the 
marginally significant negative coefficient in Models 2 and 3 is not robust to the 
differencing length. In the drinking frequency models, there is less systematic variation in 
the magnitude of the “work intensity effect” as the length of the difference increases. 
Therefore, although measurement error does appear to produce some attenuation bias in 
FD/FDIV (especially for smoking), the substantive conclusions remain essentially 
unchanged. The FDIV estimates are still substantially smaller than the FEIV estimates. 
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Panel means are then subtracted off these transformed variables, and estimation carried out as usual.  
20 In the presence of measurement error, taking longer differences increases the “signal to noise” 
variance ratio, which in turn produces larger coefficients. I am indebted to Seth Sanders and Jeff Smith for 
suggesting the possibility of measurement error, and for directing me to the paper by McKinnish (2000) 
that documents this problem and proposes the auxiliary FD/FDIV models that I use here to diagnose it.  
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 The conclusion thus far remains that the preferred (on the basis of specification 
tests) FD/FDIV models imply no relationship between school-year work intensity and 
substance use, in contrast to the preferred FE/FEIV models, and this conclusion is robust 
to potential violations of key model assumptions. Aside from econometric explanations 
for the difference between FD/FDIV and FE/FEIV, there is a theoretical argument that 
can be made in favor of FD/FDIV over FE/FEIV. Recall that FE/FEIV transforms all 
variables into deviations from panel means in order to sweep out unobserved 
heterogeneity, whereas FD/FDIV does so by computing a change score from the previous 
time period. Although both accomplish a similar goal (that of eliminating the individual 
effect), there are two very important differences. First, there are differences in how the 
“work intensity effect” is identified and interpreted. FE/FEIV suggests that during 
periods in which youths work longer-than-average hours during the school year, they 
engage in a higher-than-average rate of substance use. In contrast, FD/FDIV suggests 
that an increase in work hours from the previous time period has no effect on change in 
substance use since that time period. In other words, FE/FEIV is identified on change 
from panel means, while FD/FDIV is identified on year-to-year change. Second, there are 
differences in the assumption about unobserved heterogeneity. FE/FEIV assumes that 
unobservables are fixed or stable over the entire panel, whereas FD/FDIV assumes that 
unobservables are specific to adjacent time periods. These are not trivial interpretive 
differences. The assumptions of FE/FEIV may be tenable during adulthood, when change 
is more orderly. However, during the period of adolescence, change can be much more 
episodic and erratic. On this basis, then, the estimates provided by FD/FDIV may be 
more appropriate.  
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 In the final analysis, a cautious reader may prefer the conclusion that the “work 
intensity effect” on substance use is sensitive to how the model is specified. Although it 
is fairly clear from this sensitivity analysis that longer work hours do not consistently 
reduce substance use, it is also not the case that longer work hours invariably increase 
substance use. On the other hand, the conclusion about the “work intensity effect” on 
criminal behavior is unequivocal. Longer work hours during the school year consistently 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study, I have endeavored to provide a reasonable estimate of the causal 
effect of school-year work intensity on crime and substance use. To date, dozens of 
studies have found that youths who work the longest hours while in high school are at the 
greatest risk for problem behavior. The empirical literature is so unambiguous that one is 
easily tempted to proclaim the deleterious “work intensity effect” on problem behavior an 
empirical fact. However, a cautious reading of the literature urges some restraint on the 
interpretation of this consistently positive association, as it is plagued by what Manski 
(1995) refers to as the “identification problem.” Because all prior research is 
observational in nature, and all prior research until recently has been restricted to 
controlling for observed sources of heterogeneity, the causal significance of the adverse 
“work intensity effect” is in some dispute. Consequently, researchers are not in a position 
to definitively rule out the possibility that the positive relationship between work 
intensity and problem behavior is a spurious one, or that perhaps the true causal 
relationship is actually negative. Indeed, Brame et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate that the 
sign of the “work effect” on delinquency is unidentified, and differs as a function of the 
assumptions that researchers are willing to make about the impact of unobservables on 
the probability of problem behavior and the probability of being employed. Their 
sensitivity analysis showed that if an unobserved “crime trait” is associated with a higher 
probability of being employed during adolescence, and also a higher probability of 
engaging in crime, the “work effect” could in fact be negative. 
 This study is a direct outgrowth of two recent empirical analyses that sought to 
directly confront this identification problem. Tyler (2003) used state child labor laws as 
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instrumental variables to identify the impact of school-year work intensity on 
achievement test scores. Paternoster et al. (2003) used a fixed-effects estimator to identify 
the impact of within-individual change in intensive work during the school year on 
within-individual change in delinquency, substance use, and problem behavior. In the 
present study, I merged the empirical methods from these two prior studies. First, I 
employed state child labor laws governing the maximum number of hours of work per 
week allowed for enrolled minors during the school year as instrumental variables for 
school-year work intensity. These laws vary by state and by age eligibility. For example, 
all states impose the most restrictive laws on the employment of 14 and 15 year olds, but 
relax these laws by the time youths are ages 16 and 17. Different states impose different 
restrictions at these ages, however, and by age 18 child labor laws expire in all states. I 
thus take advantage of the fact that states vary at the cross-sectional level in the 
restrictiveness of child labor laws during the 14-15 and 16-17 age periods. Second, I 
followed a panel of youths through these age ranges, and thereby used the within-
individual increase in school-year work intensity attributed to the easing of child labor 
laws to identify the causal impact of work intensity on crime and substance use.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I summarize the results from a series of empirical 
models designed to assess the strength of the evidence for causality between adolescent 
work intensity and problem behavior. This is followed by a discussion of the implications 
of the findings for criminological theory as well as public policy. I close the chapter with 
a discussion of avenues for continued research. 
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YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND PROBLEM BEHAVIOR 
In direct response to the identification problem, I employed three different 
estimation strategies along with specification tests to evaluate the strength of the claim 
that longer work hours during the school year are causally related to elevated 
involvement in problem behavior. First, I used a random-effects estimator, which is the 
panel equivalent to a cross-sectional design that assumes that selection bias in the “work 
intensity effect” can be eliminated by controlling for a variety of observed covariates. 
Second, I used a fixed-effects estimator, which assumes that controlling for observed 
covariates does not eliminate all possible sources of bias, but that including individual-
specific intercepts to adjust for unobserved time-invariant factors does so. Third, I used a 
fixed-effects instrumental variables estimator, which assumes that the “work intensity 
effect” remains contaminated by unobserved dynamic factors, but that exclusion 
restrictions involving state child labor laws are sufficient to render change in work 
intensity exogenous.  
 
School-Year Work Intensity and Crime  
 Empirical models based on a strict “selection on observables” strategy show that 
longer work hours are associated with more criminal behavior. However, this positive 
correlation is due entirely to unobserved heterogeneity, since an adjustment for individual 
fixed effects shows that longer work hours are associated with a slight decrease in 
criminal behavior. Even this modest negative correlation may be biased and inconsistent 
due to the omission of relevant explanatory variables that change over time along with 
work intensity and crime. When the portion of change in work hours that is exogenous to 
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crime is isolated, the results show that longer work hours are associated with a 
substantial reduction in criminal behavior. Specification testing suggests that these last 
empirical models—the fixed-effects instrumental variables models—are the most 
appropriate, and that the results provided by random- and fixed-effects models are 
inconsistent. 
 Based on the empirical results in the previous chapter, I can conclude with a good 
deal of confidence that, among youths in the NLSY, the increase in work hours 
attributable to change in child labor law eligibility significantly reduces criminal 
behavior. It appears to be the case that the preventive “work intensity effect” is stronger 
for comparatively less serious forms of property crime, primarily vandalism, theft, 
shoplifting, and offenses dealing with stolen goods. It is perhaps no coincidence that it is 
precisely these types of criminal behavior that peak during adolescence. More serious 
forms of crime such as burglary, robbery, assault, and handgun possession are less 
consistently associated with change in work intensity. Of the 116 crime-specific models 
estimated, in only one did work intensity significantly increase crime (Model 1 for drug 
selling frequency), and in all others it was associated with either no change or a decrease 
in criminal conduct. Not only is the work intensity effect insensitive to how crime is 
measured, it is insensitive to how work hours are operationalized. Irrespective of whether 
work intensity is measured dichotomously, ordinally, or continuously, its relationship to 
crime appears to be invariant. Thus, even changing to the most intensive work hours 
reduces crime. 
The relationship between youth employment and crime in this study provides an 
intriguing counterpoint to previous studies of the topic. Virtually all of these studies 
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support the conclusion that higher work intensity has a criminogenic influence by 
increasing youth involvement in minor delinquency (e.g., theft, vandalism, phony ID) and 
serious delinquency (e.g., Index crime, interpersonal aggression, assault), and by 
increasing rates of police contact and arrest (see Abe, 1999, 2001; Agnew, 1986; 
Bachman et al., 1986, 2003; Bachman and Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; Bartko and Eccles, 
2003; Crowley, 1984; Cullen et al., 1997; Heimer, 1995; Huang et al., 2001; Mihalic and 
Elliott, 1997; Ploeger, 1997; Resnick et al., 1997; Ruggiero, 1984; Shannon, 1982, 1988; 
Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991; Steinberg et al., 1993; 
Tanner and Krahn, 1991; Wright et al., 1997, 2002; for null effects or even negative 
effects of work intensity on crime and arrest, see Apel et al., 2003; Brame et al., 
forthcoming; Good et al., 1986; Gottfredson, 1985; Paternoster et al., 2003; Staff and 
Uggen, 2003; Uggen, 2000a). Indeed, Wright et al. (2002:12) conclude that “the more 
adolescents become embedded in work, the more deeply they become embedded in 
delinquency.” The present study suggests, however, that these prior “work intensity 
effects” are predominately driven by self-selection. That is, youths with a higher 
propensity to engage in criminal behavior are more likely to work and to work the longest 
hours, and this propensity for delinquency, crime, and arrest may actually precede work 
involvement (see Gottfredson, 1985; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; Staff and Uggen, 2003; 
Steinberg and Avenevoli, 1998; Steinberg et al., 1993). However, once these crime-prone 
youths enter the formal work force, their longer work hours actually inhibit their criminal 
involvement. Moreover, the instrumental variables estimates provided in this study 
suggest that this reduction in crime is causally related to their heavier work involvement. 
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In a later section, I give some thought to potential theoretical mechanisms than can 
account for this beneficial “work intensity effect” on crime. 
 
School-Year Work Intensity and Substance Use  
 Empirical models that control strictly for observables show that higher work 
intensity is associated with more extensive substance use. When individual fixed effects 
are introduced to control for time-invariant unobservables, the deleterious “work intensity 
effect” does not disappear, and in fact changes very little. When change in state child 
labor law eligibility is further introduced, the impact of work intensity on substance use 
increases considerably. However, because of the poor performance of the instrumental 
variables in these models and their correlation with the disturbance in the structural 
model, these empirical results are invalid. Additional analyses demonstrated that the 
inclusion of marijuana use and binge drinking was responsible for this. On the other 
hand, the use of specific substance use behaviors like smoking and drinking frequency 
mitigates this problem with the instrumental variables. My initial conclusion, then, is that 
the increase in work hours attributable to change in child labor law eligibility 
significantly increases the frequency of monthly cigarette and alcohol use. This 
conclusion harmonizes with virtually all other research finding that higher work intensity 
exacerbates substance use (see Bachman et al., 1981, 1986, 2003; Bachman and 
Schulenberg, 1992, 1993; Greenberger et al., 1981; Hansen and Jarvis, 2000; Huang et 
al., 2001; Johnson, forthcoming; McMorris and Uggen, 2000; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997; 
Mortimer, 2003; Mortimer et al., 1996; Mortimer and Johnson, 1998; Resnick et al., 
1997; Ruggiero, 1984; Safron et al., 2001; Staff and Uggen, 2003; Steinberg and 
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Dornbusch, 1991; Steinberg et al., 1982, 1993; Tanner and Krahn, 1991; for null effects 
of work intensity on substance use, see Apel et al., 2003; Gottfredson, 1985; Paternoster 
et al., 2003; Ploeger, 1997). Indeed, Mortimer and colleagues (1996) find that the greatest 
concern about the consequences of intensive work involvement during high school is 
with alcohol use.1  
Unfortunately, causal inference is extremely sensitive to how this model is 
specified. When an alternative identification strategy is employed using first differences 
in place of fixed effects, the “work intensity effect” is statistically (and substantively) 
indistinguishable from zero. This unexpected difference cannot be fully explained by the 
mechanics of the differencing procedure, violation of the exogeneity assumption, serial 
correlation, or measurement error. Indeed, the difference between results for the two 
estimators is surprisingly robust; thus, neither set of results is favored on technical 
(econometric) grounds. However, there may be theoretical reasons to favor the null work 
effect on substance use provided by the first-differences models. This procedure may 
lend itself well to modeling behavior during the period of adolescence, when 
physiological, emotional, affiliative, and behavioral changes are taking place rapidly, 
reminiscent of G. Stanley Hall’s (1904:xiii) now famous dictum: “Development is less 
gradual and more saltatory, suggestive of some ancient period of storm and stress when 
old moorings were broken and a higher level attained.” This may be particularly true 
concerning adolescent behavior like substance use, which is so much more fluid and 
experimental during this life stage. In the context of this instability, it is desirable to 
temporally link change in work intensity with change in substance use, and to relax the 
                                                 
1 It bears mentioning, however, that McMorris and Uggen (2000; also Mortimer and Johnson, 
1998) find that the impact of high work intensity during high school on alcohol use does not persist into 
early adulthood. 
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assumption that unobservables are time-invariant over the 12-22 age span considered 
here, both of which first differences accomplish.2 Ultimately, the question of what set of 
empirical results to believe must await further research using the NLSY and similar data 
sets. As it stands, then, the most balanced conclusion at the present time may simply be 
that the empirical results are equivocal with respect to the causal impact of school-year 
work intensity on substance use.  
 
Potential Threats to Causal Inference  
 One potential threat to the finding that higher work intensity reduces criminal 
behavior is that the result is specific to the NLSY cohort. In other words, it reflects a 
period effect rather than a genuine causal effect of employment on crime. The NLSY 
youths were born in the first half of the 1980s (1980-1984) and were completing high 
school at the turn of the century. At the time that they were reaching the age of initiation 
into the formal labor market, the United States was in the midst of a period of 
unprecedented economic growth and prosperity. Indeed, among the fastest growing 
occupations in the lowest earnings group (which we may safely assume includes 
adolescents) were sales and service workers in the retail trade and service industries (Ilg 
and Haugen, 2000). The booming economy of the mid- to late-1990s thus offered more 
expansive work opportunities to young people. In comparison, most prior surveys of 
adolescents were conducted on samples of youths completing high school in the late 
                                                 
2 If this line of reasoning is accurate, it has important implications for future longitudinal studies 
of adolescent behavior and the transition to adulthood. Fixed effects may be sufficient during periods of 
relative orderliness of change in life circumstances such as during adulthood. However, the assumptions of 
this model underlying the temporal linkage of causal and response variables, as well as the temporal 
stability of unobserved heterogeneity, may be a bit too restrictive when the analytical focus is on the 
adolescent life stage. These issues are worthy of additional research, and it seems that untangling them 
should be a priority as panel estimators become more common in criminological research.  
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1970s and early 1980s, when youth employment reached record levels (e.g., Bachman et 
al., 1981, 1986; Greenberger et al., 1981; Marsh, 1991; Mihalic and Elliott, 1997), or else 
on samples of youths finishing high school during the late 1980s and early 1990s, prior to 
the time when the U.S. began its period of growth (e.g., Bachman and Schulenberg, 1993; 
Mortimer et al., 1996; Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991). Consequently, the beneficial 
“work intensity effect” on crime in the current study could be confounded with a larger 
secular trend of expanding economic opportunities for young people.3  
 The strength of this “period effect” critique of the present results is diminished, 
however, by two factors. First, other studies of more recent youth cohorts replicate the 
adverse “work intensity effect” on problem behavior. For example, recent studies using 
the Monitoring the Future survey rely on 8th, 10th, and 12th graders in the classes of 
1991-1998 (Bachman et al., 2003; Safron et al., 2001); the Maryland Adolescent 
Development in Context study uses high-school seniors in 1997 (Bartko and Eccles, 
2003); and a study using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health relies on 
youths attending grades 10-12 during 1996 (Johnson, forthcoming). Each of these studies 
finds that more time spent in the workplace corresponds with more extensive 
involvement in problem behavior. Second, in the current study, I show that the adverse 
“work intensity effect” is also replicated in the NLSY (as do Abe, 1999, 2001; Apel et al., 
2003; Brame et al., forthcoming; Huang et al., 2001; Paternoster et al., 2003). When I 
employ a panel estimator with random effects—a longitudinal counterpart to the cross-
sectional designs used in existing youth employment literature—longer work hours are 
positively and significantly associated with crime and substance use (refer back to Tables 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, it is just as easily argued that the findings from prior studies of an adverse 
“work intensity effect” could be confounded with a larger secular trend of high youth unemployment. 
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9 and 12). Therefore, I have greater confidence that the results reported herein are not a 
historical artifact, and can be attributed to the causal impact of work intensity on crime. 
A second potential threat to causal inference is that the impact of work intensity 
on crime (and the absence of a consistent impact of work intensity on substance use) is 
actually an estimate of the “local average treatment effect” (LATE) or, when the 
endogenous regressor is continuous as in the present case, the weighed “average causal 
response” (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The most 
appropriate interpretation is that longer work hours result in lower crime among youths 
who increase their work hours in response to the easing of state child labor restrictions 
on weekly school-year work intensity. In other words, the “work intensity effect” is 
estimated only for those respondents whose behavior can be manipulated by the 
instruments used in this analysis (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). A related concern is 
whether we would obtain a different estimate of the “work intensity effect” using 
different instrumental variables; in other words, whether the estimates are “instrument 
dependent.” An additional qualification is that the identifying power of the instrumental 
variables is based on the age-16 transition and, to a lesser extent, the age-18 transition, 
corresponding with the ages in which state child labor laws are relaxed to allow longer 
hours during school weeks in formal jobs. The question thus arises about who the 
“compliers” are and whether they are representative of the population of all youths 
(Angrist et al., 1996).4 If these youths comprise only a small proportion of the adolescent 
population, the “work intensity effect” estimated in this study could have little theoretical 
or practical significance.  
                                                 
4 As Angrist (2004:C52) maintains, “even internally valid estimates are less interesting if they are 
completely local, i.e., have no predictive value for populations other than the directly affected group.” 
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However, the very nature of youth employment and child labor law minimizes 
concern over the estimated “work intensity effect” being too local. For example, Figure 5 
shows that youth employment increases slowly and steadily during the 14-15 age period, 
but that there is a rapid increase at age 16 and a more steady increase thereafter. The most 
plausible explanation for this discontinuity is that child labor laws are eased considerably 
at age 16, and that employers are more inclined to hire young people as a consequence. 
The fact that the federal child labor law governing school-year work involvement is 
likely to be operative for most 14 and 15 year olds (and expires thereafter) implies that 
the age-16 transition corresponds with a loosening of work restrictions (and thus 
expanding work opportunities) that applies to all youths and not to some circumscribed 
subpopulation. Therefore, the group of “compliers” from whom the estimated work 
intensity effect is derived constitutes are large proportion of the adolescent population.  
 
YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 
 To this point, there has been virtual agreement that an extensive work 
commitment is responsible for higher rates of crime and substance use, among other 
forms of problem behavior (e.g., school misconduct). Numerous criminological theories 
can be marshaled to explain the criminogenic “work intensity effect.” Among the most 
popular causal mechanisms invoked are that intensive youth employment (1) disrupts 
effective family functioning (social control theory), (2) erodes school performance and 
educational commitment (social control theory), (3) introduces additional stress during an 
already stressful life stage (general strain theory), (4) contributes to antisocial friendship 
formation (learning theory), (5) negatively alters the way that youths spend their leisure 
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time (routine activity theory), and (6) offers a new domain for deviant conduct as well as 
funding for a deviant lifestyle (opportunity theory). Other theories maintain that the 
positive relationship is spurious; in other words, the true relationship is actually a null 
one. These theories claim that an inability to delay gratification underlies the correlation 
between work intensity and problem behavior, but differ according to whether this 
underlying process is limited to the adolescent life stage (precocious development theory) 
or is stable across the life span (propensity theory).  
 The present findings suggest that neither of these sets of theories is appropriate to 
explain the relationship between school-year work intensity and criminal behavior. The 
relationship between work intensity and crime is neither positive nor spurious. It is, in 
fact, negative. This interesting empirical result demands that criminologists refocus the 
theoretical lens on the expected relationship between employment during adolescence 
and involvement in crime from a position emphasizing the potential harmful effects of 
work involvement to one emphasizing the potential benefits. There are two theoretical 
issues that must be attended to, at least where adolescent crime and delinquency is 
concerned: (1) understanding the differential selection process, and (2) explaining the 
crime-preventive effect of longer work hours. These two tasks go hand in hand, as an 
understanding of the causal impact of work intensity on crime necessitates an 
understanding of the selection problem. As we will see, selection is an essential part of 
the causal story. 
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Selection into the Youth Labor Market  
 We have seen that there is non-random selection into the formal youth labor 
market, such that youths at highest risk for crime and substance use are most likely to 
make this transition during the middle teenage years, and to also work the longest hours 
while on the job. This is most obviously demonstrated by the fact that work intensity is 
positively related to crime in the random-effects model, but negatively related to crime in 
the fixed-effects and fixed-effects instrumental variables models. The implication is that 
the positive relationship observed in prior studies is entirely a consequence of failure to 
control for time-invariant differences between youths. Fixed-effects models, however, are 
fundamentally agnostic about what exactly these unobservables entail, as they treat the 
unobserved individual effect as a nuisance parameter that is simply swept out of the 
model.  
Previous research provides some guidance about potential sources of 
heterogeneity, although the list is quite extensive. This may in part explain why prior 
studies have not completely eliminated the adverse “work intensity effect”—it is simply 
not possible to control for all potential sources of selection bias or heterogeneity. To 
provide some context for the following discussion, Appendix E provides a more rich 
description of working and non-working youths, as well as youths working at varying 
levels of intensity, during the 14-16 age span.5 A casual comparison of workers and non-
workers shows several things. First, workers are at a comparative advantage relative to 
                                                 
5 I selected out 12-13 year olds from the first interview and constructed their work history from 
age 14 to age 16. I used this subsample because at the first interview, all predictors of employment are 
prospective, since work histories are not collected until age 14. Moreover, for these younger cohorts, a 
wide array of risk and protective factors of interest to criminologists is available. I first created a work 
status indicator coded “1” if a youth worked at all during that period. I then created an ordinal measure of 
mean work intensity during this three-year period (1 = 1-10 hours; 2 = 11-20 hours; 3 = 21-30 hours; 4 = 
31+ hours). All variables provided in Appendix E1 are measured at the first interview. Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix E2. 
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non-workers with respect to their location in the social structure, consistent with much 
prior research (e.g., National Research Council, 1998; Schoenhals et al., 1998; U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2000). For example, workers are far more likely to be white, to 
have employed parents (especially an employed mother), to have well educated parents 
(some college experience), to live in a permanent dwelling (house, condo, or farm vs. 
apartment), and to have higher family income and more assets. Second, workers are 
better students, as indicated by their higher achievement scores and lower likelihood of 
being behind in school. Third, workers are subject to slightly less parental social control 
early on, as they confide less in their parents and are subject to more permissiveness and 
less inductiveness (although attachment and monitoring are unaffected). Fourth, workers 
are also more likely to have deviant peers, to be autonomous (going out on dates, 
working in an informal job), and to experiment with minor delinquency and substance 
use, but nothing serious enough to lead to arrest. Thus, the image of the would-be worker 
(compared to the non-worker) is that of a good student from a middle-class background, 
subject to less parental control (but far short of detachment) and thus more easily tempted 
in the company of deviant friends to engage in minor delinquency and experimental drug 
use. This image harmonizes with a number of delinquency theories, the most prominent 
of which might include social control, learning, and routine activity theories. It is also 
consistent with Matza’s (1964) notion of the adolescent in a state of “drift,” Hagan’s 
(1991) image of the middle-class “party subculture,” and Moffit’s (1993; Moffit et al., 
2001) theory of “adolescence-limited” antisocial behavior.6 From each of these 
                                                 
6 Moffit (1993:686) notes that a hallmark of adolescence-limited antisocial behavior is the lack of 
cross-situational consistency: “For example, they may shoplift in stores and use drugs with friends but 
continue to obey the rules at school.” This seems to be the pattern observed here. Prior to working, 
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viewpoints, the delinquent is neither fully committed nor uncommitted to delinquent 
action, but instead behaves in response to an occasional loosening of institutional control 
and in the pursuit of adventure and excitement (see also Campbell, 1969). Accordingly, 
employment is but one aspect of the greater freedom accorded to would-be workers by 
their parents, and a modestly higher level of minor problem behavior is an 
inconsequential byproduct of this freedom.  
A comparison of adolescent workers by their mean work intensity over the 14-16 
age span, however, reveals that they are a quite heterogeneous lot. In contrast to the 
findings from the comparison between workers and non-workers, youths who work over 
20 hours per week are uniformly disadvantaged with respect to predictors of problem 
behavior. For example, they are more likely to be minority, to live in impermanent 
housing, to have unemployed fathers and parents with lower education, and to live in 
households with lower income, higher rates of program participation, and fewer assets. 
They are also far less likely to live in intact households, to perform well in school, and to 
be subject to parental social control. Finally, they have less-than-conventional friends and 
more extensive involvement in delinquency and substance use, leading to a far higher 
probability of arrest. On the other hand, youths who restrict their work involvement to ten 
hours or fewer, on average, are with few exceptions the most advantaged compared to 
other workers and even to non-workers.7 Thus, the image of the would-be intensive 
                                                                                                                                                 
employed adolescents are performing at a high level academically, but on occasion “flirt” with deviance 
when away from school.  
7 Compared to workers and non-workers alike, the most moderate workers (1-10 hours) rate the 
highest on protective factors and the lowest on risk factors for delinquency and substance use. Not 
surprisingly, then, they also have the lowest rates of involvement in delinquency and substance use. This is 
consistent with Bachman and Schulenberg’s (1993) contention that no work experience at all is not 
necessarily better than a light work commitment. The only notable exception is that these moderate workers 
are granted more autonomy by their parents compared to non-workers (decision-making autonomy, dating, 
informal work), but within the context of more responsive and authoritative parenting (attachment, 
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worker (compared to other workers and non-workers) is that of a disengaged student 
from a lower-class background (but with indicators of family functioning not consistently 
related to this work pattern). Their antisocial behavior is qualitatively different, 
evidencing greater seriousness which leads to a higher probability of police contact. This 
image is consistent with Bachman and Schulenberg’s (1993) characterization of intensive 
adolescent employment as one symptom of a “syndrome” of problem behavior. This 
syndrome is apparent prior to the work transition, early indicators being academic failure 
and more serious problem behavior, with employment occurring relatively late in the 
syndrome sequence (Bachman and Schulenberg, 1993). An early desire for high levels of 
work involvement also presages actual attainment of that goal, and this preference for 
long work hours is itself related to early school failure and problem behavior (Bachman 
et al., 2003).  
In sum, at 12 and 13 years of age—prior to entry into the formal economy—it is 
possible to distinguish would-be workers from non-workers, and would-be intensive 
workers from moderate workers, on the basis of many of the known risk factors for crime 
and substance use. Youths who will go on to exhibit a pattern of intensive work during 
the middle teenage years (21-30 or 31+ hours per week) are distinguished by their 
measurably higher risk for problem behavior during early adolescence. For example, they 
are less structurally advantaged, more disengaged from school, and more delinquent prior 
to their transition to formal work. It is this early predisposition for problem behavior that 
                                                                                                                                                 
monitoring, inductiveness). A light work commitment may thus be characterized by the healthiest 
balance—a “developmental match”—between freedom and control vis-à-vis their parents (see Baumrind, 
1978; Eccles et al., 1991). Indeed, their work pattern is a reflection of this balance—being employed is one 
aspect of their exercise of freedom and autonomy, but the limits placed on their involvement demonstrates 
the continued control exerted by their parents.  
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has probably been confounded with estimates of the “work intensity effect” in prior 
research. 
 
The Causal Impact of Investment in Work  
 With the foregoing findings in mind, we are in a better position to explain how an 
increase in work intensity can causally reduce criminal involvement. The fact of the 
matter is that intensive workers are at high risk on manifold predictors of adolescent 
problem behavior well before they begin working. Foremost among these is early 
educational failure, signifying a premature detachment or disengagement from school.8 
With this in mind, there are at least two theoretical mechanisms that can account for the 
“work intensity effect” on criminal behavior. 
 One possible explanation is that work experience is viewed as a substitute arena 
for the development of skills and networks, or human and social capital, respectively. In 
short, investment in work may compensate for disinvestment in education, and early 
success in the workplace may offset perceived failure in the classroom. This may be 
especially true in urban neighborhoods, where youths are exposed to extremely low-
quality schools and pervasive economic pressures, face a far higher risk of dropping out, 
and are presented with widespread illegal opportunities (see Leventhal et al., 2001). In 
                                                 
8 The origin of this detachment is subject to debate. For the present discussion, I simply take it as a 
given. It could be that detachment from school is a manifestation of low ability, which leads to dislike of 
school and teachers or a perceived irrelevance of education for one’s future (Hirschi, 1969; Hirschi and 
Hindelang, 1977; Ward and Tittle, 1994). It could also be that low ability produces a negative emotional 
state that leads to a desire to escape from the constraints imposed by the educational system (Agnew, 1992; 
Brezina, 1996). On the other hand, it is possible that poor performance creates negative parental and 
teacher appraisals of ability, which are adopted by the adolescent as self-appraisals of ability, and which 
then lead to diminished school commitment (Heimer and Matsueda, 1994; Matsueda, 1992; Triplett, 1993). 
Or, low self-control or impulsivity could underlie school detachment, as youths who discount the long-term 
rewards of schooling are the least likely to satisfy the academic requirements, and thus the most likely to 
disengage from this imposed system of restraints (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Wilson and Herrnstein, 
1985). 
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the short run, more desirable work opportunities may flow from this early work 
experience (see Entwisle et al., 2000). This upward mobility may result from a 
combination of work-related skills and personal connections acquired on the job. This 
does not necessarily mean that educationally disinvested youths completely eschew the 
classroom for the workplace. On the contrary, recent work by Entwisle and colleagues 
(2004) suggests that many of these youths (about 40%) will eventually complete their 
education upon realizing the value that this credential possesses for advancement in their 
economic roles (by temporarily “stopping out” instead of permanently “dropping out”).  
 A second, related explanation is that the workplace constitutes a new domain of 
institutional control over behavior. By withdrawing from educational pursuits, youths 
forgo an important dimension of structure and discipline in their daily lives, and thus 
neutralize the social control function that this institution serves (see Hirschi, 1969). More 
intensive involvement in work may fill this void by imposing a greater degree of order 
and conformity to conduct standards in the workplace, with more concrete and severe 
consequences for violations than might be encountered in the educational system (e.g., 
cut in wages, assignment to less desirable shifts, termination). These standards could, 
perhaps unknowingly on the part of the employee, generalize to other non-work contexts 
as youths become more embedded in employment (see Newman, 1999). Moreover, 
workplace adults may fulfill the supervisory and socializing role formerly occupied by 
teachers.  
 Both of these theoretical explanations view adolescents as agentic; in other words, 
as being actively engaged in the construction of their own life course (see Elder, 1998), 
rather than being buffeted about by forces over which they exercise little control or 
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making decisions that have permanent consequences. The theoretical emphasis should be 
on how young people respond to and manage the opportunities and constraints they face 
within the institutions of family, school, and work. The conceptual tools of a life-course 
perspective—context, timing, interdependency, and agency—offer a promising starting 
point.  
In sum, theoretical explanations of the relationship between youth employment 
and crime must account for two things. First, youths select themselves into the labor 
market, and youths who select themselves into the highest-intensity work are at far higher 
risk for problem behavior. Second, change in the number of hours of employment is 
actually associated with a decline in crime. The latter assertion will require new 
theorizing about youth employment and its consequences, some initial attempts at which 
I have provided here by drawing largely on themes that currently exist in the literature. 
Whatever theoretical mechanism is provided to account for the “work intensity effect” on 
problem behavior, it is clear that with respect to crime, there is continuity between youth 
employment and early adult employment. In other words, the direction of the “work 
intensity effect” does not change as the transition to adulthood approaches (see Wright et 
al., 2002).  
 
YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 
 Presently the federal government, under the auspices of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938, imposes a maximum 18-hour work week on all 14 and 15 year olds under its 
jurisdiction, and no weekly hours restriction on 16 and 17 year olds. The National 
Research Council (1998), however, has recommended that federal child labor laws 
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governing school-year work hours be extended to 16 and 17 year olds, and specifically 
that a 20-hour work restriction be imposed, consistent with the “intensive work” cut-off 
used in most prior research. The justification for these restrictions lies with the fact that 
long hours are empirically linked with a host of adverse developmental outcomes, not the 
least of which is crime and substance use. However, the current study suggests that the 
emphasis on work intensity as a causal agent of increased problem behavior is 
overdrawn. In fact, with respect to adolescent crime, it is entirely misplaced, as a within-
individual increase in work intensity actually reduces criminal behavior.9  
 Where the current study also diverges from previous empirical work is in the use 
of existing public policies to investigate the causal link between youth employment and 
problem behavior; the very policies that are currently the subject of scholarly debate. 
That is, I exploit variation across age and across jurisdictions in applicable child labor 
laws in order to generate within-individual variation in school-year work intensity. 
Although this study is fundamentally agnostic about the optimal restrictions on youth 
work intensity, it is the first to incorporate the existing restrictions into a model of youth 
problem behavior.10  
                                                 
9 Although the current study relied on state-level child labor laws to identify the “work intensity 
effect” on problem behavior, the fact that the instruments for 14 and 15 year olds had identical effects on 
school-year work intensity at the first stage strongly suggests that identification actually derives from the 
federal child labor law. This may be because for most employment at these ages, the federal law is binding, 
as the employers who are inclined to hire these youths are likely to be under the jurisdiction of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.  
10 One important issue that remains unresolved is the degree of compliance with federal and state 
child labor laws. The stronger relationship between child labor laws and work intensity among 14 and 15 
year olds may be due in part to stricter enforcement of employment policies for these younger adolescents 
in order to protect them from harm. Or, business owners may be particularly sensitive to the bad publicity 
that can result from violations or workplace accidents that occur within the context of violations. In future 
work, it may be possible to obtain state and federal enforcement data related to the number of compliance 
officers employed by labor departments, the number of inspections that are carried out, and the monetary 
penalties assessed for violations.  
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 The finding that youths who work the most intensively during mid-adolescence 
are much more disengaged from school has important practical implications. Contrary to 
recent accounts, intensive employment does not detach youths from school (see 
Steinberg, 1996). These youths are already detached one or two years prior to working 
and their work history is simply a reflection of this, not its cause (Bachman and 
Schulenberg, 1993). The relationship may, in fact, be working in the opposite direction. 
School disengagement may be a cause of higher investment in work experience, with 
work intensity an indication of the level of investment. In the short run, this “intensive 
employment as investment” may pay off by making additional work opportunities 
available through the human and social capital that such experience provides (Entwisle et 
al., 2000). However, in the long run, it may prove to be detrimental if youths completely 
detach from school by dropping out, as returns to high-school completion may be higher 
than the returns to high-school work experience (Hotz et al., 2002).  
 The policy solution lies not with imposing stricter child labor laws, as more 
restrictive statutes may do more harm than good. Child labor laws apply to youths who 
are enrolled in school. The educationally detached 16-17 year old who finds herself 
unable to gain the work experience that she seeks because of restrictive child labor laws 
may find that dropping out is the only alternative. In many states, doing so frees her from 
the jurisdiction of these laws, at least those governing school-year work hours.11 The 
National Research Council’s (1998) recommendation may ultimately be 
counterproductive by making a bad situation worse.  
                                                 
11 Although it is just a hunch at the moment, in future work we may be able to exploit variation 
across states in whether or not child labor laws for work hours apply to all minors, or only to enrolled 
minors. This could serve as a useful identifying instrument for high-school dropout when considered 
alongside age eligibility for dropout.  
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 Public policy discussion may be more productive if it is sensitive to the issue of 
differential selection. This appears to be an emerging theme in research on the costs and 
benefits of youth employment, as Entwisle et al. (2000) have taken note of the increasing 
attention to selection bias and the increasing sophistication of analytic designs in the 
“fourth stage” of youth employment research.12 Additional research along these lines 
would be fruitful indeed. The list of correlates of youth employment, and particularly 
intensive youth employment, is lengthy. Unfortunately, because of methodological 
weaknesses, the list of causes and consequences is extremely short. The current study 
considered one of the more robust correlates of youth employment—crime and substance 
use. The empirical findings demonstrate that researchers should reconsider the “facts” 
about adolescent work in light of the recent advances that have been made in analytical 
techniques such as instrumental variables estimation. Such research may challenge 
conventional wisdom but at the same time lead to fascinating new insights about the 
nature of youth employment as well as its short- and long-term consequences.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 There are several additional lines of inquiry suggested by the current study. First 
is coming to terms with the issue of “treatment effect heterogeneity.” The estimated 
causal effect is, in reality, “an average of unit level causal effects of the treatment of 
interest” (Angrist et al., 1996:450). To the extent that there is heterogeneity in the work 
                                                 
12 Entwisle et al. (2000) classify the “first stage” by the lack of systematic attention given to the 
nature of youth employment and thus the relative ignorance about its consequences. The “second stage” 
corresponded with explicit data-collection strategies to fill in this knowledge gap, and was dominated by 
economists interested in the labor-market consequences of youth employment. The “third stage” was 
dominated by developmental psychologists who broadened the scope of inquiry to include a wide variety of 
explicitly developmental outcomes related to family functioning, peer associations, and scholastic 
performance. 
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effect across the adolescent population, the estimated causal effect of work intensity on 
crime may not be representative of any one particular subpopulation. Future work should 
thus investigate whether and to what extent the “work intensity effect” varies as a 
function of such characteristics as gender and race, family economic background, and 
school disengagement.  
 Second, future work should more explicitly consider the community context of 
youth employment. Much adolescent work is in “naturally occurring” jobs (Greenberger 
and Steinberg, 1986), and these opportunities are by definition structured ecologically. 
Although not a central focus of the current study, such factors as unemployment, per 
capita personal income, and availability of jobs in certain industries (namely 
manufacturing, service, and government) significantly influenced the number of hours 
that youths committed to working. Moreover, several of these community factors directly 
influenced participation in problem behavior. Future research would thus benefit from 
efforts to better understand these processes. 
Third, it is imperative that future work consider what causal effect work intensity 
has on other outcomes, particularly educational outcomes such as scholastic achievement 
and dropout. We have seen that, prior to labor market entry, youths who work at the 
highest intensity are most at risk of school failure. Thus, selection bias confounds 
estimates of the “work intensity effect” on educational performance. Considering that the 
loudest calls for youth employment reform are from advocates of the thesis that intensive 
employment leads to school disengagement and withdrawal (e.g., Steinberg, 1996), this 
seems a fruitful direction for additional research (á la Tyler, 2003). 
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 Fourth, future work should consider identification strategies for other work 
characteristics, as youth employment does not vary solely along the dimension of work 
intensity. Although some research has recently considered other work dimensions, it has 
been restricted to traditional cross-sectional methods and is thus subject to the same 
selection bias critique leveled against studies of work intensity (e.g., Mortimer, 2003; 
Staff and Uggen, 2003). There are several possibilities for this line of research. First, state 
child labor laws governing work hours may directly affect other work dimensions such as 
wages, earnings, and type of occupation. Access to higher-paying and higher-quality 
work opportunities may be determined in part by the number of hours that youths may 
work. Employers may be reluctant to hire youths for these positions if they are not 
allowed to work more than 18 hours per week during the school year, for example. Thus, 
the age-16 and age-18 transitions may correspond not only with change in work hours, 
but also change in opportunities for more desirable and upwardly mobile positions. 
Second, it may be possible to exploit variation across states and across age in what are 
deemed to be “hazardous” occupations off limits to minors. For example, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act bans employment of 14 and 15 year olds in most work other than food 
service and retail occupations. At ages 16 and 17, youths may not work in certain 
manufacturing and mining jobs or with certain types of dangerous machinery. It may thus 
be possible to construct an instrument set consisting of age eligibility for certain skilled 
occupations. Third, variation in state minimum wage may be used as an instrumental 
variable for wages and earnings. In sum, additional exclusion restrictions using existing 
state labor policies can be used to estimate a system of multiple equations to determine 
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how other youth employment dimensions are causally related to involvement in problem 
behavior.  
 Fifth, researchers are well advised to consider the reciprocal causal impact of 
crime and substance use on work involvement. Although identification is equally, if not 
more, difficult in a non-recursive model, existing research provides several promising 
avenues for making defensible exclusion restrictions that do not rely on past behavior as 
an instrumental variable for current behavior (as do Thornberry and Christenson, 1984). 
For example, Levitt (1998) uses the relative punitiveness of juvenile and adult criminal 
sanctions around the age of majority to assess the deterrent effect of said sanctions on 
crime. Several researchers have successfully used cross-state variation in cigarette prices, 
tobacco control expenditure, clean indoor air laws, beer and liquor taxes, alcohol 
advertising, residence in dry counties, minimum legal drinking age laws, blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC) limits, and marijuana decriminalization statutes in a variety of 
substance use demand equations (e.g., Beenstock and Rahav, 2003; Chatterji, 2003; 
Chatterji and Markowitz, 2000; Cook and Tauchen, 1982; Dave and Kaestner, 2002; Dee, 
2001; Dee and Evans, 2003; DeSimone, 2002; Evans and Ringel, 1999; Farrell et al., 
2003; Liang and Chaloupka, 2002; Mullahy and Portney, 1990; Mullahy and Sindelar, 
1996; Ohsfeldt and Morrisey, 1997; Ruhm, 1996; Saffer and Dave, 2003; Tauras and 
Liang, 2003). There are thus a number of variables that could be used as instrumental 
variables for crime and substance use (along with state child labor laws as instrumental 
variables for work intensity) in a simultaneous equations system that models feedback 




 This study was motivated by two factors—the consistency of the positive 
relationship between school-year work intensity and problem behavior, and the National 
Research Council’s (1998) recommendation that federal child labor laws be changed to 
allow fewer hours of employment while youths are enrolled in school. Drawing on recent 
econometric advances in the estimation of “treatment effects” when receipt of the 
treatment is endogenous, I used state child labor laws as instrumental variables in a fixed-
effects panel model. This method arguably provides the best estimates to date of the 
causal relationship between youth employment and problem behavior. 
The findings herein suggest that the causal relationship between school-year work 
intensity and crime is actually negative, thus challenging most prior empirical research 
and one of the justifications for the National Research Council’s policy recommendation. 
The relationship between school-year work intensity and substance use is less consistent, 
and tends to vary as a function of how the empirical model is formulated. There is 
support for the contention that longer work hours increase substance use (fixed effects 
estimation) and support for the contention that longer work hours have no effect on 
substance use (first differences estimation). Thus, only the results for crime are 
conclusive, suggesting that work involvement is indeed beneficial and that prior research 
has been plagued by the selection problem.  
The next challenge is to better understand the processes of selection and causation 
that have been addressed here. Disentangling these two processes should be a priority for 
future youth employment research. Of particular theoretical and policy import where 
crime and delinquency are concerned is the school-work nexus, as supplementary 
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analysis suggests dual processes of detachment from one institution (the school) followed 
by re-attachment to another (the workplace). Criminological research would benefit from 






Comparison of Employment Estimates from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1997 with Existing Surveys of High-School Youths 
 
 % Employed % Working at High Intensity 
National Longitudinal Survey of 



















33% 42% 55% 
 --------------- 38% --------------- 
(23 hrs.)   
Any Work (Formal or Informal) 50% 59% 65%    
 --------------- 56% ---------------   
Study Author(s), Year 
(Survey)       
Lower Range (40-50% employed)       
Greenberger et al., 1981 
(Orange County, California) 
-------- 40% --------     
Agnew, 1986 
(Youth in Transition) 
 46% 
(21 hrs.) 
    
Steinberg and Dornbusch, 1991 
(California and Wisconsin) 
--------------- 45% --------------- --------------- 28% --------------- 
Middle Range (50-70% employed)       
Tanner and Krahn, 1991 
(Canada) 
  70/57%ª 
(18 hrs.) 
   
Mortimer, 2003 







28% 40% 40% 
Upper Range (over 70% employed)       
Bachman et al., 1986 
(Monitoring the Future) 
  80%   39% 
Bachman and Schulenberg, 1993 
(Monitoring the Future) 
  74%   42% 
Marsh, 1991 







   
Wright et al., 2002 
(Tri-Cities Survey) 
  86/75%ª 
(18 hrs.) 
   
 
Note: ª = the first figure denotes the percentage that held a job at some point during the current year, 
while the second figure denotes the percentage currently employed. Mean work intensity among 
employed youths is provided in parentheses (if provided in the original study). High-intensity work is 
defined as that over 20 hours per week. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics Pooled across Five Waves (N = 8,724, NT = 40,283) 
 
Variables Range Mean (Std. Dev.) % Change 
Problem Behavior    
Annual Crime 0–22 1.034 (2.228) 68.3 
Recent Substance Use 0–4 1.103 (1.334) 77.2 
Formal Work Hours during the School Year    
Annual School-Year Work Hours 0–67 14.445 (16.27) 89.9 
Recent School-Year Work Hours 0–70 10.868 (15.82) 80.6 
Individual-Level Control Variables    
Age 12.17–22.33 17.265 (2.173) 100.0 
Household Size 1–17 4.178 (1.532) 68.6 
Local Unemployment Rate 1.0–18.8 4.676 (2.082) 100.0 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in High School (ref.) 0–1 0.651 (0.477) 70.0 
High-School Dropout or GED 0–1 0.096 (0.294) 18.9 
High-School Graduate 0–1 0.253 (0.435) 54.1 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.) 0–1 0.603 (0.489) 31.3 
Single Mother 0–1 0.214 (0.410) 21.6 
No Mother Figure 0–1 0.070 (0.255) 11.6 
Live Independently 0–1 0.100 (0.300) 26.2 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.) 0–1 0.540 (0.498) 17.0 
Central City 0–1 0.265 (0.441) 14.2 
Rural Area 0–1 0.195 (0.396) 7.2 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate 1.00–18.80 4.677 (2.082) 100.0 
Per Capita Personal Income (thousands) 11.55–84.27 25.928 (6.946) 98.2 
Total Number of Jobs (thousands) 1.35–5513.90 508.635 (990.6) 98.0 
Manufacturing Jobs (thousands) 0.01–700.88 58.926 (124.0) 98.0 
Retail Jobs (thousands) 0.08–787.85 78.255 (142.3) 98.0 
Service Jobs (thousands) 0.15–2098.94 179.177 (368.7) 98.0 
Government Jobs (thousands) 0.16–607.88 59.584 (109.3) 98.0 
Unemployment Insurance (thousands) 0.05–780.68 64.730 (130.9) 98.2 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps (thousands) 0.98–12042.74 793.912 (1873.4) 98.1 
    
 
Note: “(ref.)” denotes the dummy variable reference category. Estimates are weighted. Standard deviations are not survey 




Problem Behavior Indicators Used in Scale Construction 
 
Annual Crime Indicators NLSY97 Definition 
Vandalism Purposely damaged or destroyed someone else’s property. 
Petty Theft (<$50) Stole something worth less than 50 dollars. 
Petty Shoplifting Took something from a store without paying for it. 
Petty Larceny Snatched someone’s purse/wallet or picked someone’s pocket. 
Petty Burglary Entered a locked house or building to steal something. 
Petty Robbery Used a weapon to steal something. 
Major Theft (>$50) Stole something worth more than 50 dollars. 
Major Shoplifting Same definition as above. 
Major Larceny Same definition as above. 
Major Burglary Same definition as above. 
Major Robbery Same definition as above. 
Vehicle Theft Stole a motor vehicle (e.g., car, motorcycle) for own use or to 
sell it. 
“Other” Property Crime Committed other property crime (e.g., fencing, receiving, 
possessing, or selling stolen property). 
Aggravated Assault Attacked someone with the intent of seriously hurting them. 
Selling Drugs Sold or helped sell drugs. 
Selling Marijuana Sold marijuana or hashish (e.g., pot, grass, hash). 
Selling Hard Drugs Sold hard drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine, LSD). 
Carrying a Handgun Carried a handgun (not a rifle or shotgun). 
Income from Stolen Property Received cash for stolen items. 
Income from “Other” Property Crime Received cash for fencing, receiving, possessing, or selling 
stolen property. 
Income from Selling Drugs Received cash for selling or helping to sell drugs. 
Arrest for Criminal Offense Arrested by police or taken into custody for an illegal or 
delinquent (not including for minor traffic violations). 
Recent Substance Use Indicators  
Smoked Cigarettes Smoked a cigarette. 
Drank Alcohol Had a drink of an alcoholic beverage (e.g., can or bottle of beer, 
glass of wine, mixed drink, shot of liquor), not including 
childhood sips from an older person's drink. 
Used Marijuana Smoked marijuana (e.g., grass, pot). 
Binge Drank Had five or more drinks in a single occasion (at the same time or 
within hours of each other). 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Problem Behavior and Work Intensity, by Interview Year 
 
 Interview Year 
Problem Behavior Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Within 
Person 
Annual Crime 1.034 1.806 1.058 0.833 0.783 0.615 1.058 
P(Crime > 0) .334 .526 .340 .292 .262 .231 .686 
Mean | Crime > 0 3.098 3.434 3.114 2.851 2.991 2.666 2.761 
Recent Substance Use 1.103 .600 .960 1.191 1.321 1.499 1.104 
P(Substance > 0) .504 .297 .455 .541 .588 .661 .789 
Mean | Substance > 0 2.189 2.019 2.108 2.201 2.248 2.269 2.029 
        
Formal Work Hours during the School Year      
Annual School-Year Work Hours 14.445 3.604 10.131 15.265 20.903 23.672 14.492 
P(Hours > 0) .573 .219 .475 .622 .774 .818 .900 
Mean | Hours > 0 25.194 16.444 21.349 24.539 27.022 28.931 24.627 
Recent School-Year Work Hours 10.868 2.075 7.071 11.551 16.295 18.459 10.876 
P(Hours > 0) .422 .129 .333 .462 .587 .634 .806 
Mean | Hours > 0 25.754 16.135 21.219 25.008 27.775 29.118 24.956 
        
Mean Age 17.265 14.837 16.459 17.409 18.465 19.456 17.267 
# of Observations 40,283 8,587 8,190 7,996 7,843 7,667 8,724 
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. For annual problem behavior, the 1997 interview references lifetime 
prevalence. For annual work intensity, the 1997 interview references since the 14th birthday. The figures 
in the final column are pooled within individuals across the five interviews. For example, 0.686 for 
“P(Crime > 0)” is the proportion of NLSY youths who report committing crime at least once across all 




Instrumental Variables for School-Year Work Hours in a Formal Job, as of January 1, 
1997 
 
Weekly Hours Restrictions during  
the School Year by Age Eligibility # of States States Where Applicable 
Restrictions for 14-15 Year Olds   
Under 20 hours maximum 21 AL,AZ,CA,CT,DE,FL,IN,KY,LA,ME,MI,NJ,ND, 
OH,OK,PA,SC,TN,VA,WA,WI 
20-39 hours maximum 10 AK,IL,IA,MD,MT,NH,NY,NC,OR,SD 
40+ hours maximum 19 AR,CO,DC,GA,HI,ID,KS,MA,MN,MS,MO,NE,NV,
RI,TX,UT,VT,WV,WY 
No restriction 1 NM 
Restrictions for 16-17 Year Olds   
20-39 hours maximum 9 CA,FL,ME,MI,NH,NY,PA,WA,WI 
40+ hours maximum 12 AR,CO,CT,DC,IN,KY,MA,NJ,ND,OR,RI,VT 
No restriction 30 AL,AK,AZ,DE,GA,HI,ID,IL,IA,KS,LA,MD,MN, 
MS,MO,MT,NE,NV,NM,NC,OH,OK,SC,SD,TN, 
TX,UT,VA,WV,WY 
   
 
Source: Monthly Labor Review (Nelson, 1996-2003); National Research Council (1998:194-211); U.S. 
Department of Labor (online at http://youthrules.dol.gov/states.htm). 
 161
TABLE 6 
Proportion of NLSY Respondents Subject to State Child Labor Laws, by Interview Year 
 
 Interview Year 
Child Labor Law (Age Eligibility) Pooled 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Within 
Person
        
Weekly hours restrictions        
(1) Under 20 hours maximum (14-15) .115 .221 .215 .119 .005 .000 .391 
(2) 20-39 hours maximum (14-15) .045 .085 .082 .048 .002 .000 .152 
(3) 40+ hours maximum (14-15) .052 .100 .096 .056 .002 .000 .179 
(4) 20-39 hours maximum (16-17) .119 .090 .144 .147 .140 .072 .342 
(5) 40+ hours maximum (16-17) .052 .044 .061 .065 .061 .030 .150 
        
# of Observations 40,283 8,587 8,190 7,996 7,843 7,667 8,724
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. Proportions refer to the proportion of the sample that resides in a state 
governed by each child labor law and that is also within the age-eligible range. The figures in the final 
column are pooled within individuals across the five interviews. For example, 0.391 for law (1) is the 




First-Stage, Fixed-Effects Models of Annual School-Year Work Intensity 
 
D.V. = Annual Work Hours Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Weekly Hours Restrictions   
 
Under 20 Hours Max., 14-15 –18.6331 (.5456)*** –16.5768 (.5232)*** –15.5437 (.5339)*** 
20-39 Hours Max., 14-15 –18.2638 (.5457)*** –16.1673 (.5654)*** –15.1121 (.5747)*** 
40+ Hours Max., 14-15 –18.7501 (.5315)*** –16.7412 (.5302)*** –15.7188 (.5410)*** 
20-39 Hours Max., 16-17   –2.3763 (.3239)***   –1.8776 (.3146)***   –1.8172 (.3148)*** 
40+ Hours Max., 16-17   –1.0314 (.4033)*     –.8126 (.3932)*     –.7667 (.3936)+ 
Individual Control Variables    
Age  3.9032 (.7041)*** 4.0802 (.7060)*** 
Age Squared  –.0690 (.0197)*** –.0780 (.0198)*** 
Household Size  –.1346 (.0958) –.1299 (.0961) 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED  7.7179 (.4164)*** 7.5928 (.4150)*** 
HS Graduate  6.3217 (.3200)*** 6.1193 (.3209)*** 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother  –.0826 (.3504) –.1151 (.3501) 
No Mother Figure  1.1461 (.5078)* 1.1150 (.5083)* 
Live Independently  3.2532 (.4471)*** 3.1439 (.4454)*** 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City  –.5135 (.4418) –.5587 (.4337) 
Rural Area  –.6916 (.6338) –.7234 (.6607) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate     .3389 (.0565)*** 
Per Capita Personal Income     .1339 (.0392)*** 
Total Number of Jobs     .0030 (.0071) 
Manufacturing Jobs   –.0367 (.0096)*** 
Retail Jobs     .0128 (.0213) 
Service Jobs     .0013 (.0112) 
Government Jobs   –.0198 (.0124) 
Unemployment Insurance   –.0007 (.0036) 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0002 (.0003) 
    
df 31,499 31,489 31,479 
F-test for instruments 263.86 191.22 162.46 
Partial R-square for instruments .0461 .0309 .0262 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 
missing data dummies for county controls, and state dummies. 
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TABLE 8 
First-Stage, Fixed-Effects Models of Recent School-Year Work Intensity 
 
D.V. = Recent Work Hours Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Weekly Hours Restrictions   
 
Under 20 Hours Max., 14-15 –14.6663 (.6159)*** –13.0305 (.6264)*** –12.5402 (.6349)*** 
20-39 Hours Max., 14-15 –14.2493 (.6441)*** –12.6226 (.6590)*** –12.0740 (.6680)*** 
40+ Hours Max., 14-15 –14.1029 (.6539)*** –12.5305 (.6650)*** –12.0784 (.6738)*** 
20-39 Hours Max., 16-17   –2.6872 (.3396)***   –2.2720 (.3338)***   –2.2394 (.3346)*** 
40+ Hours Max., 16-17     –.8076 (.4657)+     –.6051 (.4574)     –.5711 (.4600) 
Individual Control Variables    
Age    .2039 (.7397)   .2236 (.7393) 
Age Squared    .0285 (.0211)   .0262 (.0211) 
Household Size  –.0998 (.1071) –.0999 (.1070) 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED  5.4011 (.4482)*** 5.3429 (.4483)*** 
HS Graduate  5.6511 (.3516)*** 5.5364 (.3532)*** 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother  –.2894 (.3932) –.2712 (.3939) 
No Mother Figure  1.2433 (.5543)* 1.2236 (.5565)* 
Live Independently  3.5954 (.5188)*** 3.5438 (.5192)*** 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City    .1305 (.4986)   .1439 (.4944) 
Rural Area  –1.3014 (.7067)+ –1.1863 (.7347) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate     .1355 (.0607)* 
Per Capita Personal Income     .0929 (.0423)* 
Total Number of Jobs   –.0076 (.0080) 
Manufacturing Jobs   –.0220 (.0109)* 
Retail Jobs     .0302 (.0236) 
Service Jobs     .0242 (.0128)+ 
Government Jobs   –.0283 (.0139)* 
Unemployment Insurance   –.0035 (.0040) 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0002 (.0003) 
    
df 31,499 31,489 31,479 
F-test for instruments 123.02 87.49 79.38 
Partial R-square for instruments .0266 .0175 .0156 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 
missing data dummies for county controls, and state dummies. 
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TABLE 9 
Random-Effects Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity on Annual Crime 
 
D.V. = Annual Crime Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
School-Year Work Hours    .0020 (.0010)*   .0025 (.0010)*   .0024 (.0010)* 
Individual Control Variables    
Age    .9669 (.1395)***   .9403 (.1399)*** 
Age Squared  –.0287 (.0037)*** –.0275 (.0037)*** 
Household Size  –.0080 (.0115) –.0078 (.0115) 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED    .2903 (.0702)***   .2883 (.0702)*** 
HS Graduate    .1275 (.0458)**   .1202 (.0458)** 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother    .2258 (.0435)***   .2284 (.0436)*** 
No Mother Figure    .3777 (.0734)***   .3813 (.0731)*** 
Live Independently  –.0197 (.0554) –.0205 (.0552) 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City  –.0146 (.0439)   .0055 (.0449) 
Rural Area    .0331 (.0557)   .0775 (.0592) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate   –.0355 (.0087)*** 
Per Capita Personal Income   –.0019 (.0032) 
Total Number of Jobs     .0006 (.0006) 
Manufacturing Jobs     .0020 (.0010)* 
Retail Jobs   –.0009 (.0021) 
Service Jobs   –.0020 (.0010)+ 
Government Jobs     .0003 (.0010) 
Unemployment Insurance   –.0005 (.0004) 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0000 (.0000) 
    
df 40,227 40,217 40,207 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 
missing data dummies for county controls, and state dummies. 
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TABLE 10 
Fixed-Effects Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity on Annual Crime 
 
D.V. = Annual Crime Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
School-Year Work Hours  –.0048 (.0011)*** –.0036 (.0011)** –.0033 (.0011)** 
Individual Control Variables    
Age    .7397 (.1252)***   .7188 (.1254)*** 
Age Squared  –.0216 (.0033)*** –.0208 (.0033)*** 
Household Size  –.0021 (.0154) –.0016 (.0154) 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED  –.2448 (.0767)*** –.2277 (.0767)** 
HS Graduate    .0936 (.0421)*   .1221 (.0429)** 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother    .0877 (.0626)   .0890 (.0625) 
No Mother Figure    .2111 (.0916)*   .2178 (.0913)* 
Live Independently  –.2712 (.0701)*** –.2523 (.0698)*** 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City  –.0307 (.0754) –.0177 (.0760) 
Rural Area    .0516 (.1049)   .0223 (.1062) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate   –.0228 (.0099)* 
Per Capita Personal Income   –.0046 (.0052) 
Total Number of Jobs     .0022 (.0013)+ 
Manufacturing Jobs     .0022 (.0016) 
Retail Jobs   –.0077 (.0041)+ 
Service Jobs   –.0030 (.0020) 
Government Jobs   –.0028 (.0024) 
Unemployment Insurance   –.0008 (.0005)+ 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0000 (.0000) 
    
df 31,503 31,493 31,483 
Hausman Test (FE vs. RE) 14.19 11.92 10.73 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 




Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variables Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity 
on Annual Crime 
 
D.V. = Annual Crime Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
School-Year Work Hours  –.0175 (.0044)*** –.0309 (.0057)*** –.0282 (.0062)*** 
Individual Control Variables    
Age    .8500 (.1311)***   .8275 (.1315)*** 
Age Squared  –.0242 (.0035)*** –.0235 (.0035)*** 
Household Size  –.0068 (.0158) –.0057 (.0157) 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED    .0063 (.0941) –.0074 (.0950) 
HS Graduate    .3349 (.0670)***   .3276 (.0676)*** 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother    .0860 (.0653)   .0863 (.0647) 
No Mother Figure    .2422 (.0959)*   .2447 (.0954)** 
Live Independently  –.1613 (.0740)* –.1589 (.0738)* 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City  –.0460 (.0789) –.0344 (.0787) 
Rural Area    .0398 (.1079)   .0079 (.1083) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate   –.0082 (.0110) 
Per Capita Personal Income     .0001 (.0055) 
Total Number of Jobs     .0023 (.0013)+ 
Manufacturing Jobs     .0008 (.0017) 
Retail Jobs   –.0071 (.0041)+ 
Service Jobs   –.0029 (.0020) 
Government Jobs   –.0034 (.0025) 
Unemployment Insurance   –.0007 (.0005) 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0000 (.0000) 
    
df 31,503 31,493 31,483 
Overidentification Test (Hansen’s J) 2.38 4.05 4.10 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. RE) 4.56 4.68 5.00 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. FE) 2.98 3.28 4.10 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 
missing data dummies for county controls, and state dummies. Hansen’s J-statistic is distributed chi-square (df = 4). The Hausman 
test is a t-statistic computed for “school-year work hours.”  
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TABLE 12 
Random-Effects Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity on Recent 
Substance Use 
 
D.V. = Recent Substance Use Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
School-Year Work Hours    .0054 (.0006)***   .0039 (.0006)***   .0038 (.0006)*** 
Individual Control Variables    
Age    .6345 (.0693)***   .6327 (.0698)*** 
Age Squared  –.0140 (.0019)*** –.0138 (.0019)*** 
Household Size  –.0341 (.0062)*** –.0334 (.0062)*** 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED    .1461 (.0317)***   .1452 (.0317)*** 
HS Graduate    .1433 (.0285)***   .1425 (.0285)*** 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother    .0425 (.0246)+   .0436 (.0246)+ 
No Mother Figure    .0691 (.0355)+   .0721 (.0356)* 
Live Independently  –.1074 (.0328)*** –.1062 (.0330)*** 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City  –.0323 (.0254) –.0132 (.0258) 
Rural Area  –.0193 (.0331) –.0182 (.0351) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate   –.0090 (.0045)* 
Per Capita Personal Income   –.0015 (.0021) 
Total Number of Jobs   –.0001 (.0004) 
Manufacturing Jobs     .0014 (.0006)* 
Retail Jobs     .0005 (.0011) 
Service Jobs   –.0004 (.0006) 
Government Jobs     .0004 (.0006) 
Unemployment Insurance     .0002 (.0002) 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0000 (.0000) 
    
df 40,227 40,217 40,207 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 
missing data dummies for county controls, and state dummies. 
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TABLE 13 
Fixed-Effects Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity on Recent Substance 
Use 
 
D.V. = Recent Substance Use Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
School-Year Work Hours    .0055 (.0006)***   .0041 (.0006)***   .0040 (.0006)*** 
Individual Control Variables    
Age    .4583 (.0644)***   .4737 (.0648)*** 
Age Squared  –.0118 (.0017)*** –.0124 (.0018)*** 
Household Size  –.0093 (.0076) –.0087 (.0077) 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED    .1103 (.0340)***   .0983 (.0341)** 
HS Graduate    .3671 (.0249)***   .3474 (.0252)*** 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother    .0418 (.0315)   .0403 (.0316) 
No Mother Figure    .0758 (.0428)+   .0751 (.0429)+ 
Live Independently  –.0431 (.0353) –.0512 (.0355) 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City    .0761 (.0369)*   .0728 (.0370)* 
Rural Area  –.0598 (.0508) –.0654 (.0526) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate     .0201 (.0049)*** 
Per Capita Personal Income     .0044 (.0031) 
Total Number of Jobs     .0007 (.0006) 
Manufacturing Jobs   –.0019 (.0008)* 
Retail Jobs   –.0002 (.0018) 
Service Jobs   –.0009 (.0009) 
Government Jobs   –.0019 (.0010)+ 
Unemployment Insurance     .0005 (.0003)* 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0000 (.0000) 
    
df 31,503 31,493 31,483 
Hausman Test (FE vs. RE) 1.60 2.43 1.25 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 




Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variables Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity 
on Recent Substance Use 
 
D.V. = Recent Substance Use Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
School-Year Work Hours    .0437 (.0036)***   .0445 (.0045)***   .0429 (.0047)*** 
Individual Control Variables    
Age    .4458 (.0725)***   .4564 (.0724)*** 
Age Squared  –.0121 (.0020)*** –.0124 (.0020)*** 
Household Size  –.0041 (.0088) –.0039 (.0088) 
Educational Attainment:    
Enrolled in HS (ref.)    
HS Dropout or GED  –.1551 (.0476)*** –.1486 (.0478)** 
HS Graduate    .0577 (.0441)   .0644 (.0442) 
Family Structure:    
Two Parents (ref.)    
Single Mother    .0531 (.0353)   .0510 (.0351) 
No Mother Figure    .0253 (.0504)   .0281 (.0501) 
Live Independently  –.2119 (.0450)*** –.2072 (.0449)*** 
Residential Location:    
Suburban Area (ref.)    
Central City    .0723 (.0437)+   .0704 (.0434) 
Rural Area  –.0172 (.0575) –.0251 (.0606) 
County Control Variables    
Local Unemployment Rate     .0071 (.0057) 
Per Capita Personal Income   –.0009 (.0036) 
Total Number of Jobs     .0011 (.0007) 
Manufacturing Jobs   –.0004 (.0009) 
Retail Jobs   –.0017 (.0021) 
Service Jobs   –.0020 (.0011)+ 
Government Jobs   –.0006 (.0012) 
Unemployment Insurance     .0006 (.0003)+ 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps     .0000 (.0000) 
    
df 31,503 31,493 31,483 
Overidentification Test (Hansen’s J) 14.48 16.86 16.52 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. RE) 10.78 11.21 8.41 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. FE) 10.75 11.16 8.38 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Not shown but included in the models are a constant, a control for exposure time, age dummies, 
missing data dummies for county controls, and state dummies. Hansen’s J-statistic is distributed chi-square (df = 4). The Hausman 
test is a t-statistic computed for “school-year work hours.”    
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TABLE 15 
Summary of Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of School-Year 
Work Intensity on Individual Problem Behaviors 
 
 Prevalence Frequency 
Problem Behavior Response Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Annual Crime: 
      
Vandalism – – – – – –
Petty Theft (under 50 dollars) – – –    
Petty Shoplifting – – –    
Petty Larceny NS NS NS    
Petty Burglary – – –    
Petty Robbery NS NS NS    
Major Theft (over 50 dollars) – – – NS – –
Major Shoplifting NS – NS    
Major Larceny NS NS NS    
Major Burglary NS NS NS    
Major Robbery  NS  NS  NS    
Vehicle Theft – – –    
“Other” Property Crime – – – NS – NS 
Aggravated Assault – – – NS NS NS 
Selling Drugs  NS  NS  NS + NS NS 
Selling Marijuana  NS  NS  NS    
Selling Hard Drugs  NS  NS  NS    
Carrying a Handgun – – – NS NS NS 
Income from Stolen Property – – –    
Income from “Other” Property Crime – – –    
Income from Selling Drugs NS NS NS    
Arrest for Criminal Offense NS NS NS  NS  NS  NS
Recent Substance Use:       
Smoking Cigarettes + + + + + + 
Drinking Alcohol +  +  + + + + 
Using Marijuana  +   +   +   +   +   +  
Binge Drinking  +   +   +   +   +   +  
 
Note: “–” indicates a negative and significant coefficient; “+” indicates a positive and significant coefficient; “NS” indicates a non-
significant coefficient (p < .10, two-tailed tests). Boxed symbols indicate that the overidentification test is rejected. 
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TABLE 16 
Fixed-Effects Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity on the Frequency of 
Smoking Cigarettes and Drinking Alcohol 
 
First-Stage Fit Statistics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
F-test for instruments 123.02 87.49 79.38 
Partial R-square for instruments .0266 .0175 .0156 
 Frequency of Smoking Cigarettes 
Estimation Procedure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Random Effects    .0549 (.0035)***   .0439 (.0036)***   .0438 (.0035)*** 
Fixed Effects    .0665 (.0045)***   .0477 (.0047)***   .0479 (.0046)*** 
Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables   .2805 (.0161)***   .2869 (.0244)***   .2981 (.0256)*** 
Overidentification Test (Hansen’s J) 6.78 6.62 7.34 
Hausman Test (FE vs. RE) 4.02 1.27 1.35 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. RE) 14.34 10.05 10.01 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. FE) 3.01 4.77 3.86 
    
 Frequency of Drinking Alcohol 
Estimation Procedure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Random Effects    .0170 (.0017)***   .0089 (.0017)***   .0087 (.0017)*** 
Fixed Effects    .0252 (.0025)***   .0110 (.0026)***   .0103 (.0026)*** 
Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables   .1472 (.0088)***   .1412 (.0126)***   .1397 (.0132)*** 
Overidentification Test (Hansen’s J) 4.12 4.91 4.72 
Hausman Test (FE vs. RE) 4.57 1.10 0.84 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. RE) 15.16 10.58 10.01 
Hausman Test (FEIV vs. FE) 14.52 10.53 9.99 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 40,283. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Hansen’s J-statistic is distributed chi-square (df = 4). The Hausman test is a t-statistic computed 
for “school-year work hours.” To facilitate interpretation of the results, the highlighted coefficients are the “preferred” estimates 
according to the Hausman tests. 
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TABLE 17 
Summary of Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of School-Year 
Work Intensity on Problem Behavior with Alternative Model Specifications 
 
 Annual Crime Recent Substance Use 
Alternative Model Specification Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Censored Work Hours: 
60 Hours – – –  +   +   +  
50 Hours – – –  +   +   +  
40 Hours – – –  +   +   +  
Ordinal Work Hours:    
Dichotomous (Work vs. No Work) – – –  +   +   +  
Trichotomous Hours (1-20, 21+ vs. 0) NS / – NS / – NS / –  + / +   + / +   + / +  
Quadratic in Work Hours NS / NS  NS / NS  NS / NS  + / –   + / –   + / –  
Adjustment for Level of Work Hours – – – +  +   +  
Logged (+1) Work Hours – – – + + + 
Lagged Y – – –  +   +   +  
Poisson with Fixed Effects – – – NS NS NS 
First Differences – – – + NS NS 
 Smoking Cigarettes Drinking Alcohol 
Alternative Model Specification Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Censored Work Hours: 
60 Hours + + + + + + 
50 Hours + + + + + + 
40 Hours + + + + + + 
Ordinal Work Hours:    
Dichotomous (Work vs. No Work) + + + + + + 
Trichotomous Hours (1-20, 21+ vs. 0) + / + + / + + / + NS / + NS / + NS / +
Quadratic in Work Hours  + / –   + / NS   + / NS   + / NS   + / NS   + / NS  
Adjustment for Level of Work Hours + + + + + + 
Logged (+1) Work Hours + + + + + + 
Lagged Y  +   +   +  + + + 
Poisson with Fixed Effects + + + + + + 
First Differences NS – – NS NS NS 
 
Note: “–” indicates a negative and significant coefficient; “+” indicates a positive and significant coefficient; “NS” indicates a non-
significant coefficient (p < .10, two-tailed tests). Boxed symbols indicate that the overidentification test is rejected. The Poisson 
model with fixed effects is a reduced-form model, and the symbols represent the implied second-stage “work intensity effect” based 




First-Differences Models of the Effect of School-Year Work Intensity on the Frequency 
of Smoking Cigarettes and Drinking Alcohol 
 
First-Stage Fit Statistics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
F-test for instruments 21.30 10.47 9.34 
Partial R-square for instruments .0043 .0017 .0016 
 Frequency of Smoking Cigarettes 
Estimation Procedure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Random Effects    .0549 (.0035)***   .0439 (.0036)***   .0438 (.0035)*** 
First Differences   .0286 (.0045)***   .0255 (.0045)***   .0252 (.0045)*** 
First Differences IV –.0487 (.0449) –.0931 (.0362)*** –.0884 (.0413)** 
Overidentification Test (Hansen’s J) 6.78 6.62 7.34 
Hausman Test (FD vs. RE) 9.21 6.66 6.79 
Hausman Test (FDIV vs. RE) 3.01 4.77 3.86 
Hausman Test (FDIV vs. FD) 2.26 4.15 3.33 
    
 Frequency of Drinking Alcohol 
Estimation Procedure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Random Effects    .0170 (.0017)***   .0089 (.0017)***   .0087 (.0017)*** 
First Differences   .0051 (.0028)+   .0033 (.0028)   .0030 (.0028) 
First Differences IV –.0123 (.0201) –.0240 (.0156) –.0137 (.0186) 
Overidentification Test (Hansen’s J) 3.82 3.95 3.68 
Hausman Test (FD vs. RE) 5.25 2.53 2.57 
Hausman Test (FDIV vs. RE) 1.47 2.12 1.21 
Hausman Test (FDIV vs. FD) 0.87 1.78 0.91 
    
 
Note: + p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). NT = 31,558. Estimates are weighted. Survey-adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. Hansen’s J-statistic is distributed chi-square (df = 4). The Hausman test is a t-statistic computed 
for “school-year work hours.”  To facilitate interpretation of the results, the highlighted coefficients are the “preferred” estimates 

















1 13 25 37
employment rate cumulative employment rate
 
freshman sophomore junior senior 
 
Note: n = 8,984. Estimates are weighted. The employment rate refers to the proportion of youths 
employed in a given month. The cumulative employment rate refers to the proportion of youths that 
have been employed at least once since the beginning of high school. Month 1 denotes September of a 
youth’s freshman year of high school, month 13 the sophomore year, month 25 the junior year, and 
month 37 the senior year.  
 














1 13 25 37
 
freshman sophomore junior senior 
Note: Estimates are weighted. Non-workers are excluded from the work intensity calculation. Month 1 
denotes September of a youth’s freshman year of high school, month 13 the sophomore year, month 25 
the junior year, and month 37 the senior year. 
 



























Note: Estimates are weighted. Non-workers are excluded from the work intensity calculation. Work 
intensity is averaged over the academic year, from September to May. 
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14-15 16 17 18
 
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. Employment rates for youths ages 14-15 are not available after 1970, and 
are illustrated here for comparative purposes only. 
 
















14 14.5 15 15.5 16 16.5 17 17.5 18 18.5
p(formal job only) p(informal job only) p(both formal & informal jobs) p(any job)
 
 
Note: n = 8,984. Estimates are weighted. At any age, the sum of the data points for “formal job only,” 
“informal job only,” and “both formal and informal jobs” is the equivalent of “any job.”  
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school year summer total
 
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. Mean work intensity for summer employment is less stable due to 
computation from a smaller number of cases. 
 



























Note: Estimates are weighted. Non-workers at each month are excluded from this figure. Summer 
months are included, but the inflation of work intensity estimates is modest. Only 25 percent of the 
observations at each month are during the summer.  
 














<10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19+
first  informal job first  formal job
 
 
Note: n = 7,552 for first formal job; n = 5,299 for first informal job. Estimates are weighted. A portion 
of the total sample (n = 8,984) is censored due to missing data on age of first job, attrition, or having not 
yet taken a first job. 
 




























Note: n = 7,366. Estimates are weighted. Respondents contribute a single observation, depending on 
what age they acquired their first formal job. The figures represent the share of all first formal jobs at a 
given age in a specific industry. Job definitions include: “agr” = agricultural; “con” = construction; 
“man” = manufacturing; “gro” = grocery store; “eat” = eating and drinking establishment; “ort” = other 
retail trade; “rec” = entertainment and recreation service; “hea” = health and social service; “edu” = 
educational service; “oth” = other industry not elsewhere classified. 
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Note: Estimates are weighted. The figures represent the share of all first formal jobs in a specific 
industry. Job definitions include: “agr” = agricultural; “con” = construction; “man” = manufacturing; 
“gro” = grocery store; “eat” = eating and drinking establishment; “ort” = other retail trade; “rec” = 
entertainment and recreation service; “hea” = health and social service; “edu” = educational service. In 
order to conserve space, the “other” category is omitted from this graph. 
 





























Note: n = 7,366. Estimates are weighted. Respondents contribute a single observation, depending on 
what age they acquired their first formal job. The figures represent the share of all first formal jobs at a 
given age in a specific occupation. Job definitions include: “pro” = professional and managerial; “csh” = 
cashier; “sal” = sales; “adm” = administrative support; “foo” = food preparation and service; “ser” = 
other service; “rep” = repair, precision production, and craft; “hel” = construction helper; “bag” = stock 
handler or bagger; “lab” = other laborer; “oth” = other occupation not elsewhere classified. 
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Note: Estimates are weighted. The figures represent the share of all first formal jobs in a specific 
occupation. Job definitions include: “pro” = professional and managerial; “csh” = cashier; “sal” = sales; 
“adm” = administrative support; “foo” = food preparation and service; “ser” = other service; “rep” = 
repair, precision production, and craft; “hel” = construction helper; “bag” = stock handler or bagger; 
“lab” = other laborer. In order to conserve space, the “other” category is omitted from this graph. 
 



























Note: n = 5,276. Estimates are weighted. Respondents contribute a single observation, depending on 
what age they acquired their first informal job. The figures represent the share of all first informal jobs 
at a given age in a specific occupation. Job definitions include: “bab” = babysitting; “mow” = yard 
work; “cle” = cleaning; “far” = farm work; “pap” = paper route; “lab” = manual labor; “off” = office and 
sales; “odd” = odd jobs; “oth” = other occupation not elsewhere classified. 
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Note: Estimates are weighted. The figures represent the share of all first informal jobs in a specific 
occupation. Job definitions include: “bab” = babysitting; “mow” = yard work; “cle” = cleaning; “far” = 
farm work; “pap” = paper route; “lab” = manual labor; “off” = office and sales; “odd” = odd jobs. In 
order to conserve space, the “other” category is omitted from this graph. 
 




Diagram of Potential Mediating Causal Mechanisms to Explain the Positive Correlation 




























Diminished Attachment to 
and Monitoring by Parents 
Reduced Commitment to 
Educational Pursuits 
Job Dissatisfaction and 
Elevated Stress Levels 
Antisocial Learning from 
Delinquent Co-Workers 
Increased Time Spent in 
Unstructured Socializing 
Problem Behavior Intensive Work 
Newfound Opportunities 
for Adolescent Deviance 
 
Note: Distinct causal pathways are denoted numerically: (1) social control theory, (2) social control theory, 
(3) general strain theory, (4) differential association and social learning theories, (5) routine activity theory, 
and (6) opportunity theory. 
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FIGURE 16 
Diagram of a Spurious Positive Correlation between Intensive Work and Problem 
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Gratification 
Intensive Work Maturity Gap 
Propensity Problem Behavior 
 
Note: The solid lines represent causal pathways. The dashed lines represent the mechanisms underlying the 

















12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
crime actual crime fitted substance actual substance fitted   
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. Figures are adjusted for exposure time. “Fitted” estimates are computed 
assuming a third-order polynomial in age. 
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FIGURE 18 









12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
hours actual hours fitted   
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. Figures are adjusted for exposure time. “Fitted” estimates are computed 
assuming a third-order polynomial in age. 
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FIGURE 19 




















Note: In the context of the relationship between employment and adolescent problem behavior, Yi  
represents problem behavior, Xi  represents work intensity, and Zi  represents the instrumental 
variable(s). Both ε i  and ν i  are residuals from their respective paths, Yi  and Xi . 
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Note: Estimates are weighted. Figures are adjusted for age (linear, quadratic, cubic) and exposure time. 
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Note: Estimates are weighted. Figures are adjusted for age (linear, quadratic, cubic) and exposure time. 












annual crime recent substance use
no work (0 hrs.) low work intensity (1-20 hrs.) high work intensity (21+ hrs.)
 
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. Figures are estimated using the total sample, and are adjusted for age 
(linear, quadratic, cubic) and exposure time. The reference period for annual crime is since the last 
interview (or ever prior to the initial interview), while the reference period for recent substance use is the 





Mean School-Year Work Hours by Change in Weekly Hours Restrictions from 15 to 16 









<20 → 20-39 <20 → 40+ <20 → none 20-39 → 20-39 20-39 → 40+ 20-39 → none 40+ → 40+ 40+ → none
age 15 age 16  
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. The reference period for work hours is since the last interview (or in the 
year prior to the first interview). Figures are estimated using those person-year observations in which 




Mean Change in School-Year Work Hours by Change in Weekly Hours Restrictions from 









5 8 10 12 15 22 30 unlimited
 
Note: Estimates are weighted. The solid line connects the actual means, the dashed line connects the 
fitted means, and individual states are denoted by an open diamond. Change in annual school-year work 











Problem Behavior  
Annual Crime Sum of 22 binary indicators for delinquent/criminal behavior 
since the last interview (or ever prior to the initial interview):  
(1) Vandalism, (2) petty theft (under 50 dollars), (3) petty 
shoplifting, (4) petty larceny, (5) petty burglary, (6) petty 
robbery, (7) major theft (over 50 dollars), (8) major 
shoplifting, (9) major larceny, (10) major burglary, (11) major 
robbery, (12) vehicle theft, (13) “other” property crime (e.g., 
receiving, possessing, selling stolen property), (14) income 
from stolen property, (15) income from “other” property 
crime, (16) aggravated assault (i.e., assault with the intention 
of inflicting serious harm), (17) selling drugs, (18) selling 
marijuana, (19) selling hard drugs (heroin, cocaine, LSD, 
other drugs), (20) income from selling drugs, (21) carrying a 
handgun, (22) arrest for a delinquent or criminal offense (not 
including arrest for minor traffic violations). 
Recent Substance Use Sum of four binary indicators for substance use in the last 30 
days:  
(1) Smoked cigarettes, (2) had one or more drinks of alcohol 
(e.g., can or bottle of beer, glass of wine, mixed drink, shot of 
liquor), (3) smoked marijuana, (4) drank five or more drinks 
in a single setting. 
  
Formal Work Hours during the School Year 
Annual School-Year Work Hours Mean number of hours worked per week in a formal job during 
the school year (September 1 to May 31) since the previous 
interview (or since age 14 at the initial interview). 
Recent School-Year Work Hours Mean number of hours worked per week in a formal job during 
the school year (September 1 to May 31) during the four weeks 
prior to the interview week. 
  
Individual Control Variables  
Age Youth’s age in years (continuous) as of interview. 
Household Size Number of people that currently live in household. 
Educational Attainment  
Enrolled in High School (ref.) =1 if youth is currently enrolled in high school. 
High-School Dropout or GED =1 if youth is not enrolled in school and has no diploma or GED, 
or is not enrolled in school but has GED. 
High-School Graduate =1 if youth is not enrolled in school but has a high-school 
diploma or college degree, or is currently enrolled in a college or 
graduate program. 
Family Structure  
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Two Parents (ref.) =1 if youth lives with both biological parents, or with a 
biological and step-parent. 
Single Mother =1 if youth lives only with biological mother. 
No Mother Figure =1 if youth lives only with biological father or with other family 
member (e.g., adoptive or foster parents, other relative). 
Live Independently =1 if youth does not live with a family member. 
Residential Location  
Suburban Area (ref.) =1 if youth lives in MSA not in the central city. 
Central City =1 if youth lives in MSA in central city. 
Rural Area =1 if youth does not live in MSA. 
  
County Control Variables  
Local Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate (continuous) for local labor market. 
Per Capita Personal Income Personal income per capita in 1997 dollars (in thousands). 
Total Number of Jobs Total number of full-time and part-time jobs (in thousands). 
Manufacturing Jobs Total number of manufacturing jobs (in thousands). 
Retail Jobs Total number of retail jobs (in thousands). 
Service Jobs Total number of service jobs (in thousands). 
Government Jobs Total number of government jobs (in thousands). 
Unemployment Insurance Total value of payments issued under state-administered 
unemployment insurance programs in 1997 dollars (in 
thousands). 
Medicaid, AFDC, & Food Stamps Total value of transfer payments issued for public assistance 
medical care, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and food 
stamps, in 1997 dollars (in thousands). 
  
 
Note: “(ref.)” denotes the dummy variable reference category. 
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APPENDIX B1 
Maximum Hours and Days per Week Permitted in Non-Agricultural Employment under 
State Child Labor Laws, as of January 1, 1997 
 
 Youths 14-15 Youths 16-17 
State Daily Hours Weekly Hours Days Per Week Daily Hours Weekly Hours Days Per Week 
Alabama 8  (3) 40  (18) 6 -- -- -- 
Alaska     (9)a       (23) 6 -- -- 6 
Arizona 8  (3) 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
Arkansas 8 48 6   10 54 6 
California 8  (3) 40  (18) 6 8  (4) 48  (28) 6 
Colorado 8  (6) 40 -- 8 40 -- 
Connecticut* 8  (3) 40  (18) 6  8/9b 48 6 
Delaware 8  (4) 40  (18) 6   12a -- -- 
District of Columbia 8 48 6 8 48 6 
Florida 8  (3) 40  (15) 6     (8)       (30)     (6) 
Georgia 8  (4) 40 -- -- -- -- 
Hawaii 8  (10)a 40 6 -- -- -- 
Idaho 9 54 -- -- -- -- 
Illinois 8  (8)a 48  (24) 6 -- -- -- 
Indiana 8  (3) 40  (18) --  8/9c (8)  30/48c (30/40)c 6 
Iowa 8  (4) 40  (28) -- -- -- -- 
Kansas 8 40 -- -- -- -- 
Kentucky* 8  (3) 40  (18) -- 8  (6) 40     (6) 
Louisiana 8  (3) 40  (18) 6 -- -- -- 
Maine 8  (3) 40  (18) 6   10  (4) 50  (20) 6 
Maryland 8  (4) 40  (23) --   12a -- -- 
Massachusetts 8 48 6 9 48 6 
Michigan  10 48  (48)a 6   10 48  (48)a 6 
Minnesota 8 40 -- -- -- -- 
Mississippi 8 44 -- -- -- -- 
Missouri 8  (3) 40 6 -- -- -- 
Montana 8  (3) 40  (18/23)c -- -- -- -- 
Nebraska 8 48 -- -- -- -- 
Nevada 8 48 -- -- -- -- 
New Hampshire 8  (3) 48  (23) -- -- 48  (30) 6  (6) 
New Jersey 8  (3) 40  (18) 6 8 40 6 
New Mexico* -- -- -- -- -- -- 
New York 8  (3) 40  (18/23)c 6 8  (4) 48  (28) 6 
North Carolina 8  (3) 40  (18/23)c -- -- -- -- 
North Dakota 8  (3) 40  (18) 6 8 48 6 
Ohio 8  (3) 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
Oklahoma 8  (3) 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
Oregon 8  (3) 40  (18/23)c -- -- 44 -- 
Pennsylvania 8  (4) 44  (18) 6 8 44  (28) 6 
Rhode Island 8 40 --     (9)       (48) -- 
South Carolina 8  (3) 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
South Dakota 8  (4) 40  (20) -- -- -- -- 
Tennessee 8  (3) 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
Texas 8 48 -- -- -- -- 
Utah 8  (4) 40 -- -- -- -- 
Vermont* 8 40 6 9 50 -- 
Virginia 8  (3) 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
Washington 8  (3) 40  (16) 6 8  (4/6)c 48 (20/28)c 6 
West Virginia* 8 40 6 -- -- -- 
Wisconsin 8  (4) 40  (18) 6 8  (5) 50  (26) 6 
Wyoming 8 56 -- -- -- -- 
 
Note: * = child labor law was amended after 1997 (CT, KY, NM, VT, WV); a = hours of combined school and work (AK, DE, HI, 
IL, MD, MI); b = different hours allowed in different occupations (CT); c = less restrictive hours allowed with written parental 
permission or other approved exception (IN, MT, NY, NC, OR). Figures in parentheses represent maximum work commitment 
allowed during school days/weeks. 
 




Time-of-Work Restrictions in Non-Agricultural Employment under State Child Labor 
Laws, as of January 1, 1997 
 
State Youths 14-15 Youths 16-17 
Alabama 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) (5:00am–10:00pm)a
Alaska 5:00am–9:00pm  
Arizona 6:00am–11:00pm  (6:00am–9:30pm)  
Arkansas 6:00am–9:00pm    (6:00am–7:00pm) (6:00am–11:00pm) 
California 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 5:00am–12:30pm  (5:00am–10:00pm) 
Colorado (5:00am–9:30pm)  
Connecticut* 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 6:00am–11/10pmb
Delaware 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
District of Columbia 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 6:00am–10:00pm 
Florida 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) (6:30am–11:00pm) 
Georgia 6:00am–9:00pm  
Hawaii 6:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Idaho 6:00am–9:00pm  
Illinois 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Indiana 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 6am–12am/10pmc (6:00am–11:30/10pm)d
Iowa 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Kansas (7:00am–10:00pm)  
Kentucky* 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 6:00am–1:00am    (6:30am–11:30pm) 
Louisiana 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Maine 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 5:00am–12:00am  (7:00am–10:00pm) 
Maryland 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–8:00pm)  
Massachusetts 6:30am–9:00pm    (6:30am–7:00pm) 6:00am–12:00am  (6:00am–10:00pm) 
Michigan 7:00am–9:00pm 6:00am–11:30pm  (6:00am–10:30pm) 
Minnesota 7:00am–9:00pm (4:30/5am–11:30/11pm)e
Mississippi 6:00am–7:00pm  
Missouri 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Montana 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Nebraska 6:00am–10:00pm  
Nevada   
New Hampshire 7:00am–9:00pm  
New Jersey 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) (6:00am–11:00pm) 
New Mexico*   
New York 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 6:00am–12:00am  (6:00am–12am/10pm)c
North Carolina 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) (5:00am–11:00pm)f
North Dakota 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Ohio 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) (7:00am–11:00pm) 
Oklahoma 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Oregon 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Pennsylvania 7:00am–10:00pm  (7:00am–7:00pm) 6:00am–1:00am    (6:00am–12:00am) 
Rhode Island 6:00am–9:00pm    (6:00am–7:00pm) 6:00am–1:30am    (6:00am–11:30pm) 
South Carolina 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
South Dakota (10:00pm)g  
Tennessee 6:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) (6:00am–12am/10pm)e
Texas 5:00am–12:00am  (5:00am–10:00pm)  
Utah (5:00am–9:30pm)  
Vermont* 6:00am–7:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Virginia 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Washington 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 5:00am–12:00am  (7:00am–10:00pm) 
West Virginia* 5:00am–8:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Wisconsin 7:00am–11:00pm  (7:00am–8:00pm) 5:00am–12:30am  (7:00am–11:00pm) 
Wyoming 5:00am–12:00am  (5:00am–10:00pm) 5:00am–12:00amh
 
Note: * = child labor law was amended after 1997 (CT, KY, NM, VT, WV); a = applies to all youths until age 19 as of 2000 (AL); b 
= different times apply to different occupations (CT); c = applicable only to 16 year olds, with no restriction for 17 year olds (IN); d 
= 17 year olds allowed to work until later time, whereas 16 year olds must abide by the more restrictive time (IN); e = less restrictive 
times allowed with written parental permission (MN, NY, TN); f = no restriction with written parental approval (NC); g = restriction 
after 10:00 p.m. on school night, with no morning restriction (SD); h = applicable to females only (WY). Times denote the range of 
hours in which employment is permitted. Figures in parentheses represent time-of-work restrictions during school days/weeks.  
 




Amendments to State Child Labor Laws after 1997 
 
 Maximum Hours and Days Per Week Restrictions
 Youths 14-15 Youths 16-17 
State (Year of Change) Daily Hours Weekly Hours Days Per Week Daily Hours Weekly Hours Days Per Week
Connecticut (1998) 8  (3) 40  (18) 6  8/9a  (6) 48  (32) 6 
Kentucky (2002) 8  (3) 40  (18) -- 8  (6) 40  (30/40)b     (6) 
New Mexico (1998) -- 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
Vermont (2001) 8  (3) 40  (18) 6 No restrictions 
West Virginia (2002) 8  (3) 40  (18) -- -- -- -- 
 
 Time-of-Work Restrictions
 Youths 14-15 Youths 16-17 
Connecticut (1998) 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 6am–12am/11pma    (6:00am–11/10pm)a
Kentucky (2002) 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm) 6:00am–1:00am    (6:30am–10:30pm) 
New Mexico (1998) 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
Vermont (2001) 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
West Virginia (2002) 7:00am–9:00pm    (7:00am–7:00pm)  
   
 
Note: a = different hours allowed in different occupations (CT); b = less restrictive hours allowed with written parental permission. 
Shaded figures highlight the amendments that were introduced.  
 
Source: Monthly Labor Review (Nelson, 1997-2003); National Research Council (1998:194-211); U.S. Department of Labor (online 




Child Labor Laws for Work Hours in a Formal Job, by State, as of January 1, 1997 
 
 Child Labor Law (from Table 4)  
State 
Under 20 Hrs. 
(14-15) 
20-39 Hrs.  
(14-15) 
40+ Hrs.  
(14-15) 
20-39 Hrs.  
(16-17) 
40+ Hrs.  
(16-17) # Laws 
Alabama +     1 
Alaska  +    1 
Arizona +     1 
Arkansas   +  + 2 
California +   +  2 
Colorado   +  + 2 
Connecticut +    + 2 
Delaware +     1 
District of Columbia   +  + 2 
Florida +   +  2 
Georgia   +   1 
Hawaii   +   1 
Idaho   +   1 
Illinois  +    1 
Indiana +    + 2 
Iowa  +    1 
Kansas   +   1 
Kentucky +    + 2 
Louisiana +     1 
Maine +   +  2 
Maryland  +    1 
Massachusetts   +  + 2 
Michigan +   +  2 
Minnesota   +   1 
Mississippi   +   1 
Missouri   +   1 
Montana  +    1 
Nebraska   +   1 
Nevada   +   1 
New Hampshire  +  +  2 
New Jersey +    + 2 
New Mexico      0 
New York  +  +  2 
North Carolina  +    1 
North Dakota +    + 2 
Ohio +     1 
Oklahoma +     1 
Oregon  +   + 2 
Pennsylvania +   +  2 
Rhode Island   +  + 2 
South Carolina +     1 
South Dakota  +    1 
Tennessee +     1 
Texas   +   1 
Utah   +   1 
Vermont   +  + 2 
Virginia +     1 
Washington +   +  2 
West Virginia   +   1 
Wisconsin +   +  2 
Wyoming   +   1 
 
Note: “+” indicates the law is in effect. Measures of centrality for # of laws: mode = 1; median = 1; mean = 1.392. 
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APPENDIX C 
Restrictions to Obtain NLSY Estimation Sample 
 
 N NT 
Initial sample 8,984 44,920 
Non-attrited sample 8,984 41,543 
Case-wise deletions   
17 years of age or younger at first interview 8,980 41,522 
At least two complete interviews 8,765 41,307 
Cell-wise deletions   
Valid data for problem behavior measures 8,764 40,652 
Valid data for work intensity 8,764 40,550 
Valid data on state of residence 8,764 40,323 
Final case-wise deletions   
At least two complete interviews 8,724 40,283 
% of initial sample 97.1 89.7 
% of non-attrited sample 97.1 97.0 
 




Interview Sequence of NLSY Estimation Sample (N = 8,724, NT = 40,283) 
 
Interview Sequence N % of N NT % of NT 
     
Five Complete Interviews     
11111 6,554 75.1 32,770 81.3 
     
Four Complete Interviews     
11110 472 5.4 1,888 4.7 
11101 276 3.2 1,104 2.7 
11011 232 2.7 928 2.3 
10111 243 2.8 972 2.4 
01111 87 1.0 348 0.9 
Subtotal 1,310 15.1 5,240 13.0 
     
Three Complete Interviews     
11100 216 2.5 648 1.6 
11010 65 0.7 195 0.5 
11001 76 0.9 228 0.6 
10101 30 0.3 90 0.2 
10011 87 1.0 261 0.6 
10110 41 0.5 123 0.3 
01011 9 0.1 27 0.1 
00111 11 0.1 33 0.1 
01110 8 0.1 24 0.1 
01101 10 0.1 30 0.1 
Subtotal 553 6.3 1,659 4.1 
     
Two Complete Interviews     
11000 177 2.0 354 0.9 
10100 44 0.5 88 0.2 
10010 28 0.3 56 0.1 
10001 46 0.5 92 0.2 
01001 2 0.0 4 0.0 
00011 4 0.0 8 0.0 
01100 4 0.0 8 0.0 
01010 2 0.0 4 0.0 
Subtotal 307 3.5 614 1.5 
     
 
Note: “1” denotes that the respondent completed the interview; “0” denotes that the 




Prospective Predictors of Work Status and Work Intensity during the 14-16 Age Span 
 
 Employed 14-16? Mean Work Intensity 
1997 Predictors 
No 
(N = 794) 
Yes 
(N =2,062 ) 
1-10 Hrs.  
(N = 463) 
11-20 Hrs.  
(N = 823) 
21-30 Hrs.  
(N = 479) 
31+ Hrs.  
(N = 297) 
       
Demographic Variables       
Male a,b 47.7% 52.9% 48.4% 50.5% 56.4% 62.3% 
Race/Ethnicity:       
White a,b 62.0% 73.4% 78.0% 76.4% 67.7% 65.5% 
Black a,b 22.2% 13.4% 10.3% 12.1% 16.2% 18.0% 
Hispanic a,b 15.0% 11.8% 9.9% 10.6% 14.6% 14.2% 












       
Residential Characteristics       
Housing Type:       
House, Condo, or Farm a,b 78.6% 83.1% 88.8% 83.6% 78.1% 79.5% 
Apartment a,b 13.1% 9.4% 5.7% 9.6% 11.4% 11.9% 
Other Housing b 8.3% 7.5% 5.5% 6.8% 10.4% 8.6% 












Residential Location:       
Suburbs b 53.7% 53.4% 59.2% 56.2% 45.5% 47.8% 
Central City 27.7% 26.0% 23.5% 25.9% 29.0% 26.1% 
Rural b 18.6% 20.5% 17.3% 17.9% 25.5% 26.1% 
Census Region:       
Northeast a,b 14.2% 19.3% 19.0% 21.4% 19.5% 12.6% 
Midwest a 19.4% 26.8% 25.4% 28.6% 26.7% 24.0% 
South a,b 42.8% 32.5% 28.8% 29.8% 35.5% 42.6% 
West b 23.6% 21.4% 26.7% 20.2% 18.3% 20.9% 
       
Family Economic Background       
Mother Figure Employed a 64.4% 75.4% 77.7% 75.3% 74.7% 72.1% 
Father Figure Employed a,b 87.5% 91.8% 95.8% 91.9% 90.4% 85.4% 
Mother Figure Education:       
Less than High School a,b 19.7% 15.6% 12.6% 13.0% 19.9% 23.1% 
High School Completion 36.4% 34.4% 30.7% 36.0% 34.8% 35.6% 
Some College a 36.0% 40.3% 43.5% 40.4% 38.2% 37.6% 
Some Graduate b 7.9% 9.6% 13.3% 10.6% 7.1% 3.7% 
Father Figure Education:       
Less than High School a,b 22.9% 14.6% 10.6% 12.7% 20.4% 19.6% 
High School Completion b 32.0% 34.1% 28.1% 35.2% 37.6% 37.6% 
Some College a,b 32.8% 38.6% 43.9% 39.5% 33.6% 32.5% 
Some Graduate b 12.4% 12.7% 17.4% 12.6% 8.3% 10.4% 












Low-Income Household a,b 31.2% 22.0% 16.1% 19.6% 26.7% 32.6% 
Received Government Aid b 47.9% 46.7% 36.8% 45.4% 52.7% 59.1% 
Participated in Head Start a,b 17.6% 13.9% 9.4% 12.5% 19.0% 18.3% 
No Medical Insurance a,b 12.3% 9.5% 7.9% 7.9% 10.1% 16.4% 












Early First Birth a,b 27.1% 21.8% 16.9% 19.2% 29.3% 26.7% 
Foreign-Born Parent(s) a 13.9% 10.0% 9.8% 9.7% 9.7% 11.7% 
       
Family Composition       












Family Structure:       
Both Biological Parents b 53.3% 54.6% 63.8% 55.5% 47.1% 47.9% 
Step Parent 12.7% 14.8% 13.5% 14.8% 17.2% 12.9% 
Biological Mother Only b 25.4% 24.0% 17.4% 24.1% 28.1% 28.3% 
Biological Father Only 3.2% 3.2% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6% 4.1% 
Other Arrangement a,b 5.0% 3.1% 2.4% 2.4% 3.3% 6.3% 
Deceased Parent(s) a 6.5% 3.4% 2.4% 3.7% 3.8% 4.1% 
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Relational & Instrumental Control       
Confide in Parent(s) a,b 65.2% 57.7% 65.3% 54.7% 53.2% 60.8% 
































































































       
School Performance & Disengagement       












Repeated a Grade a ,b 14.7% 9.4% 7.6% 7.6% 11.9% 14.7% 
Skipped a Grade 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 0.8% 0.0% 
Suspended from School b 19.9% 17.9% 11.6% 15.7% 21.8% 30.2% 
















































       
Religiosity & Time Use       
Religious Preference:       
Catholic b 29.1% 28.3% 27.9% 32.4% 25.9% 20.4% 
Baptist a,b 23.9% 19.0% 16.3% 16.4% 24.6% 22.3% 
Protestant a 31.6% 36.6% 39.7% 36.2% 35.1% 34.5% 
Other Religion 5.2% 5.1% 5.2% 5.0% 3.9% 7.1% 
No Religious Affiliation b 10.1% 11.1% 10.9% 10.0% 10.5% 15.8% 








































































       
Peer Association & Behavioral Autonomy       












Friends in a Gang b 14.3% 14.9% 10.6% 16.1% 16.7% 15.5% 
Unsupervised Dating a,b 25.8% 37.6% 29.1% 37.8% 44.2% 41.2% 
Earned an Allowance 58.4% 59.4% 58.4% 62.2% 57.8% 54.9% 
Worked in an Informal Job a,b 42.2% 56.4% 58.0% 57.8% 55.9% 49.5% 
       
Early Problem Behavior       
Ran Away from Home b 5.2% 6.2% 4.5% 5.5% 8.0% 8.9% 












Involved in Minor Property Crime a,b 35.6% 40.8% 30.3% 43.2% 46.6% 42.3% 
Involved in Serious Property Crime 1.8% 1.5% 1.2% 1.4% 1.4% 2.3% 
Involved in Income-Generating Crime b 6.9% 7.7% 5.6% 7.4% 7.8% 12.0% 
Committed Aggravated Assault b 14.9% 14.6% 10.1% 13.9% 16.4% 22.4% 
Carried a Handgun a,b 6.3% 8.3% 5.6% 8.3% 7.4% 15.1% 
Arrested for a Delinquent Offense b 3.8% 3.1% 1.7% 2.7% 3.9% 5.4% 












Smoked Cigarettes a,b 18.3% 27.6% 16.7% 28.5% 34.4% 32.6% 
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Drank Alcohol a,b 20.5% 25.5% 18.5% 26.9% 27.6% 30.2% 
Used Marijuana b 5.7% 7.4% 3.3% 7.6% 8.7% 11.6% 












Smoked Cigarettes a,b 5.5% 10.7% 7.2% 10.5% 12.6% 14.5% 
Drank Alcohol 6.6% 7.4% 5.4% 8.6% 7.6% 6.9% 
Binge Drank 1.9% 3.0% 1.7% 3.0% 4.1% 3.6% 
Used Marijuana a 1.8% 3.0% 1.9% 3.6% 2.5% 4.5% 
       
 
Note: a = difference between workers and non-workers is significant at p < .10 (two-tailed t-test); b = differences between work 
intensity groups are globally significant at p < .10 (F-test). Sample is composed of 2,856 youths 12-13 years old at the first 
interview with valid data on work status and work intensity. All statistics are computed using those cases with non-missing values. 









Demographic Variables  
Male =1 if youth is male. 
Race/Ethnicity:  
White =1 if youth is non-Hispanic white. 
Black =1 if youth is non-Hispanic black. 
Hispanic =1 if youth is Hispanic. 
Age at First Interview Age in years at the first (1997) interview (continuous). 
  
Residential Characteristics  
Housing Type:  
House, Condo, or Farm =1 if youth lives in a house, condo, townhouse, row house, farm, or ranch. 
Apartment =1 if youth lives in an apartment or flat. 
Other Housing =1 if youth lives in some other type of dwelling (e.g., hotel/motel, rooming house, 
trailer). 
Residential Mobility Mean number of different residences per year since age 12. 
Residential Location:  
Suburbs =1 if youth lives in MSA not in the central city. 
Central City =1 if youth lives in MSA in the central city. 
Rural =1 if youth does not live in MSA. 
Census Region:  
Northeast =1 if youth lives in Northeast region. 
Midwest =1 if youth lives in Midwest region. 
South =1 if youth lives in South region. 
West =1 if youth lives in West region. 
  
Family Economic Background  
Mother Figure Employed =1 if mother figure is employed. 
Father Figure Employed =1 if father figure is employed. 
Mother Figure Education:  
Less than High School =1 if mother figure did not complete high school. 
High School Completion =1 if mother figure finished the 12th grade. 
Some College =1 if mother figure completed up to four years of college. 
Some Graduate =1 if mother figure completed up to eight years of college. 
Father Figure Education:  
Less than High School =1 if father figure did not complete high school. 
High School Completion =1 if father figure finished the 12th grade. 
Some College =1 if father figure completed up to four years of college. 
Some Graduate =1 if father figure completed up to eight years of college. 
Household Income Gross household income in the previous year. 
Low-Income Household =1 if gross household income is less than $5,000 per person. 
Received Government Aid =1 if parent(s) ever received government aid since age 18 or since oldest child was 
born. 
Participated in Head Start =1 if youth ever attended an official, government-sponsored Head Start program. 
No Medical Insurance =1 if youth is not covered by health insurance that includes physician or hospital 
care. 
Number of Family Assets Number of different assets owned by parent(s): (1) real estate property, (2) pre-paid 
tuition savings account, (3) savings in a pension or retirement plan, (4) checking or 
savings account, (5) investments in government savings bonds or certificates of 
deposits, (6) investments in stocks or mutual funds, (7) automobiles or boats, (8) 
other assets or savings. 
Early First Birth =1 if biological mother was 19 or younger when first child born. 
Foreign-Born Parent(s) =1 if parent was not born in the United States. 
  
Family Composition  
Household Size Number of people that currently live in household. 
Family Structure:  
Both Biological Parents =1 if youth lives with both biological parents. 
Step Parent =1 if youth lives with a biological and step-parent. 
Biological Mother Only =1 if youth lives only with biological mother. 
Biological Father Only =1 if youth lives only with biological father. 
Other Arrangement =1 if youth has some other family arrangement (e.g., adoptive or foster parents, 
grandparent or other relative). 
Deceased Parent(s) =1 if at least one of youth’s biological parents is deceased. 
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Relational & Instrumental Control  
Confide in Parent(s) =1 if youth turns to parents first with emotional or relationship problems. 
Attachment to Mother Figure Sum of the number of statements about mother figure with which youth agrees or 
strongly agrees: (1) I think highly of her, (2) she is a person I want to be like, (3) I 
really enjoy spending time with her, (4) she usually praises me for doing well, (5) 
she usually criticizes me or my ideas (reverse coded), (6) she usually helps me do 
things that are important to me, (7) she usually blames me for her problems (reverse 
coded), (8) she usually makes plans with me and cancels for no good reason 
(reverse coded). 
Attachment to Father Figure Same as above, but with respect to father figure. 
Monitoring by Mother Figure Sum of the number of persons in youth’s life in which mother figure knows most 
things: (1) my close friends, (2) my close friends’ parents, (3) who I am with when 
I am not at home, (4) my teachers and what I am doing in school. 
Monitoring by Father Figure Same as above, but with respect to father figure. 
Decision-Making Autonomy Sum of the number of behaviors in which youth participates in setting limits either 
alone or jointly with parents: (1) how late youth stays out at night, (2) what kinds of 
T.V. shows and movies youth watches, (3) who youth can hang out with. 
Permissive Disciplinary Style Sum of the number of behavioral limits (curfew, T.V./movies, who youth hangs out 
with) in which parent responds to violation by (1) letting youth decide, (2) ignoring 
it, pretending it didn’t happen, or letting youth get away with it, or (3) sulking, 
pouting, or giving youth the silent treatment. 
Inductive Disciplinary Style Sum of the number of behavioral limits (curfew, T.V./movies, who youth hangs out 
with) in which parent(s) respond to violation by (1) discussing it calmly or (2) 
taking away a privilege, grounding, or giving chores. 
Parental Discord Sum of the number of statements about parental interaction style in which mother 
usually (1) is fair and willing to compromise in a disagreement (reverse coded), (2) 
screams or yells when angry, (3) expresses love and affection (reverse coded), (4) 
insults or criticizes, (5) encourages or helps spouse do things that are important to 
him/her (reverse coded), (6) blames spouse for problems. Same items scored for 
father. 
  
School Performance & Disengagement  
PIAT Math Percentile Math percentile on the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT). 
Repeated a Grade =1 if youth has ever repeated a grade. 
Skipped a Grade =1 if youth has ever skipped a grade. 
Suspended from School =1 if youth has ever been suspended from school. 
Number of School Fights Number of times youth got into a physical fight at school. 
Number of Times Late Number of times youth was late for school without an excuse. 
Number of Times Absent Number of times youth was absent from school. 
Positive School Attitudes Sum of the number of statements about school with which youth agrees or strongly 
agrees: (1) teachers are good, (2) teachers are interested in the students, (3) 
disruptions by other students get in the way of learning (reverse coded), (4) 
students are graded fairly, (5) there is a lot of cheating on tests and assignments 
(reverse coded), (6) discipline is fair, (7) I feel safe at school. 
  
Religiosity & Time Use  
Religious Preference:  
Catholic =1 if youth’s religious preference is Catholic. 
Baptist =1 if youth’s religious preference is Baptist. 
Protestant =1 if youth’s religious preference is Protestant (e.g., Methodist, Lutheran, 
Presbyterian, Episcopal). 
Other Religion =1 if youth’s religious preference is some other category (e.g., Jewish, Mormon, 
Hindu/Buddhist, Wicca). 
No Religious Affiliation =1 if youth claims no religious affiliation. 
Hours Spent on Homework Number of hours per weekday that youth typically spends doing homework. 
Hours Spent in Extracurricular Activities Number of hours per weekday that youth typically spends taking extra classes or 
lessons (e.g., music, dance, foreign language). 
Hours Spent Reading for Pleasure Number of hours per weekday that youth typically spends reading for pleasure. 
Hours Spent Watching T.V. Number of hours per weekday that youth typically spends watching television. 
Household Chores Number of days in the week that youth gets housework done (e.g., cleaning up after 
dinner, doing dishes, taking out the trash). 
Family Activities Sum of the number of weekdays that youth typically: (1) eats dinner with the 
family, (2) does something fun with the family (e.g., play a game, go to a sporting 
event, go swimming), (3) does something religious with the family (e.g., go to 
church, pray, read the scriptures). 
  
Peer Association & Behavioral Autonomy  
Antisocial Peer Affiliation Sum of the number of statements in which youth agrees that about half or more of 
his/her peers at school: (1) smoke cigarettes, (2) get drunk at least once a month, (3) 
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belong to a gang that does illegal activities, (4) use marijuana, inhalants, or other 
drugs, (5) cut classes or skip school. 
Friends in a Gang =1 if youth has any brothers, sisters, cousins or friends that belong to a gang. 
Unsupervised Dating =1 if youth has ever gone on a date or unsupervised social outing with a 
girl/boyfriend. 
Earned an Allowance =1 if youth received an allowance from family in the previous year. 
Worked in an Informal Job =1 if youth has ever worked in an informal job. 
  
Early Problem Behavior  
Ran Away from Home =1 if youth has ever run away from home (i.e., left home and stayed away at least 
overnight without parents’ prior knowledge or permission). 
Lifetime Delinquency Variety Sum of the number of delinquent/criminal behavior in which youth has ever 
engaged: (1) vandalism, (2) petty theft (under 50 dollars), (3) petty shoplifting, (4) 
petty larceny, (5) petty burglary, (6) petty robbery, (7) major theft (over 50 dollars), 
(8) major shoplifting, (9) major larceny, (10) major burglary, (11) major robbery, 
(12) vehicle theft, (13) “other” property crime (e.g., receiving, possessing, selling 
stolen property), (14) income from stolen property, (15) income from “other” 
property crime, (16) aggravated assault (i.e., assault with the intention of inflicting 
serious harm), (17) selling drugs, (18) selling marijuana, (19) selling hard drugs 
(heroin, cocaine, LSD, other drugs), (20) income from selling drugs, (21) carrying a 
handgun, (22) arrest for a delinquent or criminal offense (not including arrest for 
minor traffic violations). 
Involved in Minor Property Crime =1 if youth engaged in offenses (1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), or (9). 
Involved in Serious Property Crime =1 if youth engaged in offenses (5), (6), (10), (11), or (12) 
Involved in Income-Generating Crime =1 if youth engaged in offenses (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), or (20). 
Committed Aggravated Assault =1 if youth engaged in offense (16). 
Carried a Handgun =1 if youth engaged in offense (21). 
Arrested for a Delinquent Offense =1 if youth engaged in offense (22). 
Lifetime Substance Use Variety Sum of the number of substance use behavior in which youth has ever engaged: (1) 
smoked cigarettes, (2) had one or more drinks of alcohol (e.g., can or bottle of beer, 
glass of wine, mixed drink, shot of liquor), (3) smoked marijuana.  
Smoked Cigarettes =1 if youth engaged in offense (1). 
Drank Alcohol =1 if youth engaged in offense (2). 
Used Marijuana =1 if youth engaged in offense (3). 
Recent Substance Use Variety Sum of the number of substance use behavior in which youth has engaged in the 
past 30 days: (1) smoked cigarettes, (2) had one or more drinks of alcohol (e.g., can 
or bottle of beer, glass of wine, mixed drink, shot of liquor), (3) smoked marijuana, 
(4) drank five or more drinks in a single setting. 
Smoked Cigarettes =1 if youth engaged in offense (1). 
Drank Alcohol =1 if youth engaged in offense (2). 
Binge Drank =1 if youth engaged in offense (3). 
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